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Abstract 
In the present work, we focused on mind-wandering (MW). MW is a 
multidimensional mental state that absorbs parts of our waking life and can be defined 
as a shift of attention away from a current activity towards internal thoughts unrelated 
to the ongoing activity. Although neurocognitive studies on MW have increased 
substantially over the last years, there are still a number of overlooked questions. In 
particular, a number of researchers have indicated a need for investigations of the 
dynamics of this process. To this end, it would be especially important to focus on the 
two basic elements of MW experiences, specifically, the moment of the onset of MW 
episodes (i.e., when the flow of thoughts starts) and the maintenance of these episodes 
over time (i.e., what happens during the continuation of the flow). In our studies, we 
focused on identifying the ignition moment (i.e., the onset) of MW experiences, as 
well as investigating its dynamics over time. Here we report three empirical studies 
employing a vigilance task that allowed elicitation and analysis of MW episodes in the 
laboratory. Pupillometry was also employed both in the second and third study to 
assess the association between physiological and self-report measures. 
The three studies used different versions of the vigilance task, in which 
participants were asked to detect infrequent target stimuli among a number of non-
target stimuli and were eventually exposed to task-irrelevant verbal cues that could 
potentially act as triggers for MW episodes. MW was collected by using either a self-
caught procedure (first and third studies) or a probe-caught procedure (second study).  
Specifically, the first study was carried out for investigating the cue-dependent 
nature of MW and verifying whether MW episodes could be linked to preceding 
triggers. Thus, in a between-subject design, we studied the causal role of meaningful 
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external cues (i.e., verbal cues) in triggering MW experiences. We found that the 
exposure to the external cues increased the amount of MW and biased its temporal 
focus towards the past compared with a condition of no exposure to the cues.  
The second study was developed on the basis of the first one, with the main aim 
of associating a physiological measure (i.e., pupil diameter) to the onset and 
maintenance of MW experiences. The main finding was obtained by tracking pupil 
size over 6 seconds after MW triggers and non-triggers: we found a significantly larger 
pupil dilation following cues reported as triggers of the MW episodes compared to 
non-trigger cues. This suggested that the onset of MW and its unfolding over time 
were accompanied by a physiological marker (i.e., a pupil dilation). 
The third study was conducted with the main aim of replicating the results of the 
second study by using a different thought-sampling method, and extend them further. 
In particular, we used a self-caught procedure instead of a probe-caught procedure in 
order to track the pupil diameter following triggers of aware MW. We also examined 
whether and how the pupil dilation associated with MW was modulated by the 
emotional valence of MW. The main findings showed a significant increase in pupil 
diameter following triggers of aware MW compared to non-triggers, and this dilation 
appeared not to be modulated by the emotional content of MW.  
Collectively, these studies provided several contributions to neurocognitive 
research on MW. First, they demonstrated that the onset of MW episodes could be 
identified in the laboratory, since MW episodes were linked to external, meaningful 
and task-irrelevant stimuli. Second, they showed that a physiological index (i.e., pupil 
dilation) was associated with the onset of MW and accompanied its unfolding over 
time. Third, the use of the vigilance task with verbal cues and the self-caught procedure 
Abstract 
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allowed us to also explore the latency of MW episodes (i.e., the time for the formation 
of thought and being aware of it).  
In the general discussion, we report some implications of these findings for further 
investigations in MW research.    
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Chapter 1 
General introduction 
 
 
While attending a lecture, reading a book, or driving the car, there might be 
moments when our attention drifts away from the primary task towards internal 
thoughts, such as memories or prospective thoughts, whose content is unrelated to the 
ongoing task. Finding ourselves disengaging from a current activity and thinking about 
different thoughts unrelated to the ongoing activity is a common experience in our 
daily life. Often this attentional disengagement is also costly because it could be 
associated with worse performance or mistakes in the ongoing task. This cognitive 
phenomenon, referred to as mind-wandering (hereafter MW), is the focus of the 
present work. Specifically, our work aimed to address, in a series of studies, a key 
challenge still facing research on this topic, that is the question of the dynamics of 
MW, “when” the mind starts wandering (the onset of MW) and “how” MW unfolds 
over time (the maintenance of MW).  
In this introduction, we will briefly review the state-of-the-art of the research in 
this field, and we will focus on both conceptual (i.e., definition, functional 
mechanisms) and methodological issues (i.e., measurement). We will also briefly 
mention the costs and benefits of MW across different contexts. In the last section, we 
will introduce the aims of our multi-experiment study and provide an overview of the 
experiments.  
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1.1 Mind-wandering: definition  
With the term mind-wandering (MW) we refer to the “shift of attention away from 
a primary task toward internal information” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 946). 
Since the earlier studies in cognitive science (e.g., Antrobus, 1968; Klinger & Cox, 
1987-88; Singer, 1966) to the most recent and systematic ones (see Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015 for a review), the research focusing on this phenomenon has been 
framed into various constructs, and different terminologies have been used (Callard, 
Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013), such as task-unrelated imagery (Giambra, 
1995), daydreaming (Mar, Mason, & Litvack, 2012; Singer, 1966), stimulus-
independent thought (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Mason et al., 2007; 
Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993), task-unrelated thought (Smallwood et 
al., 2004; Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003), self-generated thought 
(e.g., Smallwood, 2013) or, more generally, off-task states (Franklin, Broadway, 
Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2013; Mittner et al., 2014). All of these lines of 
research addressed a certain mental state in which thoughts are unrelated to the 
external environment and the current situation, and these terms have been somewhat 
interchangeably used (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016; but 
see Seli et al., 2018 for a discussion on differences among these constructs). 
The term MW, which has rapidly become the most used in the field, was finally 
chosen with the specific intent to make this experience familiar to lay people and 
elevate the status of this research (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). However, 
conceptual confusion about the term MW, due to an attempt to capture the rich variety 
of this experience, has been also observed (see Seli et al., 2018). Here we adopt the 
term MW (unless differently specified because of the reference to other studies) and 
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define it as the experience of attentional shifting from an ongoing task and the external 
environment towards task-unrelated thoughts. 
Thus, on the basis of this definition, MW should be considered as a different 
experience compared with task-related thoughts or external distractions. This 
distinction is clearly reported by Smallwood and Schooler (2015) and represented in 
Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. A schematic of different attentional states based on the relationship between 
the dimensions of task-relatedness (columns) and reliance on external information (rows) 
(from Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
 
Smallwood and Schooler (2015) compared different attentional states that might 
be experienced during a task, that is (i) on-task (OT):  the participant is fully focused 
on the task and the contents of thoughts are only those that arise from task-related 
sensory input  (top left panel); (ii) external distractions (ED): the attention is focused 
on other external stimuli, unrelated to the ongoing task (e.g., noise in the room, 
temperature) (top right panel); (iii) task-related interferences (TRI): the attention is 
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distracted by interfering thoughts related to the appraisal of the current task, including 
evaluations about the task or about task performance (e.g., “What is the point of this 
task?!”); in this situation the contents of thoughts are related to the ongoing task but 
self-generated (i.e., unguided by sensory input) (bottom-left panel); (iv) mind 
wandering (MW): attention is drifted away from the ongoing task and external 
environment toward internal contents unrelated to the task; the contents are unrelated 
to the task and self-generated (i.e., unguided by sensory input) (bottom right panel). 
Recently, an additional off-task attentional state has been proposed to be distinct 
from MW, that is mind-blanking (MB; Ward & Wegner, 2013). Mind-blanking is 
defined as a state in which there are no inputs at all into conscious awareness, that is 
our attention is directed neither towards perceptual stimuli nor toward stimuli 
decoupled from the current situation. 
In the following, a brief description of task-related interferences (TRI), external 
distractions (ED) and mind-blanking (MB) is presented, in order to explain further the 
distinction between MW and these other attentional states.  
 
Task-related interferences (TRI) 
These thoughts are formed by contents somehow related to the task that people 
are currently performing and they include thoughts related to features of the task (e.g., 
I was wondering about the colour of the words in this book which I am reading) or to 
the own performance (e.g., I was thinking that I cannot remember what I have just 
read) (e.g., Smallwood, Baracaia, et al., 2003). Evidence has been reported that MW 
and TRI behave differently during a task (e.g., Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Reid, 2003; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011) and they also 
differ at the physiological level (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). For example, in the 
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laboratory study by Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al. (2011), participants were asked 
to perform the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) while being 
intermittently interrupted by probes asking them to report about their current 
attentional state. The comparison between MW and TRI revealed that, although both 
attentional states were associated with decreased performance in blocks in which they 
were reported (decreased accuracy to the target and increased variability in RTs), the 
frequency of TRI was not influenced by the time on task and block duration, whereas 
the frequency of MW increased with both variables. Moreover, the number of TRI 
were not related to global performance at the task. In a few studies on the relations 
among adult aging, MW and TRI, older adults reported more TRI and less MW than 
did younger adults (McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013; Zavagnin, Borella, & De 
Beni, 2014).  
Globally, these results highlight the importance of distinguishing between the two 
different attentional states. 
 
External distractions (ED) 
External distractions include thoughts about both exteroceptive stimuli (e.g., “I 
was thinking about the twitter of the birds”) and interoceptive stimuli (e.g., “I was 
thinking that I am hungry”). These thoughts are unrelated to the task at hand but they 
are clearly related to the external environment or the personal current situation. MW, 
on the contrary, is unrelated both to the task at hand and to the current situation.  
Indeed, as we will specifically discuss in Study 1 (see Chapter 2), MW might also 
be triggered by an external stimulus. However, the difference between ED and MW 
triggered by an external stimulus is that MW might start from an external stimulus but, 
afterwards, thoughts move away, drifting to other information (e.g., “While I was 
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listening to the birds, a memory from my childhood holidays spent in the countryside 
suddenly popped in my mind”) (see also Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015, for a 
discussion on this topic).  
Studies that directly compared ED and MW (self-generated) have shown 
differences between the two attentional states, at both behavioural (e.g., Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Catale, & D’Argembeau, 2014) and physiological level (Unsworth & 
Robison, 2016). For example, in a recent study on young adults and adolescents, 
Stawarczyk et al. (2014) found that adolescents experienced more frequent ED, but 
not more MW, than young adults during the Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART). Moreover, in young adults, after taking into account an attentional composite 
score (i.e., the combination of four measures of attentional abilities), only MW, but 
not ED, remained an independent predictor of task accuracy. These results show that 
MW cannot be entirely reduced to failures in the ability to maintain one's attention 
focused on task, and suggest that EDs rather than MW are due to attentional control 
failures. 
 
Mind-blanking (MB) 
To describe the experience of this state, we could say that our mind is nowhere 
and lacks any contents (e.g., “My mind was blank. I realized this when I was just 
staring blankly at a sentence and not reading it. I think I only stared at the sentence 
for a few seconds before I snapped out of it”, Ward & Wegner, 2013, p. 6).  
Authors suggested that mind-blanking might not be part of the same attentional 
cycling system of MW (Ward & Wegner, 2013), and that it might correspond to the 
short periods of microsleep that occur during monotonous and long-lasting tasks since 
its association with high level of sleepiness (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2016). On 
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the other hand, it has been found that mind-blanking is increased in both clinical and 
subclinical ADHD patients (Van den Driessche et al., 2017) suggesting that it could 
reflect deficiencies in metacognition or mixed/confused states occurring at the 
transition between other states, such that many short episodes of MW occur but fail to 
be sustained.  
 
1.2 Costs and benefits of mind-wandering 
After defining this cognitive experience, we could ask why neurocognitive 
research should focus on MW. Besides the importance on the theoretical level for 
cognitive science, its investigation is also worthy because of the several costs and 
benefits of MW (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
Indeed, it has been shown that MW is costly in educational contexts and learning 
environment, such that students who experience more MW episodes during lectures 
were found to have poorer memory for the lecture material (e.g., Lindquist & McLean, 
2011; Risko, Anderson, Sarwal, Engelhardt, & Kingstone, 2012; Smallwood, 
Fishman, & Schooler, 2007; Szpunar, Khan, & Shacter, 2013). For example, Lindquist 
and McLean (2011) found that participants who reported high rates of MW were also 
more likely to self-report that they took fewer notes, and they performed more poorly 
on a later exam. Moreover, Risko et al. (2012) reported that students spent a relative 
portion of time (around 40%) experiencing MW during lectures and, in their study, an 
increase in MW over the course of a video lecture was found to be negatively 
correlated with retention of lecture material. In a recent investigation of students’ self-
reports of their everyday attention failures, Unsworth, McMillan, Brewer, and Spillers 
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(2012) found that most self-reported attentional lapses occurred either while studying 
or in class, and that these lapses predicted subsequent standardized test scores.   
Besides these costs in educational contexts, studies also found that MW affects 
encoding of perceptual information (Smallwood et al., 2003), distorts interval timing 
discrimination (Terhune, Croucher, Marcusson-Clavertz, & Macdonald, 2017), or 
impairs face processing (Denkova, Brudner, Zayan, Dunn, & Jha, 2018). For example, 
Denkova et al. (2018) asked participants to perform a task in which they had to respond 
to upright faces (non-target stimuli) and withhold response to inverted faces (target 
stimuli) while being simultaneously probed about their mental experience (i.e., 
whether they were on-task or off-task). EEG data were also recorded throughout the 
task and the ERP analyses revealed an attenuated N170 (an ERP component 
consistently associated with face perception) response to non-target faces preceding 
reports of MW. 
Costs of MW have been also documented in driving (Galera et al., 2012; He, 
Becic, Lee, & McCarley, 2011; Yanko & Spalek, 2014). For example, Yanko and 
Spalek’s study (2014) examined the effects of MW on driving by using a driving 
simulator. Participants with driver’s licence were seated in a simulated driving 
environment and were asked to follow a pace car along a route while abiding by all 
traffic laws. At randomly times throughout the session, participants were probed by an 
auditory prompt and should indicate whether they were on-task or mind wandering. 
Results from two experiments showed that MW reports, compared to on-task reports, 
were associated with longer response times to sudden events, higher velocity, and 
shorter headway distance. The authors suggested that their results differentiate MW 
from dual-tasking (e.g., talking on a cell phone while driving). Indeed, they reported 
that dual-tasking has been found to promote longer headway distance (e.g., Strayer & 
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Drews, 2004) and slower velocity (e.g., Chiang, Brooks, & Weir, 2004), whereas in 
their study, MW was associated with shorter headway distance and higher velocity. 
In addition, Smallwood, Mrazek, and Schooler (2011) reported that the 
experience of MW may also have costs in medical contexts. Given that some aspects 
of a medical professional’s work (i.e., fatigue, low mood, highly practiced task) 
facilitate the tendency to mind wander, this mental experience is likely to occur 
frequently in medical contexts, and these authors suggested that “it has the potential 
to interfere with the information-gathering process upon which medical decisions are 
based” (p. 1078). 
Despite these negative effects, MW has also benefits in several important aspects. 
This mental experience can have a positive role in problem-solving abilities (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013), autobiographical planning and maintaining of 
goal-directed thoughts (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013) as well as a sense of self-
identity across time (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), since task-unrelated 
thoughts are highly self-relevant and engaged in mental time travel. 
A relationship has also been found between MW and reduced delay discounting 
(i.e., a tendency to opt for the smaller immediate reward over a larger future reward) 
such that the amount of MW during an undemanding task has been found to be 
associated with a greater resistance to the temptation of an immediate reward in favour 
of receiving a larger economic reward in the future (Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 
2013). 
Moreover, in the context of a creative task, performing an undemanding task 
(characterized by a high amount of MW) during the incubation break improved the 
subsequent divergent thinking (i.e., the unusual uses task) performance (Baird et al., 
2012; see also Leszczynski et al., 2017, for similar positive results on compound 
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remote associates performance). However, the results of the studies on the association 
between MW and creativity are still contradictory. For example, Hao, Wu, Runco, and 
Pina (2015) found that MW during creative idea generation was detrimental to 
divergent thinking (i.e., the alternative uses task). The results of a recent study by 
Agnoli, Vannucci, Pelagatti, and Corazza (2018) showed that trait-level measures of 
spontaneous and deliberate daily MW were differently associated to the originality 
score in a divergent thinking task (i.e., titles task), such that deliberate MW positively 
predicted creative performance, whereas spontaneous MW was negatively associated 
with that. These authors also suggested that research on the association between MW 
and creative thinking should perhaps take into account the different processes involved 
in creative thinking as well as different dimensions of MW. 
Also, the experience of MW can have positive effects in the short term, that are 
likely to be related to the increase in arousal levels. It has been proposed a functionality 
of MW for attentional-cycling and relief from boredom (Mooneyham & Schooler, 
2013): MW might allow us to switch between different trains of thought to maintain 
goal-appropriate behaviours for various goals simultaneously. In other words, during 
a boring or uninteresting task, our ability to mind-wander might be adaptive because 
it helps us to overcome the boredom and not to abandon the activity. The preliminary 
study of Baird, Smallwood, and Schooler (2010) gives initial support to this 
suggestion. They presented participants with a tedious task to perform for 45 minutes. 
The comparison between pre-task and post-task assessment of mood revealed that, 
although the mood was worse after the task, this drop was reduced the more MW 
people had. Perhaps MW can make us perceive the time as going faster than the actual 
time, resembling what happens with the time compression phenomenon in episodic 
memory retrieval (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2018). 
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A deeper understanding of MW and its underlying processes, therefore, might 
ultimately help to reduce the costs and boost the benefits of this ubiquitous mental 
experience. 
 
1.3 Measurement of mind-wandering 
Generally, triangulation between different methods is important to allow an 
explanation for cognitive processes that is not tied to a specific method. Therefore, it 
would be the optimal strategy also in the case of MW (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
In order to study MW experiences, researchers can possibly use self-report measures 
associated with behavioural as well as physiological ones in the same study. In the 
next sections, each of these measures will be separately described. We will specifically 
focus on how MW has been investigated in the laboratory, even though it is also 
possible to study this experience in daily-life by using mainly self-reports (e.g., Kane 
et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2017; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Maillet et al., 2018; 
Song & Wang, 2012).  
 
1.3.1 Behavioural paradigms 
Generally, MW is studied in the laboratory by asking participants to perform 
sustained attention tasks, that are not too demanding and are easily automatized. In 
some of these tasks, behavioural measures, such as amount of errors (e.g., Smallwood 
et al., 2004) or reaction times (e.g., Bastian & Sackur, 2013; McVay & Kane 2009, 
2012), can be also extracted by analysing the task performance, and these behavioural 
indexes have been associated to certain attentional states (i.e., MW periods) collected 
with self-report measures either during or after performing the tasks. A number of 
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different tasks have been used across studies. In the following, we will report some 
examples of the most used ones.   
The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) is a task used by a high percentage of studies (e.g., Christoff, 
Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Jackson, Weinstein, & Balota, 2013; 
Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016; Shrimpton, McGann, & Riby, 2017; Smallwood et al., 
2004; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2016; Stawarczyk et al., 2014; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). It is a go/no-go task in which participants are required to 
press a button in response to frequent non-target stimuli (e.g., digits from 1 to 9, except 
3) and inhibit the response to infrequent target stimuli (e.g., the digit 3) (but see also 
the semantic and perceptual versions of the task; e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; 
Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006). Given the nature of this task, it is sensitive 
to the tendency to automate behaviour (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Accuracy of 
response and reaction times can be recorded as measures of performance on the task 
and studies have found a relationship between these behavioural markers and off-task 
states (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011). For example, Smallwood et al. (2004) reported that task blocks in which 
task-unrelated thoughts occurred were associated with faster response times to non-
target stimuli than blocks in which attention was on-task. 
A task which has been developed more recently is the Metronome Response Task 
(MRT, Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; see also Laflamme, Seli, & Smilek, 2018, for 
the visual version of the MRT). This task more simply presents participants with tones 
interspaced by a blank interval and requires them to respond synchronously with each 
tone, via a key press (Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2013). Similarly to the SART, the MRT 
allows for measuring behavioural measures. For example, Seli, Cheyne, et al. (2013) 
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measured the rhythmic response times (i.e., the temporal intervals between the 
metronome onset and the button responses) and used the variance of these response 
times computed in a definite number of trials before reports of on-task and MW. They 
found that MW was associated with more behavioural variability than on-task reports. 
A third example of laboratory task used in MW studies is the Choice Reaction 
Times task (CRT; e.g., Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). It is an undemanding task in 
which participants are presented with a series of stimuli (e.g., digits) and are requested 
to make a choice only when certain target stimuli (e.g., digits characterised by a 
different font colour) appear on screen. When a target stimulus appears, participants 
have to press a button to decide whether the current digit is even or odd. This task is 
used for investigating MW in the laboratory because it can likely stimulate a high 
percentage of MW compared to more demanding tasks (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 
2011; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). 
Finally, reading tasks (e.g., Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; 
Franklin et al., 2013; Franklin, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2009; 
Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011) are also used to investigate MW in the laboratory and 
they are especially important for examining the costs of MW associated with reading 
behaviour (e.g., Franklin et al., 2011; Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, 2010; Schooler, 
Reichle, & Halpern, 2004). Typically, in these task participants are asked to read some 
text passaged and afterwards their text comprehension is evaluated. Moreover, the 
experience of MW during the reading is also assessed. By using this procedure, studies 
have found that MW was associated with worse performance in subsequent 
comprehension tests (e.g., Franklin et al., 2011, 2013). 
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1.3.2 Self-report sampling methods 
To collect self-reports about the contents of one’s mind, thought-sampling 
methods are employed. Three types of sampling methods are commonly used: probe-
caught, self-caught and retrospective method.  
 
Probe-caught method 
It is the method used by the vast majority of studies to sample MW. People are 
intermittently interrupted during a task and are asked (probed) about their experience 
immediately before the probe. Thought-probes can be presented randomly or pseudo-
randomly. Rarely, they can be also presented at a particular timing based on changes 
in some parameters. For example, based on known associations between changes in 
task performance and MW states, researchers can program online the appearance of 
thought-probes according to the current performance of participants on the task (e.g., 
Franklin et al., 2011). 
As for the time interval between two consecutive thought-probes, studies found 
that larger gaps between two consecutive probes are associated with greater reports of 
off-task thoughts (e.g., Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013). According to Seli, 
Carriere, Levene, et al. (2013), this could be explained by two possibilities: probe rates 
might affect either the experience of MW or the likelihood of reporting MW. These 
authors, however, argued for the second hypothesis on the basis of their findings. In 
their study, they found no relationship between the mean time between thought-probes 
and the variance of response times in the MRT. Since previous studies have, instead, 
found that variance of response times index MW experiences (e.g., Seli, Cheyne, et 
al., 2013; see section 1.3.1 of the present chapter), the authors suggested that the probe 
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rates might affect the likelihood of reporting MW without modifying the actual 
incidence of MW (Seli, Carriere, Levene, et al., 2013).  
When the probe appears, participants can be provided with different questions and 
different modality of response (see Weinstein, 2018). For example, some studies asked 
participants to simply indicate whether they were on-task or off-task (considered to 
reflect MW experiences) (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2009; Foulsham, Farley, & Kingstone, 
2013; Mason et al., 2007; Yanko & Spalek, 2014); others asked participants to choose 
an option between more precise categories about different attentional states (e.g., on-
task, MW, external distraction, task-related thoughts, Stawarczyk et al., 2014; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011) or about possible contents of thoughts (e.g., 
daydreams, personal worries or everyday things, Frank et al., 2015); others presented 
participants with a Likert Konishi scale ranging from “completely on-task” to 
“completely off-task” or vice versa (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009; Konishi, Brown, 
Battaglini, & Smallwood, 2017; Mittner et al., 2014). 
However, MW episodes can be also recorded by using experimenter-
classification (i.e., having participants report all of their possible thoughts verbatim 
and having judges classify thought-reports) instead of self-classification (i.e., having 
participants choose if they had MW or not) (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). It means 
that open-ended questions about one’s experience can be also employed instead of 
requesting participants to classify their thoughts into distinct categories proposed by 
researchers (e.g., on-task vs. off-task). Thus, open-ended questions ask participants to 
describe the contents of their mind by their own words and, afterwards, these contents 
are classified by judges. By asking participants to describe their attentional state, it is 
possible not to inform them about the attentional states categories before starting a 
certain task. It is especially important in psychological studies where participants’ 
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beliefs regarding the purpose of an experiment should be controlled despite the fact 
that the knowledge of the specific phenomenon is necessary to permit the self-report 
investigation (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Moreover, it has been proposed that sometimes participants have difficulty 
classifying their mental contents into the fixed categories provided (Seli, Jonker, 
Cheyne, Cortes, & Smilek, 2015). It may be that, on certain occasions, it is not clear 
to participants whether they are completely focused on a task or not but they have not 
the possibility to choose an intermediate state. For example, Seli, Jonker, et al. (2015) 
asked participants to perform the MRT while presenting them with thought-probes 
asking them to indicate whether they were on-task or in a MW state (i.e., a 
dichotomous response). Participants were also required to indicate their confidence in 
the report they provided on a 5-point scale. A behavioural marker of MW (i.e., 
variability in participants’ response times) was also computed. The findings showed 
that participants reported various level of confidence ratings and that the association 
between MW reported and responses’ variability was moderated by participants’ level 
of confidence: the higher the level of confidence reported, the stronger the association 
of MW and responses’ variability. This suggests that, by using thought-probes with a 
simple dichotomous response modality, participants do not always find easy to classify 
their answers (but see Meier, 2018). 
Finally, it has been reported (Weinstein, 2018; see also Weinstein, De Lima, & 
van der Zee, 2018) that differences in the specific question asked to participants at the 
moment of thought-probe and in the response modality may influence the actual report 
of the experience of MW. Thus, open-ended questions (such as “What were you 
thinking just before?”) may overcome problems related to the effects that response 
modality or formulation of the questions (“Were you on-task?” vs. “Where you off-
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task?”) may have on MW reports (Weinstein, 2018). They may be also useful for 
studying the heterogeneity of thought-contents (Seli et al., 2018; Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013) without providing selected categories prearranged by the 
researcher that force the individual to put her/his thought into one of them, losing the 
peculiarity of its content. Collecting and analysing large samples of open-ended reports 
by using text-mining techniques would contribute, for example, to revealing unknown 
features of MW (Seli et al., 2018). 
 
Self-caught method 
This method requires participants to self-report, by pressing a button, when they 
realise that their attention is disengaged from the task. In other words, they have to 
stop any specific task they are doing every time they catch their mind not to be on-
task. Specific instructions are given to participants to inform them to stop the task for 
reporting MW states or off-task generally (e.g., Jackson et al., 2013; Kopp, D’Mello, 
& Mills, 2015; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). After participants stop the 
task, they may be asked to resume the ongoing task (e.g., Cunningham, Scerbo, & 
Freeman, 2000) or they may be required to answer few other questions about their 
specific mental state (e.g., Drescher, Van den Bussche, & Desender, 2018; Jackson et 
al., 2013). The self-caught approach is different from the previous one in the way that 
participants have to monitor their thoughts in order to report when their attention is not 
focused on task. 
 
Retrospective method 
Sampling MW retrospectively means that MW experiences are collected at the 
end of a task via questionnaires. On the one hand, differently from the previous 
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methods, this approach preserves the natural time-course of the task (Smallwood et al., 
2012) and this is especially important for obtaining certain objective measures 
simultaneously, such as fMRI (e.g., Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011). On the 
other hand, the retrospective measurement has several intrinsic limitations, such as the 
risk of forgetting some material or being confounded with individual differences 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
The most used retrospective questionnaire is the Thinking Component of the 
Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Matthews et al., 1999). Specifically, it is 
composed of 16 items that allow the measurement of the frequency of both task-
unrelated thoughts (8 items; e.g., “I thought about an event in the recent past”) and 
task-related interferences (8 items; e.g., “I thought about how poorly I performed”). 
Participants rate their answers on a 5-point scale (ranging from 1 = never, to 5 = very 
often) and subscale averages (both task-unrelated thoughts and task-related 
interferences) are computed. The task-unrelated thoughts scale is used as measure for 
MW frequency. 
 
1.3.3 Psychophysiological measures 
In addition to the measures described above, psychophysiological and 
neurocognitive measures have been also collected in MW investigations. Some 
examples are: ocular measures (such as eye-movements, blinks, pupil activity; e.g., 
Foulsham et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2012; Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010), 
EEG (Barron et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2011; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 
2008; Xu, Friedman, & Metcalfe, 2018), fMRI (Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 
2007), heart-rate response and skin conductance (Ottaviani & Couyoumdjian, 2013; 
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Smallwood et al., 2004) or spontaneous movements and fidgeting (Carriere, Seli, & 
Smilek, 2013; Seli, Carriere, Thomson, et al., 2013). 
For example, the combination of the eye-movements recording with self-report 
measures has been important in the context of reading, in that by collecting MW 
reports while participants read passages of text and their eye-movements were 
recorded, it has been found that MW reports were associated with fewer and longer 
fixations, and less responsive ocular activity to linguistic features (e.g., word 
frequency effect) (e.g., Foulsham et al., 2013; Frank et al., 2015; Reichle et al., 2010; 
Smilek et al., 2010). Moreover, Smilek and colleagues (2010) also found that blink 
rate was higher when participants were in a MW state than when they were in an on-
task state. 
Moreover, the coupling between self-reports and neurocognitive measures has 
been crucial for revealing the main brain areas associated with MW (e.g., Christoff et 
al., 2009; see section 1.6 of the present chapter for further discussion). Finally, the 
association between physiological measures with self-reports, and behavioural ones 
has also been significant for providing validity to the self-report procedures themselves 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
 
1.4 Contents and phenomenology of mind-wandering 
Studies on MW have consistently shown that it encompasses a considerable 
heterogeneity of experiences (Seli et al., 2018; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Wang et al., 2018) and it can vary on a number of dimensions (e.g., Seli, Ralph, Risko, 
et al., 2017). In this section we will focus on three main dimensions by which MW 
experiences can be differentiated, namely the temporal focus (i.e., whether the content 
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of MW is related to the past, the present or the future), the meta-awareness (i.e., 
whether an individual is aware or not that she/he was wandering) and the dimension 
of intentionality/spontaneity of thoughts (i.e., whether an individual is engaged in MW 
with conscious intention). 
 
Temporal focus 
MW episodes may have contents related to past episodes, present circumstances, 
future plans or even atemporal considerations (“timeless MW”, Jackson et al., 2013). 
The temporal focus of mental contents is assessed with a specific question presented 
during the task whenever participants report being in a MW state (e.g., Smallwood et 
al., 2009) or in a questionnaire after the completion of the task (e.g., Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). Many studies reported a bias towards the future in MW 
contents both in the laboratory and in daily-life (e.g., Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 
2011; Ruby et al., 2013; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011) 
and this characteristic is interpreted as a reflection of the functional value of MW in 
enabling the anticipation and planning of relevant future goals (e.g., Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013). However, it has been also found that a number of variables 
may affect the temporal focus of thoughts. These factors include individual’s 
characteristics, such as mood (e.g., Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011), working memory capacity (Baird et al., 2011), task interest and 
experience with a topic (Smallwood et al., 2009) as well as context’s features, such as 
task demands (Smallwood et al., 2009), self-reflection prior to perform a task 
(Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011), illusion of self-motion (Miles, Karpinska, 
Lumsden, & Macrae, 2010) or visuo-spatial processing (Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, 
& Brugger, 2018).  
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In particular, as for the individual’s characteristics, these studies found that 
negative mood was associated with retrospective MW, both when inducing negative 
mood and measuring MW in laboratory (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011) and when 
measuring the mood and the temporal focus of MW with experience-sampling 
questions in daily-life (Poerio et al., 2013). Variables affecting the temporal focus of 
thoughts were also found in the context of reading (Smallwood et al., 2009, 
Experiment 2), such that individuals with low interest and high experience with the 
subject matter showed a retrospective bias in MW collected during the reading task, 
whereas disinterested individuals with low experience in the subject mater tended to 
prospect. 
As for the context’s features affecting the temporal focus of MW, Smallwood et 
al. (2009) showed that higher task demands make the prospective bias disappear. 
Indeed, they found that when participants performed an undemanding task (i.e., both 
CRT and Passive Viewing), they were more inclined to report future-related thoughts, 
whereas when they performed a task which requested continuous monitoring (i.e., 
Working Memory Task), this prospective bias was absent (Smallwood et al., 2009). 
On the contrary, a period of self-reflection (i.e., a writing task in which participants 
described one or two of their most important current personal projects and the steps 
that should be taken for reaching them) before performing a sustained attention task 
was found to stimulate future-related MW during the task (Stawarcyzk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011). Specifically, in this study, the condition of self-reflection was realised by 
asking participants to perform a writing task, in which they had to describe one or two 
of their most important current personal projects and the steps that should be taken for 
reaching them. This condition was, next, compared with a condition of mental 
navigation, in which participants had to describe the itinerary from the building where 
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the experiment took place to a well-known location. From the comparison between 
these two conditions, an increase in future-oriented MW emerged in the condition of 
self-reflection (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). Finally, another line of 
research investigating the influence of context’s features is the one demonstrating how 
the manipulation of spatial information (apparent movement and visuo-spatial 
processing) might alter the temporal focus of thoughts, such that the induction of 
backward vection (i.e., illusion of self-motion) or leftward orienting attention (by 
means of visual arrows) increased the proportion of past-related MW compared to 
future-related MW, whereas a reverse pattern was found with the induction of forward 
vection or rightward orienting attention (Miles et al., 2010; Vannucci et al., 2018). 
 
Meta-awareness 
A second dimension by which MW episodes can be differentiated is the awareness 
of thoughts. The final stage of a MW state is the moment that people notice the current 
contents of their thoughts and they realise that these thoughts were unrelated to the 
activity that they were performing (Schooler, 2002). However, people do not always 
notice that their mind is wandering, and sometimes MW episodes occur without people 
realising consciously that their mind is wandering. Indeed, meta-awareness is 
considered as an intermittent process by which people only periodically notice the 
contents of their mind (Schooler et al., 2011). Two main methodologies are used to 
measure these episodes which are referred to as “unaware MW”. The first one consists 
in the combination of self-caught and probe-caught sampling methods throughout the 
same task (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Self-caught methods 
require participants to press a button to report when their attention is not focused on 
the task and allow, therefore, to catch those MW episodes which are consciously 
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noticed by participants. Probe-caught methods, on the contrary, present participants 
with probe asking them to report the state of their attention at that time and allow to 
catch both aware and possibly unaware MW episodes. When they are combined in the 
same task, whether thought-probes catch MW episodes before people self-caught 
them, it is considered as an index of unaware MW. Thus, by comparing probe-caught 
reports with self-caught reports it is possible to measure the relative amount of aware 
and unaware MW. A number of studies employed this approach for investigating the 
awareness of thoughts in different circumstances (e.g., Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, 
Mrazek, & Schooler, 2013; Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Sayette, Schooler, & 
Reichle, 2010; Schooler et al., 2004) and the same procedure is also used for other 
spontaneous thought processes (i.e., trauma intrusions, Takarangi, Strange, & Lindsay, 
2014). For example, Sayette and colleagues (2009) used this methodology to 
investigate the role of alcohol intoxication on MW. In their study, social drinkers 
performed a reading task after consuming a moderate dose of alcohol or a placebo 
beverage. The combination of thought-probes and self-interruptions to report MW 
throughout the task revealed that alcohol increased the likelihood of probe-caught MW 
but unaffected the likelihood of self-caught reports. These results suggest that alcohol 
increased MW while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of noticing it. Similar 
findings were also shown with cigarette craving (Sayette et al., 2010). The 
combination between self-caught and probe-caught methods also contributed to reveal 
that aware MW episodes (i.e., those self-caught MW episodes) were reported to be 
more verbal (i.e., in the form of inner speech) compared to probe-caught MW episodes, 
which are considered to include less aware thoughts (Bastian et al., 2017). 
The second approach for measuring awareness of MW consists in a self-
classification/judgment of aware and unaware states (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood 
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& Schooler, 2015). Participants are presented with thought-probes asking about the 
focus of their attention and whether they were aware that they were experiencing 
thoughts unrelated to the task. The question about awareness may be asked by using a 
Likert scale, ranging from completely aware to completely unaware (Christoff et al., 
2009) or by using a dichotomous choice between aware MW (known as tune-outs) and 
unaware MW (known as zone-outs) (e.g., Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007, 
2008). By using this approach, it has been shown that unaware MW is associated with 
poorer task performance (Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2007, 2008), greater 
disruptions of everyday tasks (McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009), increases in the risk 
of an accident while driving a car (Cowley, 2013) and higher level of depression 
(Deng, Li, & Tang, 2014). For example, Smallwood, McSpadden, et al. (2008) asked 
participants to read a detective novel and to try solving the crime. Tune-outs and zone-
outs were collected throughout the task. Results showed that the occurrence of zone-
outs were more disruptive for solving the crime. 
 
Intentionality  
The other dimension that has been increasingly becoming important in the 
investigation of MW is intentionality of thoughts. An early distinction between 
controlled and uncontrolled shifts of attention (Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Shaw & 
Giambra, 1993) proposed that voluntary shifts of attention away from a task seem to 
involve higher orders of control in information processing, to be motivationally 
determined and more benign compared to involuntary uncontrolled shifts. Although 
most research on MW has not considered this distinction between spontaneous and 
deliberate experiences of MW, several studies have recently shown that they are 
indeed dissociable cognitive experiences (e.g., Agnoli et al., 2018; Carriere et al., 
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2013; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016; Vannucci & Chiorri, 2018). To 
investigate separately these two forms online in the laboratory, a variant of the thought-
probe method is commonly used, namely participants are presented with probes asking 
them to indicate whether their mind was spontaneously or deliberately wandering. 
Studies found that participants also report some intentional MW episodes during 
laboratory tasks (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2009; Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 
2015; Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016) and that these deliberate MW increases with lower 
motivation in performing the task (Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2015). Moreover, deliberate 
and spontaneous forms seem to be differently affected by certain experimental 
manipulations (Phillips, Mills, D’Mello, & Risko, 2016; Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016) 
and to reflect different contents (Seli, Ralph, Konishi, Smilek, & Schacter, 2017). 
However, an important contribution to understanding the two kinds of MW has 
been provided by research on individual differences in MW. Two self-report scales 
were developed to assess deliberate and spontaneous forms of everyday MW (Mind-
Wandering: Deliberate and Mind-Wandering: Spontaneous scales, Carriere et al., 
2013; see also Chiorri & Vannucci, 2018). These are four-item self-report scales that 
are scored using a 7-point Likert scale. Individuals have to select the answer that most 
accurately reflects their everyday MW, and higher scores reflect a greater tendency to 
engage in MW deliberately or spontaneously. By using these scales, studies have 
shown that these two forms are associated with different psychological dimensions 
(e.g., facets of mindfulness in Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015; attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptomatology in Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & Smilek, 
2015; obsessive-compulsive disorder symptomatology in Seli, Risko, Purdon, & 
Smilek, 2017; fidgeting in Carriere et al., 2013; creativity in Agnoli et al., 2018; self-
reflection and self-rumination in Vannucci & Chiorri, 2018) and cortical thickness 
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(Golchert et al., 2017). For example, Carriere and colleagues (2013) showed that self-
report measures of fidgeting behaviour were predicted by trait-level measures of 
spontaneous MW and not deliberate MW. By using the same trait-level measures, 
Agnoli and colleagues (2018) found that deliberate MW positively predicted 
originality scores in a divergent thinking task (i.e., Titles task), whereas spontaneous 
MW was negatively associated with the same dimension. 
Given the substantial differences between spontaneous and intentional MW, 
collapsing the two types of MW together might be detrimental for research. Recent 
studies investigated the association between the two dimensions of awareness and 
intentionality of MW episodes (e.g., Seli, Ralph, Risko, et al., 2017). Spontaneous MW 
episodes should lack of conscious initiation; thus, individuals should not be meta-
cognitively aware that their mind is starting to wander. Once these episodes are 
detected, people might experience surprise or a feeling of a lack of control. However, 
these MW episodes started spontaneously may be possibly continued intentionally 
when individuals become aware of them. By contrast, deliberate MW episodes are 
necessarily associated with a conscious intention to initiate wandering; still, after the 
initiation, individuals may become so absorbed in their flow of thoughts that they 
eventually lose awareness of they thoughts. Seli, Ralph, Risko, et al. (2017) performed 
a study in order to explore the potential overlap between these two dimensions. In the 
study, awareness of thoughts was measured by using the combination between self-
caught and probe-caught methods, while intentionality was asked by using a 
dichotomous modality (intentional task-unrelated thoughts vs. unintentional task-
unrelated thoughts). Participants performed a sustained attention task (the MRT) and 
were asked to self-catch any MW episode throughout the task and indicate whether 
this thought was intentional or spontaneous. They were also presented with thought-
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probes asking about their preceding attentional state and the relative intentionality. 
Self-caught reports of MW were considered as aware MW episodes, whereas probe-
caught MW episodes were considered as unaware MW episodes. The authors observed 
that if meta-awareness and intentionality are redundant dimensions, we should not 
expect that deliberate MW episodes are associated with no meta-awareness of its 
occurrence and that unintentional MW episodes are associated with meta-awareness. 
On the contrary, their findings showed that participants reported a significant (non-
zero) rate of intentional MW to thought-probes (i.e., considered as unaware) (12%) 
and a significant (non-zero) rate of spontaneous MW to self-caught (i.e., considered as 
aware) (74%). Thus, these authors suggested that intentionality and meta-awareness 
may overlap only at the initial point of a MW episode and, subsequently, they 
dynamically fluctuate as the episode continues. 
   
1.5 Psychological bases of mind-wandering: four hypotheses 
Over the last years, increasing attention has been paid to the investigation of the 
psychological bases of MW: why does our mind wander? Why does it wander so 
much? Following Smallwood (2013), we can identify four different hypotheses on the 
cognitive and motivation bases of mind-wandering. In the following, these theoretical 
accounts are briefly reviewed. 
 
1.5.1 The executive failure hypothesis 
According to the executive failure hypothesis (McVay & Kane, 2010), MW 
experiences reflect temporary failures in executive maintenance of goal-relevant 
information. MW is viewed as a form of distraction which would be prevented by an 
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executive-control system. This control system is known to use both a proactive 
component (i.e., when executive-control is proactively initiated and maintained in 
response to task demands) and a reactive component (i.e., when executive-control is 
reactively initiated to suppress the interference of task-unrelated thoughts as they are 
started and automatically generated). In this view the internal train of thoughts of MW 
is activated in a resource-free manner, due to temporary executive-control failures. 
Some empirical support to this hypothesis has been provided by studies on individual 
differences in executive functions and MW. Specifically, these studies found negative 
correlations between off-task thought and executive control abilities during complex 
span tasks, sustained attention tasks, and reading (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012; 
Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). However, this hypothesis does not explain the positive 
correlation between working memory capacity and task-unrelated self-generated 
thoughts in undemanding conditions (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; 
Rummel & Boywitt, 2014).  
In contrast with the executive-failure account, Smallwood (2010) proposed the 
global availability hypothesis (see also the executive-control hypothesis, by 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), which suggests that MW experiences require executive 
resources instead. As these experiences reach the consciousness, they are globally 
available to the system and consume temporarily information-processing resources. 
Thus, instead of preventing MW, executive-resources would enable these task-
unrelated thoughts.  
According to this account, MW occurs when personal relevant information 
become available to the system, obtain privileged access to the global workspace 
(global workspace theory; Baars, 1997) and, consequently, necessitate cognitive 
resources. Since the global workspace availability is limited, MW compete for the 
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same resources as task-related information. Strong empirical support for this claim 
comes from the studies on the negative effects of cognitive load of the task (i.e., 
perceptual load in Forster & Lavie, 2009; Poh, Chong, & Chee, 2016; working 
memory load in Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Smallwood et al., 2009) on the frequency 
of MW: MW decreases when the attentional and working-memory demands of the task 
increase. Moreover, when MW does occur during tasks relying on working memory, 
performance decline (e.g., Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009). 
Recently, Smallwood (2013) has tried to reconcile the two contrasting hypotheses 
(executive-failure and global availability) proposing that the two accounts explain 
different aspects/moments of the dynamics of MW. Specifically, the executive-failure 
hypothesis might explain MW occurrence whereas the global availability hypothesis 
might explain the maintenance of MW over time. The process-occurrence framework 
proposed by Smallwood (2013) is further described later in this chapter.  
 
1.5.2 The decoupling hypothesis 
When MW occurs, attention becomes divided between external and internal 
information. The decoupling hypothesis suggests that, during MW, processing of 
perceptual stimuli is attenuated in favour of internal thoughts (Schooler et al., 2011; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).  
 Importantly, attention becomes decoupled from the external information only 
once internal thoughts are already initiated and are turned into the target of attention 
(Smallwood, 2013). Although perceptual decoupling would be necessary for a 
coherent internal train of thoughts to continue, it might take place for two possibilities: 
(i) it might be simply a consequence of limited attentional resources that have stopped 
to process external information (resource competition account), or (ii) it might play a 
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specific functional role in inhibiting the processing of information unrelated to the 
internal thoughts in order to facilitate a focus on personal information (maintenance 
account) (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Either way, it is clear that during MW there 
should be reduced attention to the external inputs and the representations of 
environmental stimuli should be superficial (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).  
Evidence for perceptual decoupling comes from behavioural investigations 
showing decreased accuracy and increased RT variability during sustained attention 
tasks (McVay & Kane, 2009; Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2013) and impaired text 
comprehension during reading tasks (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004). For example, in the 
context of reading, it has been found that periods of MW during the reading of text-
passages were associated with poorer text comprehension compared to period of on-
task focus, demonstrating that MW experienced during the reading affected 
participants’ ability to comprehend the text (Schooler et al., 2004).  
Moreover, attenuated neural processing of external stimuli during MW has been 
primarily investigated using ERPs (e.g., Kam et al., 2011; Kam, Nagamatsu, & Handy, 
2014; Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008). Using the SART, Smallwood, Beach, et al. 
(2008) found attenuated P3 to nontarget stimuli immediately preceding both 
commission errors and subjective reports of MW. However, some subsequent studies 
did not consistently find a significant reduction in the P3 as a function of MW reports 
(Kam et al., 2011, Experiments 2 and 3; Kam et al., 2016). Inconsistencies were also 
reported for early sensory components, such as the P1. Smallwood, Beach, et al. (2008) 
and Denkova et al. (2018) failed to observe attenuation in the P1 during MW, whereas 
Kam et al. (2011) found this pattern. 
As recently suggested by Denkova and colleagues (2018), possible explanations 
of these contradictory findings may lie in methodological differences related to the 
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task (and its cognitive load) and the task stimuli: the load of the task and the complexity 
of the task stimuli might influence how the external information is processed during 
MW. 
 
1.5.3 The current concerns hypothesis 
This hypothesis originates from the fact that (i) individuals are committed to goals 
and wishes which extend the here and now, referred to as current concerns1 (e.g., 
Klinger, 2013; Klinger, Gregoire, & Barta, 1973), and (ii) the mental life is driven by 
the most salient experiences. According to the current concerns hypothesis, thus, MW 
experiences occur when external information is poor/uninteresting and personal 
internal information has greater salience and relevance, capturing the focus of the 
individual’s attention (Klinger, 2013; Smallwood, 2013). In this view, MW 
experiences would occur more frequently when internal information has higher value 
than external perceptual information. In addition, the individual’s commitment to 
current concerns (both positive and negative) sensitise the individual to respond to 
cues associated with her/his goals and the cues are automatically processed with 
priority (irrespective of whether noticing these cues is conscious or not). The thematic 
content of thoughts would be determined by individual’s goals as well (Klinger, 2013). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Klinger (1978) demonstrated the effects of 
personal goals on attention and thought content. He assessed participants’ concerns 
and, a few days later, asked them to listen and pay attention to two distinct but similar 
audiotaped narratives which were played simultaneously, one narrative to each ear. At 
                                                             
1 More specifically, according to Klinger (2009, 2013), goal pursuits have beginnings and 
ends. The beginning is the commitment to that specific goal pursuit, whereas the end is the 
achievement of the goal. Between these two states, there is a latent state which is a current 
concern. 
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some point on this tape, a few words going to one ear had been modified in order to 
relate to participant’s own goals, whereas a few words going, simultaneously, to the 
other ear had been modified in order to relate to someone else’s goals. During the 
listening, participants could choose, by using a toggle switch, which narrative they 
paid attention to. Ten seconds after the end of each modified passage, the tape stopped 
and participants had to report what they were thinking about and the last content that 
they could recall from the tape. Results showed that participants spent more time 
listening to sections associated with their own goals than to sections associated with 
other participants’ goals. They also recalled those passages about twice compared to 
non-concern related passages, and had thought content that was related to concern-
related passages about twice compared to the opposite passages (Klinger, 1978). 
Further support to this view comes from more recent studies which have shown 
that thinking and writing an essay about personal current concerns increase MW (and 
especially future-oriented MW) during a subsequent task (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011) and that also simply listing immediate personal future goals promotes MW 
(but not TRI) during a subsequent reading task (Kopp et al., 2015). Other authors found 
that embedding cues related to personal current concerns into the SART increases the 
frequency of participants’ reported MW (McVay & Kane, 2013; see Chapter 2 for 
further discussion on this study about the relation between MW and external cues). 
 
1.5.4 The meta-awareness hypothesis 
A factor that influences the likelihood of MW occurrence is the meta-awareness 
(Smallwood, 2013). The capacity to re-represent the current contents of consciousness 
would allow the identification of thoughts that diverge from the actual task-related 
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goal. As we already reported previously, people are not always aware of their mind’s 
contents, they are only intermittently aware of it (Schooler et al., 2011).  
According to this hypothesis, a breakdown in meta-awareness of mental contents 
causes the decoupling of the attention from perception, facilitating MW experiences 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Consequently, authors have proposed that restoring 
meta-awareness could help the individual to control her/his frequency of MW 
(Schooler et al., 2011). For example, mindfulness training could have beneficial effects 
on MW related disruptions, as this practice encourages individuals to routinely notice 
the current contents of their mind. Indeed, it has been found that an 8-min. mindful 
breathing exercise reduced behavioural indices of MW during a sustained attention 
task performed after the mindful breathing exercise (Mrazek et al., 2012) and that a 2-
weeks mindfulness training program decreased MW during both reading and working 
memory performance (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013). 
 
1.6 Neural bases of mind-wandering 
Over the last decade, a body of research has proposed a heterogeneous brain 
network, referred to as Default Mode Network (DMN), as the principal brain system 
supporting MW and spontaneous thought processes (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, 
Huang, & Buckner, 2010; Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Christoff et al., 2009, 2016; Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Mason et al., 2007). The DMN was originally 
identified as a set of brain regions consistently deactivated across externally oriented 
tasks (Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997) or by varying task-related variables 
(such as stimulus presentation rate, target discriminability or short term memory load) 
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(McKiernan, Kaufman, Kucera-Thompson, & Binder, 2003), and activated during 
passive experimental control tasks (Mazoyer et al., 2001), such that it was defined as 
“task-negative network” (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Other evidence showed that it 
is recruited in tasks requiring participants to retrieve episodic, autobiographical, or 
semantic information, imagine novel scenes, think about future scenarios or appraise 
emotional information (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009); all of 
them are activities that need active self-generation of mental contents in order to 
complete the task-goal (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). 
To illustrate the areas comprised into this network, we can fractionate it in 
different sub-systems, each of which arguably has a distinct functional contribution to 
MW (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & 
Buckner, 2010; Christoff et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016). The first sub-system, 
considered to be the core of the network, is composed of the anterior part of the medial 
prefrontal cortex (amPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). The second sub-
system is centred around the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and includes the 
hippocampal formation, the parahippocampal cortex and cortical projections (such as 
the retrosplenial cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex - vmPFC). The third 
sub-system includes the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the lateral temporal 
cortex, the temporopolar cortex (TPC), parts of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the 
temporoparietal junction. Each sub-system seems to also include a different part of the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Christoff et al., 2016). 
These DMN areas are generally associated with different functions: regions within the 
core sub-system are associated with self-referential processing, simulation of social 
interaction and making decisions concerning other people valued (e.g., Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2009
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in constructive simulations, both episodic/contextual retrieval and simulation of the 
future (e.g., Christoff et al., 2016; Schacter et al., 2012); regions within the dmPFC are 
associated with social cognitive processes, affective and conceptual processing, mental 
state inference and metacognition (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Andrews-Hanna, 
Reidler, Sepulcre, et al., 2010). 
The link between DMN and the experience of MW comes mainly from research 
employing imaging techniques combined with self-reports of MW or task-unrelated 
thoughts (reflecting MW). Such studies initially demonstrated that as task-unrelated 
thoughts increased during tasks requiring low external demands, the recruitment of 
DMN areas increased as well (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; McGuire, Paulesu, Frackowiak, 
& Frith, 1996; McKiernan, D’Angelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 2006). For example, in the 
study by Mason and colleagues (2007), participants were firstly asked to perform 
different blocks (i.e., baseline, practised, or novel) of verbal and visuo-spatial working-
memory tasks, in order to explore which task block was associated with a higher 
incidence of task-unrelated thoughts. Afterwards, participants underwent functional 
imaging recording while performing the same task without thought-sampling. Results 
showed that areas within the DMN were strongly recruited during practiced blocks 
(i.e., blocks previously associated with high-incidence thoughts periods) compared to 
novel blocks (i.e., blocks associated with low-incidence thoughts periods). Moreover, 
some participants were also asked to complete the Daydream Frequency scale of the 
Imaginal Process Inventory and their standardized scores on this scale were positively 
correlated with the change in BOLD signal observed in DMN regions when 
participants performed practiced blocks compared to novel blocks. 
Further neurocognitive studies (e.g., Bertossi, Peccenini, Solmi, Avenanti, & 
Ciaramelli, 2017; Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2016; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
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Maquet, & D'Argembeau, 2011) replicated these findings by using more accurate 
experience-sampling methods. Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al. (2011), for 
example, asked participants to perform the SART with thought-probes asking them to 
classify thoughts into 4 different categories, associated with different dimensions of 
task-relatedness and stimulus-dependence of thought: on-task, external distractions, 
task-related thoughts, MW. fMRI data were obtained while participants performed the 
task. Analysis of the fMRI data showed that, even though external distractions and 
task-related thoughts were also associated with higher DMN activity compared to on-
task reports, MW reports were associated with the highest degree of DMN activity. 
Importantly, the involvement of specific parts of DMN for MW has been also 
demonstrated in patients with vmPFC lesions (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 2016) and by 
employing transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) for establishing a causal 
relationship (Bertossi et al., 2017). Bertossi and colleagues (2017) specifically asked 
participants to perform the CRT with thought-probes two times and applied cathodal 
tDCS over the mPFC, a (control) site in the occipital cortex, or sham tDCS before the 
second task. They found that the stimulation over the mPFC decreased the propensity 
to mind wander, even though this effect was found only in men (i.e., not in woman; 
Bertossi et al., 2017). 
Moreover, a reduction in the frequency of MW has been found in people at earliest 
stages of Alzheimer’s disease (Gyurkovics, Balota, & Jackson, 2018) and people who 
are at increased risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease, such as individuals with 
amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment (Niedźwieńska & Kvavilashvili, 2018). As 
reported by Niedźwieńska and Kvavilashvili (2018), the beta-amyloid depositions 
accumulating in the hubs of the DMN (e.g., the PCC) is one of the main pathologies 
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of Alzheimer’s disease. Therefore, the fact that MW is significantly reduced in these 
people, is a further clear evidence of the role of DMN in MW. 
Besides the involvement of DMN, other brain areas, such as the lateral PFC, seem 
to be involved in task-unrelated thoughts as well (Christoff et al., 2009; Dumontheil, 
Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2010; Fox et al., 2015; Godwin et al., 2017; but see 
Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall, Duncan, & Barsalou, 2012), mirroring the DMN-
PFC coupling that occurs during creative ideas evaluation (Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, 
& Christoff, 2012). 
Christoff and colleagues’ study (2009) was the first one to show the involvement 
of executive areas in MW. During fMRI scanning, participants were asked to perform 
the SART and presented with thought-probes throughout the task. Each thought-probe 
asked participants two questions: (i) whether their attention was focused on the task or 
on something unrelated to the task; (ii) whether or not they were aware of where their 
attention was focused. Task performance errors were also collected to provide a 
behavioural measure of MW. Comparing the 10-s interval before off-task reports with 
the 10-s interval before on-task reports, a recruitment of DMN areas was observed 
again. Performance errors were preceded by activation in DMN regions as well, 
converging with subjective measures of MW. Crucially, off-task reports were also 
associated with a recruitment of executive network regions, such as the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC) and the dorso-lateral PFC (dlPFC) (see Figure 1.2). As for 
the awareness of thoughts, results showed that brain recruitment associated with off-
task thoughts was most pronounced in the absence of meta-awareness. 
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Figure 1.2. Activations preceding reports of MW (intervals prior to off-task versus on-
task thought-probes). Upward green arrows: DMN regions; downward blue arrows: executive 
network regions. Regions of activation included: (A) dACC (BA 32), (B) ventral ACC (BA 
24/32), (C) precuneus (BA 7), (D) bilateral temporoparietal junction (BA 39), and (E) bilateral 
dlPFC (BA 9). Height threshold p < 0.005, extent threshold k > 5 voxels (from Christoff et al., 
2009). 
 
A crucial role for dlPFC in MW has been additionally found by employing tDCS 
(Axelrod, Rees, Lavidor, & Bar, 2015; Kajimura, Kochiyama, Nakai, Abe, & Nomura, 
2016; Kajimura & Nomura, 2015). The stimulation of the dlPFC (anodal electrode 
over the left dlPFC and cathodal electrode over the right supraorbital area), but not of 
the occipital cortex or sham stimulation, increased MW propensity during the SART 
(Axelrod et al., 2015). In contrast, tDCS with the cathodal electrode over left dlPFC 
and the anodal electrode over right parietal regions decreased MW propensity relative 
to the reverse stimulation (i.e., cathodal over parietal regions, anodal over left dlPFC) 
(Kajimura & Nomura, 2015). 
Since the dlPFC can be considered as part of the fronto-parietal control network 
(FPCN) (Christoff et al., 2016) and it is notably involved in executive processing and 
intentional task-focused thought (e.g., Duncan & Owen, 2000), its recruitment during 
MW might be somewhat unexpected. However, hypotheses have been proposed for its 
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recruitment. Consistent with the perceptual decoupling hypothesis, executive 
resources might be needed to suppress interferences from external stimuli during the 
processing of task-unrelated thoughts in order to maintain the internal thoughts’ flow 
with no perceptual distractions (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009; Schooler et al., 2011). As 
already mentioned, the suppression of perceptual interferences is supported by studies 
revealing deactivations in the primary sensorimotor cortices while experiencing task-
unrelated thoughts. The recruitment of the executive network during MW might also 
explain the impairment in task-performance when MW occurs in demanding task 
(Christoff et al., 2009). 
It is also worth noting that the FPCN, which includes the dlPFC, is anatomically 
interposed between the DMN and the Dorsal Attention Network (DAN) (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2014), which is recruited when attention is focused on external 
information, and it might play a modulatory role in the activation or suppression of 
DMN or DAN based on switching internal/external attentional states (e.g., Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2014; Christoff et al., 2016). The temporal relationship between the 
FPCN and the DMN has been found to dynamically fluctuate across short time-scales 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Chang & Glover, 2010). At the same time, the DAN 
exhibits negative functional connectivity with the core subsystem of DMN and this 
coupling fluctuates across time, varies across different cognitive states, and is 
coordinated with interactions involving FPCN (Dixon et al., 2017; see also Zabelina 
& Andrews-Hanna, 2016). Although research still has to clearly understand the reason 
for this dynamic variability, these shifts in connectivity between networks may 
potentially reflect shifts in attentional focus or information exchange from perception 
to internal thinking and vice versa (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Specifically, periods 
of stronger anticorrelation between the FPCN and the DAN, and simultaneous stronger 
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anticorrelation between the DAN and the DMN regions may reflect a state 
characterised by a decoupling from perceptual inputs to process internal source of 
information (Dixon et al., 2017). 
Finally, Fox and Christoff (2015) suggested an additional interpretation for the 
recruitment of dlPFC in MW. These authors, in replying to Axelrod and colleagues’ 
paper (2015; see above), suggested that the stimulation of the dlPFC could have been 
increased MW reports by also affecting the meta-awareness of thoughts, since studies 
support the role of lateral PFC regions for meta-awareness of internal thoughts (e.g., 
Fleming & Dolan, 2012). 
Consistent with the idea of the dynamic nature of the brain, initial evidence has 
shown that these brain areas have a role along different stages of the dynamic of 
thoughts’ flow (Ellamil et al., 2016; Girn et al., 2017; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; 
Mooneyham et al., 2017). 
For example, Ellamil and colleagues (2016) asked to a group of highly 
experienced meditation practitioners to attend to the rising and falling of the abdomen 
during fMRI scanning. While attending to the breathing, participants also alternated 
blocks of monitoring thoughts that arose spontaneously (thought condition) and blocks 
of monitoring words that appeared onscreen (word condition). Participants were 
requested to press a first button to indicate when a thought arose or when a word 
appeared on the screen, and a second button to indicate which type of thought or word 
it was. The moment associated with the button-press was considered as the moment of 
the arising of thoughts, whereas the 4sec. time-interval before the button-press was 
considered as the time prior to the arising. Activations of some parts of the DMN, such 
as the MTL, the right IPL and the PCC, were found in this interval prior to thoughts’ 
reports. During and following thoughts’ reports, a recruitment of other parts of the 
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DMN, such as the mPFC and the TPC, and parts of the executive network, such as the 
dlPFC, were observed. 
Given the low temporal resolution of fMRI to observe events occurring in rapid 
sequence, on the basis of Ellamil and colleagues’ study (2016), Girn et al. (2017) 
employed EEG to investigate the temporal dynamics of brain activity underlying 
thoughts’ arising of experienced meditators. They used a task procedure similar to the 
one by Ellamil et al. (2016) but specified that only thoughts categorised as 
“verbal/inner speech” were used for analysis. Again, analysis of EEG data revealed 
different activations during the time-course of thoughts’ arising (i.e., from -2 sec. to 
the button press). Firstly, in the time-interval between 2 sec. and 1.5 sec. before the 
button press, connectivity between the mPFC and PCC and between right insula and 
both dorsal ACC and PCC was observed; next, from 1.5 sec. to 1 sec. before the button 
press, there was left superior temporal gyrus connectivity with the right insula and 
PCC; from 1 sec. to 0.5 sec. before the button press, a unique dlPFC-mPFC 
connectivity was found; finally, in the 500 msec. before the button-press a right insula-
dlPFC connectivity was found, interpreted as brain recruitment for the initiation of the 
required behavioural response. 
Overall, this study showed again that the thought’s generation seems to include 
temporally distinct processes, distinguishable at the neural level. However, besides the 
fact that these studies did not employ the common methods to detect specifically MW 
episodes, they assume that participants have great accuracy in recognising the actual 
arising of thoughts. Although these investigations are conducted on groups of 
experienced meditators (i.e., they practice attending to shift in attentional focus and 
should have an advanced introspective capacity; Girn et al., 2017), one cannot be sure 
whether the arising of thoughts falls within the few seconds interval immediately 
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preceding the report. Moreover, meditators may be a special category of people, 
different from the general population. 
In order to understand how the experience of MW evolves over time, from its 
actual arising to its final ending, research focusing on the dynamics of MW will be 
especially important in the near future. In the next section, we will focus on recent 
frameworks that propose, indeed, the importance of distinguishing between different 
features of the experience of MW for understanding its dynamic over time.  
 
1.7 A new dynamic approach to mind-wandering 
The process-occurrence framework presented by Smallwood (2013) offers a 
perspective to reconcile the different cognitive hypotheses for MW described 
previously in this Chapter (see section 1.5). This framework suggests that we should 
consider two distinct and basic elements of MW, that are the occurrence (onset) of a 
MW episode and the maintenance of this episode over time. The first element can be 
viewed as the number of times attention shifts from the external to the internal 
information (or the frequency of MW), whereas the second one can be considered as 
the length of time spent in this state (or the duration of MW). 
With regard to the cognitive hypotheses outlined above, Smallwood (2013) 
argued that they are aimed at explaining one of these two basic elements of MW and 
not all of them explain the same element. Specifically, the executive failure hypothesis 
focuses on the moment that MW begins and would, therefore, explain the frequency 
of MW episodes. The current-concerns and meta-awareness hypotheses, although they 
point to different mechanisms, would explain the occurrence and frequency of MW as 
well. The context-regulation hypothesis is not explicitly described in relation to the 
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other hypotheses but, since it postulates that individuals regulate MW occurrence 
depending on the circumstances, it is clear that it would also explain the frequency of 
MW. On the contrary, the global availability hypothesis and the decoupling hypothesis 
focus especially on the processes that maintain and ensure the continuity of thoughts’ 
flow over time. 
In general terms, we could reason that the likelihood of experiencing a MW state 
is higher when we have a number of pressing current concerns, we are in an appropriate 
context and a breakdown in the maintenance of task-relevant information occurs. 
Afterwards, our MW lasts longer depending on executive-resources and the process of 
perceptual decoupling that insulates the train of thoughts from external disruption. 
Although these accounts offer explanations for the conditions that facilitate MW 
episodes, they are far from clarifying either the mechanisms of the process of ignition 
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) or the dynamics of MW over time. Shedding light on 
the process of ignition means the understanding of why certain episodes arise at that 
specific moment in time. Indeed, this is a topic that has been largely neglected in MW 
research over the last years. According to Smallwood (2013), this lack of research is 
also probably due to the difficulty that researchers have found in causally linking MW 
to an imperative stimulus (trigger-event) in order to examine the associated 
spontaneous events by using, for example, behavioural or physiological measures. 
Perhaps this possibility has been doubted due to MW being described as a stimulus-
independent (Antrobus et al., 1966) phenomenon for a long time. However, more 
recently, research has been increasingly beginning to consider a role for external cues 
in triggering internal thoughts (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2013; Plimpton et al., 2015), 
making space for the investigation of the processes associated with the onset of 
thoughts. Finding a way to identify the moment of ignition would be also beneficial 
Chapter 1: General introduction 
 
 
 
! 51 
for further improving neurocognitive studies that have started to explore the different 
brain recruitments along the time-course of thoughts’ flow (e.g., Ellamil et al., 2016; 
Girn et al., 2017; see section 1.6 of the present chapter). 
Thus, the distinction between onset and maintenance of thoughts’ flow is 
ultimately important for the investigation on the dynamics of MW. Recently, it has 
been proposed that MW should be viewed as a highly dynamic process in which 
thoughts move freely (Christoff et al., 2016; Girn et al., 2017) and specific transitions 
between different MW states exist (Mittner, Hawkins, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2016).  
According to Christoff et al. (2016) it would be crucial to discover how mental 
states arise and change over time and “only once we consider the dynamics of thought 
are we able to make crucial distinctions between different types of thought” (p. 2). 
As pointed out by Ottaviani, Medea, Lonigro, Tarvainen, and Couyoumdjian 
(2015), conceptually “the term wandering evokes a flow of thoughts that come and go” 
(p. 24) whereas other kind of repetitive thinking, such as worry and rumination (i.e., 
Perseverative Cognition, PC), evokes “repetition of the same response over and over” 
(p. 24). 
In the Christoff et al.’s (2016) dynamic framework, the contents of mental states 
and the transitions from one mental state to another can have different levels of 
constraints, more or less flexible or automatic, and it’s only taking into account the 
constraints of the flow of thoughts, that MW could be distinguished from rumination 
or obsessive thoughts:  thoughts during rumination tend to remain fixed on a single 
topic and are marked by a high degree of automatic constraints, whereas thoughts 
during MW move freely (albeit more-deliberately constrained than dreaming and less 
deliberately constrained than creative thinking or goal-directed thought) (see also Fox 
et al., 2018). 
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Since the two constructs (i.e., MW and PC) have emerged in distinct research 
domains, they have rarely been directly compared in a study. Empirically, in a 
laboratory study, Ottaviani et al. (2013) have provided preliminary evidence that MW 
and PC lie on a continuum, where flexibility plays a role in the distinction: MW is not 
generally dysfunctional but might be maladaptive (e.g., intrusive thoughts) when 
flexibility is lost and it becomes a rigid pattern.  
More recently, Mills, Raffaelli, Irving, Stan, and Christoff (2018) conducted an 
experience-sampling study to demonstrate whether the free movement of thought is a 
key characteristic of MW experiences. Specifically, these authors aimed at verifying 
whether this dimension (i.e., being free of movement) is dissociable from the task-
relatedness dimension and perceptual decoupling, which are two of the most frequently 
assumed features of MW. In this study, participants were probed with text-messages 
delivered to their mobile phones during their daily-life. They were probed 10 times per 
day for 10 days. Each time, participants were asked to report, on a 7-point scale (from 
1= not at all, to 7 = very much), the extent to which their thoughts: (i) were moving 
about freely, (ii) were about something different from what they were currently doing, 
and (iii) contained awareness of their surroundings. The definition for “freely-moving 
thoughts” was given to participants, by mainly explaining that thoughts move freely 
when there is no purpose or direction to the thinking (albeit there may be connection 
between thoughts), the attention lands spontaneously on something and it may go back 
and forth between external environment and internal thoughts, and the thoughts seem 
to flow with ease. Results showed that the freely-moving thought dimension had only 
weak relationships with the other dimensions (i.e., task-relatedness and perceptual-
decoupling). On average, thoughts were both on-task and freely-moving 21.8% of the 
time, and off-task and constrained 20.2% of the time. According to the authors, 
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equating being off-task with freedom of movement would have meant misclassifying 
more than 40% of thoughts in their data. A similar misclassification would be 
happened for the perceptual-decoupling dimension, since participants reported freely-
moving thoughts while being perceptually coupled with their surroundings 26.1% of 
the time and constrained thoughts while being perceptually decoupled 24.6% of the 
time. Despite the limitations underlined by the authors of this early work, these results 
suggest that taking into account unstudied features (such as the freedom of movement 
or others) related to the dynamics of the thought process (see also Irrmischer, van der 
Wal, Mansvelder, & Linkenkaer-Hansen, 2018, for temporal dynamics of attentional 
lapses) should be necessary in further investigations on MW. 
In addition to this dynamic framework, the model proposed by Mittner et al. 
(2016) also emphasize the importance of the dynamics. Their focus is especially on 
the dynamic of the transitions between different attentional states. These authors 
consider MW as a not unitary state which comprehends a collection of several different 
states, each one with different features (such as goals or meta-awareness). Shifting 
between qualitatively different types/states of MW would involve a transition into an 
“off-focus” (exploratory) state and back to an “active” MW state. Thus, in this view it 
would happen that a person shifts into the off-focus state each time she/he moves from 
a MW state to another, even though she/he never stays into an on-task state during this 
process. An outstanding question proposed by these author is whether the phenomenon 
of mind-blanking (Ward & Wegner, 2013; see section 1.1 of the present chapter) could 
be explained by prolonged time spent in the off-focus state (Mittner et al., 2016). 
However, this paper once again highlights the need of focusing on the dynamic of MW 
and the transitions between possibly different attentional states. 
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1.8 Overview of the present studies and research aims 
As we reviewed in the previous sections, MW is a multidimensional cognitive 
experience, that still needs further investigation. Crucially, some lines of research have 
suggested the importance of focusing on the dynamics of this process (e.g., Christoff 
et al., 2016; Girn et al., 2017; Mittner et al., 2016; Smallwood, 2013) in order to further 
advance our knowledge of this phenomenon. Thus, following the “process-
occurrence” framework introduced by Smallwood (2013), in three studies, we aimed 
to identify and track the onset (i.e., the so called “process of ignition”) and time-course 
of MW (i.e., maintenance and unfolding over time).   
The Study 1 (Chapter 2) was designed to assess the causal role of external cues in 
triggering and shaping MW episodes. To this aim, we used a vigilance task to record 
MW episodes in the laboratory and we experimentally manipulated the presence of 
verbal cues during the vigilance task in two independent groups (i.e., Verbal-cues 
group and No-cues group) with a between-subject design. To collect MW experiences, 
we used the self-caught procedure that also allowed us to compute the latency of MW 
(i.e., the time-interval between the presentation of the stimulus/trigger and the report 
of MW triggered by that specific stimulus) for those MW episodes reported as 
triggered by the verbal cues. Our results mainly showed that the exposure to task-
irrelevant verbal cues increased the amount of MW reported and biased the temporal 
focus towards the past. 
The Study 2 (Chapter 3) was developed to further extend the results found in 
Study 1 by coupling self-report measures of MW with physiological ones (i.e., 
pupillometry). The main aim was, therefore, to examine the pupil activity occurring 
after external cues indicated by participants as triggers for MW episodes in order to 
obtain a cover measure associated with the onset and maintenance of MW over time. 
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To this aim, we employed a modified version of the vigilance task with verbal cues 
and we recorded pupil measures throughout the task. To collect MW episodes, we used 
the probe-caught procedure. We mainly found a significantly larger pupil dilation over 
two trials following MW triggers compared to non-triggers, suggesting that an increase 
in pupil diameter (i.e., index of emotional and cognitive load) followed the onset of 
MW and accompanied its unfolding over time. 
The Study 3 (Chapter 4) was conducted with the main aim of replicating the 
results of the previous pupillometry study (Study 2) and extend them further. 
Specifically, we aimed to replicate the results of higher pupil dilation following MW 
triggers by collecting only aware MW episodes with a self-caught procedure instead 
of a probe-caught procedure. Moreover, we also examined whether and how pupil 
dilation associated with MW was modulated by the emotional valence of MW and, for 
exploratory purposes, by its cue-dependent/independent nature. Thus, we employed 
the vigilance task with verbal cues and recorded pupil measures throughout the task. 
To collect MW experiences, we used the self-caught procedure that allowed us to 
obtain the latency of MW episodes as well. We mainly found an increase in pupil 
dilation following triggers of aware MW and, in addition, found that this dilation 
appeared not to be modulated by the emotional content of MW episodes. 
 
Part of these results have been reported in the following publications:  
Vannucci, M., Pelagatti, C., & Marchetti, I. (2017). Manipulating cues in mind 
wandering: Verbal cues affect the frequency and the temporal focus of mind 
wandering. Consciousness and Cognition, 53, 61–69.  
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2017.06.004 
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Pelagatti, C., Binda, P., & Vannucci, M. (2018). Tracking the dynamics of mind 
wandering: Insights from pupillometry. Journal of Cognition, 1(1), 38. 
doi:10.5334/joc.41 
Pelagatti, C., Marchetti, I., & Vannucci, M. (2016, July). When our mind wanders, 
where does it go? Retrospective bias induced by verbal cues. 6th International 
Conference on Memory, Budapest, Hungary. 
Pelagatti, C., Binda, P., & Vannucci, M. (2018, May). Detecting the onset of 
mind-wandering: Insights from pupillometry. International Meeting of the 
Psychonomic Society, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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Chapter 2 
What triggers MW: the causal role of 
external cues (Study 1) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction and aims of Study 1 
As we mentioned in the General introduction, MW has been largely considered 
as stimulus-independent (Antrobus et al., 1966) and self-generated (e.g., Smallwood, 
2013), highlighting its independence from external stimuli. This observation has raised 
doubts about the possibility that MW states could be linked to initial events in order to 
study the onset of these experiences (Smallwood, 2013). However, as argued by 
Smallwood (2013), any comprehensive account of MW should disentangle and explain 
the processes associated with the initial occurrence of MW and its maintenance-
continuity over time, and in order to determine the onset of MW, it is necessary to have 
an external stimulus that acts as trigger for this experience. A clear understanding of 
the role that external triggers may have in MW onset also allow to treat MW as a 
dynamic process (Christoff et al., 2016) and analyse the entire dynamic of thoughts’ 
flow: only linking MW onset to external events could indeed permit to set an initial 
point from which the experience develops over time. 
Despite the relevance of this investigation for MW research, only recently some 
studies have started to show a possible relationship between MW and external stimuli, 
probably by taking advantage of the investigations in the related research field of 
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involuntary memory (i.e., past episodes which come to mind with no deliberate attempt 
at retrieve them; e.g., Berntsen, 2010; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). 
In the next section, we will review these published studies suggesting that MW 
may not completely be a stimulus-independent phenomenon. Next, the specific aims 
of our study will be presented. 
 
2.1.1 External triggers of MW: cues related to current concerns 
The idea that MW is not independent from external inputs comes from early work 
by Eric Klinger (Klinger, 1978; see also Klinger, 2013; Klinger, Marchetti, & Koster, 
2018). Klinger’s current concerns theory proposes that one’s goals and wishes sensitise 
the individual to cues (internal or external) that are associated with one or another of 
the individual’s goals, which, upon encountering, would re-activate the goal related 
material in one’s consciousness. As stated by Klinger and co-workers (2018), 
“becoming committed to pursuing a goal boosts the cognitive-processing priority for 
cues related to that goal” (p. 216). Klinger (1978) empirically verified the effects of 
concerns’ related cues on attention and thoughts’ content. As we previously described 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.5.3), he found that, when participants were allowed to choose, 
by using a toggle switch, listening to either a narrative including their concerns’ related 
cues or a narrative including others concerns’ related cues, they (i) spent more time 
listening to the passages associated with their own current concerns, (ii) reported 
thoughts whose contents were related to those passages, and (iii) recalled those 
narrative’s passages more often than the opposite passages (see Chapter 1, section 
1.5.3). A large proportion of those thoughts qualified as daydreams. It is therefore 
evident that the goal relatedness of the cues embedded into the tapes triggered 
daydream content (Klinger, 1978, 2013).  
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The sensitivity to goal-related external stimuli and the impact on subsequent MW 
have been recently investigated using a modified version of SART (McVay & Kane, 
2013; van Vugt & Broers, 2016). Specifically, McVay and Kane (2013), embedded 
current concerns’ related words into the perceptual version of the SART. In the initial 
session of the study, they asked participants to describe their personal goals and 
concerns across several life domains. In a second session, scheduled 2 days apart, 
participants performed the perceptual version of the SART with thought-probes to 
collect MW episodes. In this SART version (McVay & Kane, 2009), each stimulus 
consists of a word presented on the screen and participants are asked to press a button 
for lowercase words (“go” trials) and to withhold responding to infrequent uppercase 
words (“no-go” trials). Crucially, in the study, after the first session and for each 
participant, three-word cues from the participant’s current concerns were created and 
inserted as three consecutive SART stimuli (i.e., each word in a subsequent “go” 
trials). Two of the most important, imminent and specific current concerns were 
selected to be embedded in the SART. A set of control-words (triplets of words not 
related to the individual’s current concerns) was also created and inserted as SART 
stimuli. Thought-probes appearing shortly after the personal-goal triplets were 
associated with a 3-4% increase in MW relative to control triplets. Although this effect 
is small, it provides evidence for a role of current-concerns’ related cues in stimulating 
MW.  
In a subsequent study, van Vugt and Broers (2016) used a modified version of the 
same paradigm but added one more control condition in the task. They included in the 
SART: (i) thought-probes presented after specific word triplets created from an 
individual’s current concerns, (ii) thought-probes presented after word triplets created 
from others’ responses (statements resulted as idiosyncratic in a pilot study), and (iii) 
Chapter 2: Study 1 
 
 
 
! 60 
thought-probes presented randomly in the task (control condition). Results from this 
study revealed that both participant’s own concerns condition and other’s concerns 
condition were associated with higher MW frequency and lower accuracy in task 
performance (considered as behavioural index of off-task thinking) compared to the 
control condition. Thus, this study did not report different MW frequency after 
exposing participants to their specific and important personal concerns. It may be that 
triplets created from idiosyncratic statements were also significant stimuli compared 
to the word stimuli not arranged in meaningful triplets during the SART. These 
findings may suggest that the exposure to external meaningful stimuli generally 
stimulates MW experiences.  
 
2.1.2 External triggers of MW: task-relevant and task-irrelevant meaningful cues 
There is initial evidence showing that MW can be elicited not only by specific 
concerns’ related cues but also by other external meaningful cues (Maillet & Schacter, 
2016; Plimpton et al., 2015; Song & Wang, 2012). First interesting results have been 
reported in the daily-life experience sampling study by Song and Wang (2012). The 
authors collected information about the content and the context of daily MW 
experiences. Participants were probed with a mobile short message during their 
everyday activities for 3 days. The probe randomly appeared 6 times from 7:30 a.m. 
to 11:30 p.m. per day (twice in the morning, afternoon, and evening, respectively). 
After receiving the probe, participants should judge whether they were mind 
wandering and complete a questionnaire on some questions, including a question on 
external/internal cues. Results showed that participants could infer the cue for most 
MW episodes (88.17%) and, even more interesting, the percentage of external cues 
(50.57%) was as high as internal cues (49.43%).  
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More recently, few other studies have addressed the question of the role of 
meaningful external cues in stimulating MW experiences also in a laboratory setting, 
by investigating both task-relevant (Maillet & Schacter, 2016) and task-irrelevant 
(Plimpton et al., 2015) stimuli.  
Specifically, in Maillet and Schacter’s study (2016), older and young adults 
performed a word-picture incidental encoding task while being intermittently probed 
with different questions about their thoughts, including one question asking whether 
their thoughts were or not triggered by one of the encoding stimuli. Results showed 
that participants reported overall more thoughts triggered by encoding stimuli 
compared to thoughts not triggered by those stimuli. In addition, a greater proportion 
of thoughts triggered by task-relevant external stimuli were about the past relative to 
the future. These findings provide a first empirical support to the hypothesis that 
meaningful task-relevant stimuli might stimulate MW, thereby increasing the 
frequency of MW episodes.  
Another important contribution investigating the role of external but task-
irrelevant stimuli in triggering MW comes from a recent study by Plimpton and 
colleagues (2015). In the study, the authors employed a modified version of a paradigm 
originally developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) to assess involuntary 
autobiographical memories (IAMs) in the laboratory setting. In this paradigm, 
participants are exposed to a long sequence of trials of mostly horizontal lines and have 
to detect infrequent targets (i.e., vertical lines), while being simultaneously exposed to 
task-irrelevant cue-words (i.e., “relaxing on a beach” or “crossing the street”), 
presented in the centre of each trial. The experience of IAMs can be assessed by using 
both self-caught (e.g., Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) or probe-caught (Vannucci, 
Batool, Pelagatti, & Mazzoni, 2014). This paradigm elicits a fair amount of IAMs, the 
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majority of which are reported as being triggered by the cues presented on the screen 
(e.g., Kvavilashvili, & Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci 
et al., 2014; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, & Mazzoni, 2016; Vannucci, Pelagatti, 
Hanczakowski, & Chiorri, 2018; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, & 
Rossi Paccani, 2015). 
In the version used by Plimpton and colleagues (2015), participants were stopped 
during the task and asked to give a brief description of their thoughts at the moment 
they were stopped (i.e., probe-caught sampling method) and indicate if the thought 
occurred spontaneously or intentionally and, for the spontaneous thoughts, to specify 
their triggers (if any). The results revealed that the vast majority of task-unrelated 
thoughts were reported to have been triggered by task-irrelevant word-phrases on the 
screen. This pattern was found in both dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants. 
Moreover, even though the frequency of past episodes was higher than the frequency 
of thoughts towards the future and the current situations, the word-phrases were more 
likely to trigger thoughts about the past and the future than the current situation but 
there was no difference between past and future episodes. These findings suggest that 
both the frequency of MW and its temporal orientation may be function of the external 
context rather than being completely self-generated.  
 
2.1.3 Aims of Study 1 
In the present study we aimed to capitalize on these recent promising findings 
described above, by experimentally investigating the causal role of external verbal 
cues in triggering and shaping MW. Specifically, we addressed two questions. First, 
does exposure to task-irrelevant verbal information directly trigger MW during a 
vigilance task? If so, we should find a higher frequency of MW during a vigilance task 
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with verbal cues compared to an identical vigilance task with no verbal cues. Second, 
does the exposure to verbal information influence the temporal orientation of MW and, 
specifically, increase past-oriented MW? 
In the previous study by Plimpton et al. (2015), given the absence of a direct 
experimental manipulation of the presence of verbal cues, it is not possible to conclude 
that the presence of verbal cues was the direct cause of the occurrence of MW and the 
steering of their temporal focus toward the past. 
To address these questions, we used the vigilance task already successfully used 
to induce and assess MW in the laboratory (Plimpton et al., 2015) and we 
experimentally manipulated the presence of verbal cues during the vigilance task in 
two independent groups, “Verbal-cues” group and “No-cues” group respectively 
(between-subject design) 
In the study, a self-catching procedure was used, thereby instructing participants 
to report the occurrence of any spontaneous mental content not directly related to the 
task at hand. Since we employed a self-catching procedure, for those MW episodes 
triggered by external cues, we could also measure their latency, that is the time in 
between the presentation of the stimulus/trigger and the report of MW triggered by 
that specific stimulus. By collecting the latency of MW episodes, we could obtain 
information about the time needed for the formation of thoughts and for becoming 
aware of them. 
Moreover, in the present study, we distinguished task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs), 
collected during the vigilance task, in MW and external distractions (EDs), To this 
regard, in the study by Plimpton et al. (2015), the authors primarily referred to TUTs 
as a category comprising both MW and EDs, while previous studies have shown that 
MW and ED are two partially distinct processes, that can be differentiated at the 
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behavioural (Stawarczyk et al., 2014; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) and physiological 
level (e.g., pupillary correlates in Unsworth & Robison, 2016). To our knowledge, it 
is still unknown whether task-irrelevant verbal cues might have differential effects on 
the frequency of MW and ED. 
Given the association reported in the literature between past-oriented MW and 
negative mood (e.g., Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011), positive and 
negative affect were measured (through the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, 
PANAS) at the beginning of the experimental session. Finally, phenomenological 
information on each reported thought was acquired. 
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-two undergraduate students from the University of Florence (48 females, 
age range 18–29 years, M = 21.76 years) volunteered to participate in the study. All 
participants were Italian native speakers and they had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Half were randomly assigned to the Verbal-cues condition (n = 31; 25 females, 
age range 18-29 years, M = 21.26 years) and the other half to the No-cues condition (n 
= 31; 23 females, age range 18-27 years, M = 22.26 years). Groups did not significantly 
differ in age, gender ratio, and depressive symptoms (assessed by the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Italian adaptation in Ghisi, Flebus, 
Montano, Sanavio, & Sica, 2006). 
The experimental protocol was in line with the declaration of Helsinki and with 
the regulations of the University of Florence that hosted the study. 
 
Chapter 2: Study 1 
 
 
 
! 65 
2.2.2 Materials 
Vigilance task 
Participants performed a modified version of the computer-based vigilance task 
developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and already used in previous 
studies to investigate both involuntary memories and MW episodes (e.g., Barzykowski 
& Niedźwieńska, 2016; Plimpton et al., 2015; Vannucci et al., 2015, 2016). This task 
consisted of 600 trials, presented in a fixed order, each remaining on the screen for 1.5 
sec. In each trial, an image (approximately 21.5 cm x 12.5 cm in size) was shown 
depicting either a pattern of black horizontal (non-target stimuli) or black vertical lines 
(target stimuli) on a white background. Target stimuli appeared on 12 trials (2% of all 
trials), with a minimum of 42 and a maximum of 59 trials between each target. 
In the Verbal-cues condition, cue-words (e.g., “tumble dryer”, “long hair”, “paper 
bag”) in 18-CPI Arial font were shown in the middle of the image on 108 (18%) trials. 
These cue-words were selected from the pool of 800 word-phrases developed by 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and adapted to the Italian sample2 (Vannucci et 
al., 2015). To check that the temporality of possible cue-words did not affect the 
results, temporally-oriented cue-words (e.g., “old family photos”, “forgotten 
appointment”, “stolen car”, “successful career”) were not included in our words 
sample. Moreover, since emotional valence has been found to affect the likelihood of 
reporting past or future thoughts (Plimpton et al., 2015), only neutral cues were 
included in our sample. When necessary, the original word-phrases were slightly 
modified in order to use them (e.g., “jealous behaviour” was replaced by “behaviour”) 
                                                             
2 In the adaptation, ten independent judges (all Italian native speakers) rated the level of 
familiarity, imageability and concreteness of the original word-phrases on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = low; 7 = high). Specific instructions were given to participants before rating each 
dimension. 
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and re-evaluated for the level of familiarity, imageability and concreteness. To verify 
that the selected cues were actually neutral and atemporal, we asked eight independent 
judges to evaluate, for each cue-word, the emotional valence (positive, negative or 
neutral) and the temporal focus, that is whether the cue-word was commonly used in 
daily life linked to a specific temporal orientation (i.e., past, present, future), more than 
one (i.e., mixed), or to no specific temporal orientation (i.e., atemporal). Only the cue-
words evaluated as neutral and atemporal by at least 6 out of 8 judges (i.e., 75%) were 
selected for the study. 
 
Thought questionnaire 
After completing the vigilance task, participants provided details of their reported 
mental contents on a questionnaire. For each mental content, they were asked to 
indicate: (i) the temporal focus, distinguishing among “past”, “present”, “future”, and 
“atemporal”, (ii) whether it was general or specific, (iii) whether it was self-related or 
not. As for the temporal focus, participants were told that an “atemporal” mental 
content would refer to any thought with no specific temporal orientation (e.g., “I am 
a very anxious person”; “I like very much eating pizza”), a “present” mental content 
would refer to any thought related to something occurring either here and now (e.g., 
“I miss my dog, that is now with my boyfriend”) or in the current period of life (e.g., 
“I don’t get along with my mother in this period”), a “past” mental content would refer 
to any thought related to something occurred prior to start the task (more or less 
remote), and a “future” mental content would refer to any thought related to something 
occurring after the end of the task (more or less distant in the future). 
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Participants were also asked to rate on a 5-point scale their overall level of 
concentration (1 = not at all concentrated; 5 = fully concentrated) and boredom (1 = 
not at all; 5 = very bored) experienced during the vigilance task. 
 
Mood questionnaire 
Before performing the vigilance task, participants were asked to complete the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – State (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988; Italian adaptation in Terracciano, McCrae, & Costa, 2003). The Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule consists of two 10-item self-report scales, one measuring 
positive affect (i.e., excited, inspired) and the other one measuring negative affect (i.e., 
upset, irritable). Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly or not at 
all; 5 = extremely), and it measures the extent to which each mood state has been 
experienced during a specified time frame. Participants completed the PANAS with 
“the present moment” instructions. 
 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After being welcomed into the laboratory, 
participants were briefly introduced to the research project, presented as a study 
examining concentration and its correlates, and signed a consent form. Afterwards, 
they were asked to complete the PANAS. Once this was completed, they received the 
instructions for the vigilance task. It was explained that they had to detect target stimuli 
(vertical lines) among a large number of non-target stimuli (horizontal lines), by saying 
“yes” out loud each time they detected a target stimulus. Participants in the Verbal-
cues condition were also told that they would see cue-words in some of the trials and 
that they were not supposed to do anything with these cue-words. It was explained that 
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the condition in which they were participating was looking at how people could keep 
their concentration on the patterns and that participants in another condition would 
have to concentrate on the cue-words. This was a cover-story and the second condition 
did not really exist. A schematic of the sequence of experimental trials in both 
conditions is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Participants were, next, told that the task was quite monotonous and that task-
unrelated mental contents (e.g., thoughts, plans, considerations, past events, images, 
etc.) could pop into their mind spontaneously throughout the task. In the event that 
something came to their mind, they should click the mouse to interrupt the task. After 
clicking the mouse, they should write a short description of the mental content on a 
paper sheet and indicate whether it was triggered by something, by selecting one of 
the following options: internal thoughts, an element in the environment, a cue-word 
on the screen (for the Verbal-cues group only; participants were also asked to specify 
the word), no trigger. If the mental content was private and intimate, participants could 
label it as “personal” and eventually provide only one relevant word instead of 
reporting a short description. After the instructions, participants were given a short 
practice of the vigilance task in which they were allowed to behave as it was the 
experimental session and to stop the presentation if they had any task-unrelated 
thoughts. 
When the vigilance task was over, participants were presented with the short 
descriptions of their mental contents and asked to report some details about these 
thoughts on a questionnaire (see Thought questionnaire in the Materials section). 
Finally, participants were asked whether they had speculated about the actual aims of 
the study (if so, what they had thought) during the task and then they were debriefed 
and dismissed. The total session lasted approximately 60–75 min. 
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Figure 2.1. Example of the stimulus displays in both conditions. Top: No-cues group; 
bottom: Verbal-cues group. Horizontal lines: non-target stimuli; vertical lines: target stimuli 
to be detected by saying “yes” out loud. 
 
2.3 Results 
Performance on vigilance task 
All 62 participants successfully completed the vigilance task. Only one participant 
(in the No-cues group) reported a mistake (omission). 
An independent sample t-test was performed to compare the level of 
concentration and boredom experienced during the task between the two groups; 
Cohen’s d was computed as effect size. There was no significant difference between 
the two groups with respect to the level of concentration experienced during the task 
(Verbal-cues group: M = 3.55, SD = 0.81; No-cues group: M = 3.45, SD = 0.81; t(60) 
= 0.47, p = 0.64, d = 0.12), but the No-cues group reported a higher level of boredom 
(M = 3.65, SD = 1.14) compared to the Verbal-cues group (M = 2.84, SD = 1.16), t(60) 
= 2.76, p = 0.008, d = 0.70. 
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Mood measures 
The PANAS was completed by participants at the beginning of the experimental 
session. An independent sample t-test was performed to compare the scores of both 
the Positive and Negative Affective Schedules between the two groups; Cohen’s d was 
computed as effect size. The two groups did not significantly differ in either Positive 
(Verbal-cues group: M = 30.97, SD = 5.27; No-cues group: M = 30.90, SD = 5.48; 
t(60) = 0.05, p = 0.96, d = 0.01) or Negative Affect Schedule (Verbal-cues group: M 
= 13.16, SD = 4.20; No-cues group: M = 12.52, SD = 2.73; t(60) = 0.72, p = 0.48, d = 
0.18). 
 
Amount and type of mental contents reported 
Before performing the analyses on the mental contents, all thoughts reported by 
participants were coded by two independent judges as belonging to different thoughts 
categories. We based our classification on the categories used in previous studies (e.g., 
Plimpton et al., 2015; Stawarczyk et al., 2014; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). 
Thoughts were coded as either task-related interferences (TRIs) or task-unrelated 
thoughts (TUTs) and all TUTs were also coded as MW or external distraction (ED). 
TRIs comprised reports whose content was related to any task features (i.e., “The 
position of the lines repeats itself”, “How long does each image last?”) or to the 
current performance on the task (i.e., “I am worried about failing this detection task”), 
whereas TUTs did not include references to the task at hand (Plimpton et al., 2015) 
and included both ED and MW episodes (Stawarczyk et al., 2014; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). TUTs were coded as EDs when the participant’s attention 
was unrelated to the task at hand but focused on stimuli in the current situation. The 
content of these thoughts could involve both exteroceptive (e.g., “I have a ladybird on 
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my shoulder” or “I was distracted by the voices outside the room”) or interoceptive 
perceptions (i.e., bodily sensations, such as hunger or cold; e.g., “I am sweaty and 
hot”). 
TUTs were coded as MW when the participant’s attention was unrelated to the 
task at hand as well as decoupled from the external environment. These thoughts could 
vary in forms and contents, and they could be triggered by internal or external stimuli. 
For thoughts triggered by external stimuli, it is especially worth noting an important 
distinction between EDs and MW episodes. When an external stimulus elicits a 
thought, the following possibilities might happen: (i) the thought’s content keeps 
including only that stimulus during the thought’s flow and the flow ends before 
thinking anything else (e.g., “I was thinking about the sudden train whistle”), or (ii) 
the thought’s flow starts from an external stimulus but, in the second place, it moves 
to a thought associated with that stimulus but decoupled from the current situation 
(e.g., “While I was paying attention to the sudden train whistle, I thought about my 
first trip by myself”). EDs contents did not involve anything else beyond the stimulus 
that originated the distraction.  
For both categorisations (TRIs vs. TUTs, and MW vs. EDs), we computed Kappa 
as inter-rater reliability between the coders and the inter-rater agreement resulted to be 
very good (Kappa = 0.93, SE = 0.02 and Kappa = 0.91, SE = 0.03, respectively). Minor 
disagreements were solved by discussion. 
By using the criteria of the median absolute deviation (as suggested by Leys, Ley, 
Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013), we checked for possible outliers in any of the 
variables we would use for analyses. Out of the 62 participants, one (in the Verbal-
cues group) was identified as outlier because of the very high frequency with which 
she reported MW episodes, and she was excluded from the analyses.  
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Sixty-one participants reported 444 mental contents. Out of all contents, 77 were 
categorised as TRIs (M = 1.26, SD = 1.40, range 0-6) and 367 as TUTs (M = 6.02, SD 
= 4.79, 0-21). Out of all TUTs, 324 were classed as MW reports (M = 5.31, SD = 4.70, 
range 0-20) and 43 as ED reports (M = 0.70, SD = 1.05, range = 0-4). All descriptive 
data are summarised in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. 
 
 
Variable M SD range 
Task-related interferences (TRIs) 1.26 1.40 0-6 
    
Task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) 6.02 4.79 0-21 
Mind-wandering (MW) 5.31 4.70 0-20 
External distraction (ED) 0.70 1.05 0-4 
 
Table 2.1. Means, standard deviations and ranges of thoughts reported. 
 
 
 Verbal-cues  No-cues 
Variable M SD range  M SD range 
Task-related interferences (TRIs) 1.07 1.20 0-5  1.45 1.57 0-6 
        
Task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) 7.60 5.57 0-21  4.48 3.32 0-14 
Mind-wandering (MW) 7.27 5.51 0-20  3.42 2.69 0-11 
External distraction (ED) 0.33 0.61 0-2  1.06 1.26 0-4 
 
Table 2.2. Means, standard deviations and ranges of thoughts reported as a function of 
group (Verbal-cues group vs. No-cues group). 
 
Before moving to the main analysis on the effects of cues on TUTs, for the sake 
of completeness we report the comparison in the number of TRIs between Verbal-cues 
group and No-cues group. Since we found that the groups differed in the level of 
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boredom reported during the task, we ran an ANCOVA with the level of boredom as 
a covariate and the TRIs frequency as dependent variable. The analysis revealed no 
significant difference between the Verbal-cues group and the No-cues group (F(1,58) 
= 1.78, p = 0.19, η2 = 0.03). 
Since we were interested in TUTs, TRIs will not be further considered in the 
analyses. 
 
Effects of experimental manipulation of verbal cues on TUTs 
To assess the effects of the experimental manipulation of cues on the two types 
of TUTs (i.e., MW and ED), the number of MW and ED reports was entered into a 2 
(Group: No-cues vs. Verbal-cues) x 2 (Type of TUTs: MW vs. ED) mixed ANCOVA, 
with boredom as covariate. Results showed a significant main effect of Group, F(1,58) 
= 8.73, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.07, with the Verbal-cues group reporting a higher amount of 
TUTs (M = 3.94) compared to the No-cues group (M = 2.11), and a significant main 
effect of the Type of TUTs, F(1,58) = 8.35, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.06, with MW reports (M 
= 5.35) being much more than ED reports (M = 0.70). However, the main effects were 
qualified by a significant Group by Type of TUTs interaction, F(1,58) = 14.70, p < 
0.0005, η2 = 0.11. The Verbal-cues group reported a higher amount of MW (M = 7.40) 
compared to the No-cues group (M = 3.30, p < 0.005, d = 0.91). The difference between 
the two groups in the amount of ED was not significant (Verbal-cues: M = 0.49 vs. 
No-cues: M = 0.92, p = 0.09, d = 0.45), albeit the not small effect size (d = 0.20 is 
considered a small effect size, d = 0.50 a medium effect size; Cohen, 1988). These 
results are shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2.  Mean number of MW and ED reports as a function of group. Dark grey: 
Verbal-cues group; light grey: No-cues group. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Type of reported triggers 
Each time participants reported a thought, they were also asked to indicate the 
trigger of this thought by choosing among different options. The Verbal-cues group 
could select one of the following trigger categories: cue-words, internal thoughts, 
environmental stimuli, and no trigger. The no-cues group were presented with the same 
options except for the one about cue-words. 
After finding that the exposure to verbal cues increased the amount of MW, to 
further investigate the contribution of the cue-words in triggering MW, we examined 
the number of MW episodes reported to be triggered by different stimuli. In the 
Verbal-cues group, out of the all MW episodes, 60.09% were triggered by the cue-
words, 21.56% were triggered by internal thoughts, 4.59% were triggered by 
environmental stimuli and 13.76% were reported to have no identifiable trigger. 
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A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with Type of trigger as independent 
variable was performed on the mean number of MW episodes reported by the Verbal-
cues group. Results showed a significant effect of Type of trigger, F(1.4,41.3) = 23.92, 
p < 0.000005, η2 = 0.33. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed 
that the mean number of MW reports triggered by cue-words (M = 4.37) was 
significantly higher than those triggered by internal thoughts (M = 1.57, p < 0.0005, d 
= 1.09), environmental stimuli (M = 0.33, p < 0.00005, d = 1.21) and no trigger (M = 
1.00, p < 0.0005, d = 1.03). The mean number of MW reports triggered by 
environmental stimuli was significantly lower than those triggered by internal thoughts 
(p < 0.005, d = 0.82) and no trigger (p < 0.05, d = 0.63), whereas the difference between 
the mean number of MW reports triggered by internal thoughts and no trigger was not 
significant (p = 0.65, d = 0.36) (see Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean number of MW episodes triggered by cue-words, internal thoughts, 
environmental stimuli and no trigger in the Verbal-cues group. Error bars represent standard 
error. 
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In the No-cues group, out of the all MW episodes, 61.32% were triggered by 
internal thoughts, 15.09% were triggered by environmental stimuli, and 23.59% were 
reported to have no identifiable trigger. For exploratory purposes, a one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA with Type of trigger as independent variable was also performed 
on the mean number of MW episodes reported by the No-cues group. Results showed 
a significant effect of Type of trigger, F(1.4,42.3) = 12.11, p = 0.000337, η2 = 0.19. 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed that the mean number of 
MW reports triggered by internal thoughts (M = 2.10) was significantly higher than 
those triggered by environmental stimuli (M = 0.52, p = 0.003, d = 0.94) and no trigger 
(M = 0.81, p = 0.001, d = 1.05). The difference between the mean number of MW 
reports triggered by environmental stimuli and no trigger was not significant (p = 0.74, 
d = 0.30) (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4. Mean number of MW episodes triggered by internal thoughts, environmental 
stimuli or no trigger in the No-cues group. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Chapter 2: Study 1 
 
 
 
! 77 
Independent sample t-tests were performed to compare the mean number of MW 
episodes triggered by internal thoughts, environmental stimuli and no trigger between 
the two groups. No significant differences emerged from the analyses (MW episodes 
triggered by internal thoughts: t(59) = 1.20, p = 0.24, d = 0.31; MW episodes triggered 
by environmental stimuli: t(59) = 0.69, p = 0.49, d = 0.18; MW episodes triggered by 
no stimuli: t(59) = 0.66, p = 0.51, d = 0.17). 
 
Temporal focus of MW 
At the end of the vigilance task, participants coded each of their recorded thoughts 
as past episode, future thought, thought about a current situation or atemporal thought. 
Out of the 324 MW reports, 127 reports (39.2%) were classed as past episodes, 81 
reports (25%) as future thoughts, 38 reports (11.7%) as present thoughts, and 78 
reports (24.1%) as atemporal thoughts. In the Verbal-cues group, out of 218 MW 
episodes, 97 episodes (44.5%) were classed as past episodes, 40 episodes (18.3%) as 
future thoughts, 23 episodes (10.6%) as present thoughts, and 58 episodes (26.6%) as 
atemporal thoughts. In the No-cues group, out of 106 MW episodes, 30 episodes 
(28.3%) were classed as past episodes, 41 episodes (38.7%) as future thoughts, 15 
episodes (14.1%) as present thoughts, and 20 episodes (18.9%) as atemporal thoughts. 
Descriptive data (mean proportions and standard deviations) as a function of group are 
reported in Table 2.3. 
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 Verbal-cues  No-cues 
Variable M SD  M SD 
Past-focused MW 0.47 0.25  0.29 0.33 
Present-focused MW 0.10 0.13  0.14 0.21 
Future-focused MW 0.19 0.19  0.39 0.34 
Atemporal MW 0.24 0.18  0.18 0.25 
 
Table 2.3. Mean proportions and standard deviations of different temporal orientations 
of MW (past, present, future, atemporal) as a function of group (Verbal-cues group vs. No-
cues group). 
 
To assess the effects of the experimental manipulation on the temporal focus of 
MW, the mean proportion of each type of thought (past, present, future and atemporal) 
was calculated per person and entered into a 2 (Group: Verbal-cues vs. No-cues) x 4 
(Temporal focus: past, present, future, atemporal) mixed ANOVA. 
The analysis was carried out on participants who reported at least 3 thoughts, and 
the epsilon correction for the degrees of freedom suggested by Greer and Dunlap 
(1997) was used to take into account that, for each participant, the sum of the values 
(proportion) across the conditions of the temporal focus factor is constant, namely 1. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Temporal focus, F(2.6,99.2) = 
8.08, p < 0.0005, η2 = 0.18. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment 
indicated that the proportion of present (M = 0.12) was significantly lower than past 
(M = 0.35, p < 0.0001, d = 0.94) and future (M = 0.30, p < 0.005, d = 0.69). The Group 
x Type of temporal focus interaction was also significant, F(2.6,99.2) = 5.53, p < 
0.005, η2 = 0.13. The Verbal-cues group reported a higher proportion of past episodes 
compared to the No-cues group (M = 0.45 vs. M = 0.26, p < 0.01, d = 0.53) and a lower 
proportion of future events (M = 0.20 vs. M = 0.40, p < 0.01, d = 0.52). In the Verbal-
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cues group, the proportion of past episodes (M = 0.45) was significantly higher than 
present thoughts (M = 0.09, p < 0.000005, d = 1.10), future thoughts (M = 0.20, p < 
0.05, d = 0.56) and atemporal thoughts (M = 0.26, p < 0.05, d = 0.54), and the 
proportion of atemporal thoughts was significantly higher than present thought (p < 
0.05, d = 0.61). In the No-cues group, the proportion of future thoughts (M = 0.40) was 
significantly higher than present thoughts (M = 0.15, p < 0.05, d = 0.62). These results 
are shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Mean proportion of past-focused, present-focused, future-focused, and 
atemporal MW in the Verbal-cues and No-cues groups. Error bars represent standard error. 
Dark grey: Verbal-cues group; light grey: No-cues group. 
 
To further investigate this aspect, we ran a secondary analysis limited to the MW 
episodes that participants reported as being triggered by the verbal cues, and examined 
the mean proportion of each type of temporal focus (i.e., past, present, future, 
atemporal) calculated over the total amount of MW triggered by the cue-words. 
Again, the analysis was carried out on participants who reported at least 3 MW 
episodes and the epsilon correction for the degrees of freedom suggested by Greer and 
Dunlap (1997) was used to take into account that, for each participant, the sum of the 
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values (proportion) across the conditions of the temporal focus factor is constant, 
namely 1. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Temporal focus, 
F(1.7,36.1) = 15.35, p < 0.00005, η2 = 0.42. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
adjustment indicated that the proportion of past (M = 0.50) was significantly higher 
than the proportion of present (M = 0.08, p < 0.000005, d = 1.75) and future (M = 0.09, 
p < 0.00005, d = 1.56). The proportion of atemporal (M = 0.32) was significantly 
higher than the proportion of present (p < 0.05, d = 0.83) and future (p < 0.05, d = 
0.75) and it did not significantly differ from the proportion of past (p = 0.65, d = 0.42). 
 
Phenomenological properties of MW reported 
At the end of the vigilance task, participants were asked to specify for each event 
whether it was general or specific, and whether it was self-related or not. Out of 324 
MW reports, 182 reports (56.2%) were classed as specific and 248 reports (76.5%) 
were classed as self-related. In the Verbal-cues group, out of 218 MW reports, 118 
reports (54.1%) were classed as specific and 167 reports (76.6%) as self-related. In the 
No-cues groups, out of 106 MW reports, 64 reports (60.4%) were classed as specific 
and 81 reports (76.4%) were classed as self-related. 
To assess whether the presence of verbal cues affected these two 
phenomenological qualities of MW, for each participant we calculated the proportion 
of specific MW episodes and the proportion of self-related MW episodes. Two 
independent sample t-tests were performed to compare the mean proportion of specific 
MW episodes and self-related MW episodes between No-cues and Verbal-cues 
groups. The results did not reveal any significant difference between the two groups 
in the mean proportion of specific MW episodes (t(54) = 0.28, p = 0.78, d = 0.07) or 
in the mean proportion of self-related mental contents (t(54) = 0.22, p = 0.80, d = 0.07). 
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Latency data 
For each MW episode indicated by participants (Verbal-cues group only) as 
triggered by a cue-word, we could compute the time-interval occurring between the 
presentation of the cue-word and the moment that participants pressed the button to 
report a mental content triggered by that cue-word. We referred to these time-intervals 
as to latency data for MW episodes. Latency data were calculated by adding the time 
for the present (clicked on) trial, to the times for all the trials back, up to the trial that 
presented the cue-word that was reported by the participant as the trigger of the mental 
content. For example, if a triggering word was presented at trial 0 and participants 
reported the triggered thought after 100 msec. from the beginning of trial 2, we 
computed 3100 msec. as latency for that thought (see also studies on involuntary 
memories for a similar procedure to obtain retrieval times; e.g., Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci et al., 2015). 
We checked for possible outliers, by transforming each data point into 
standardised data point and identified data greater than 2.5 in absolute value as outliers. 
Out of the 129 MW episodes triggered by the cue-words, six were identified as outliers 
because of the very high time-interval between the trigger and the report of MW. 
The mean latency of the remaining MW episodes was 6131.05 msec. (SD = 
4920.82 msec., range 909-25230 msec.). Since each trial lasted 1500 msec., the mean 
number of trials being between a trigger and the report of a MW episode triggered by 
that trigger was 4.09 trials (SD = 3.28 trials, range 0-17 trials). Out of the 123 MW 
episodes, 71 episodes (57.72%) were reported after a latency lower than or equal to 5 
sec., 29 episodes (23.58%) were reported after a latency greater than 5 sec. and lower 
than or equal to 10 sec., 14 episodes (11.38%) were reported after a latency greater 
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than 10 sec. and lower than or equal to 15 sec., and 9 episodes (7.32%) were reported 
after a latency greater than 15 sec. 
For exploratory purposes, we analysed whether the temporal orientation of MW 
affected the latency data. We used a multilevel (or hierarchical) dataset in which the 
unit of analysis was a single MW episode. The use of this strategy of analysis not only 
allowed us to take into account the non-independence of the units of analysis, but also 
to accommodate for unequal numbers of data points within participants (Jahng, Wood, 
& Trull, 2008). We specified random-intercept multilevel models to test for 
associations of the factor Temporal focus (past, present, future, atemporal) with the 
latency data (measured in msec.), which was considered as the dependent variable. 
Given that the latency data were substantially skewed and kurtotic, we conducted the 
analysis after log transformation of the data. 
The analysis revealed no significant differences between temporal focuses, 
F(3,107.75) = 0.37, p = 0.77 (past Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.72, 95% Confidence 
Interval [CI]: 3.62-3.83; present Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.68, 95% CI: 3.51-3.85; 
future Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.65, 95% CI: 3.48-3.81; atemporal Estimated 
Marginal Mean = 3.68, 95% CI: 3.56-3.81). 
 
2.4 Discussion 
In the present study, we investigated the causal role of the exposure to verbal cues 
in triggering and shaping MW. Two groups of participants performed a vigilance task 
and recorded their MW episodes experienced during the task with a self-caught 
procedure. One group was also exposed to task-irrelevant verbal cues in some trials of 
the task, whereas the other group was not exposed to any verbal cues. The findings 
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showed that the exposure to task-irrelevant verbal cues positively affected the amount 
of MW, with a significantly higher number of MW episodes reported by the Verbal-
cues group compared with the No-cues. The Verbal-cues group also reported a higher 
proportion of past-oriented MW compared with the other temporal orientations. The 
higher amount of MW shown by the Verbal-cues group demonstrates that the external 
context can stimulate the occurrence of MW. This is further confirmed by the fact that 
in the Verbal-cues group, the number of MW episodes triggered by the cue-words was 
significantly higher compared with MW episodes triggered by internal thoughts, by 
environmental stimulus and by no trigger. Moreover, the two groups did not 
significantly differ with respect to the amount of MW triggered by internal thoughts, 
environmental stimuli and no trigger, indicating that the difference in the rate of MW 
is likely attributable to the cue-words themselves. 
In addition to this interpretation, it should be also considered the possibility that 
the mere presence of distractors may reduce participants’ attention and make them 
more susceptible to MW. This explanation would be consistent with previous evidence 
showing that people with worse performance on attentional tasks are more prone to 
experience MW (Hu, He, & Xu, 2012). However, our results do not seem to support 
this view. Besides the fact that the Verbal-cues and the No-cues group did not differ 
with respect to the amount of MW not triggered by the cue-words, they also did not 
differ in the level of concentration and the amount of ED reported. In fact, by assessing 
separately MW and ED, we could show that only MW increased under the exposure 
to verbal cues. This result additionally confirms previous studies showing that MW 
and ED are partially distinct processes (e.g., Stawarczyk et al., 2014; Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016; see also section 1.1 in Chapter 1 of the 
present work). 
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The potential contribution of the external context as trigger for MW has not been 
considered by most of the research on MW and MW episodes has been often described 
as “stimulus-independent thoughts” (e.g., Antrobus et al., 1966) or “self-generated 
thoughts” (e.g., Smallwood, 2013). Perhaps, this lack in the research is also caused by 
the fact that the experimental paradigms that have been mainly used to investigate MW 
did not allow to distinguish between the initiation of MW and its maintenance over 
time due to either the nature of the task or the sampling method. For example, by using 
tasks involving simple stimuli (i.e., digits, letters, shapes), the likelihood that MW is 
triggered by any external stimulus is clearly reduced. Moreover, the vast majority of 
studies did not apparently consider the possibility that MW could be triggered by 
various stimuli and did not include an assessment of the potential triggers of MW. By 
doing so, the relative contribution of external stimuli and internal processes for MW 
occurrence might have been overlooked. Only recently, some studies have started 
addressing the question about the cue-dependent nature of MW (e.g., Maillet & 
Schacter, 2016; Maillet, Seli, & Schacter, 2017; McVay & Kane, 2013; Plimpton et 
al., 2015). None of these studies, however, has investigated the causal role of task-
irrelevant cues in triggering MW. For example, in a very recent study, Maillet and 
colleagues (2017) compared MW recorded with thought-probes during a task 
composed of meaningless stimuli (digits) with that reported during a task composed 
of meaningful stimuli (words). To identify thoughts triggered by external cues, one of 
the thought-probes’ questions asked participants about the type of thought 
experienced: (i) on-task, (ii) thought triggered by a task-stimulus (considered as 
thoughts dependent from external cues), (iii) thought task-related but not triggered by 
a task-stimulus, (iv) thought unrelated to the task and not triggered by any task-
stimulus. They found that the task with word stimuli was associated with a higher 
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number of thoughts triggered by task-stimuli and a lower number of thoughts not 
triggered by task-stimuli compared to the task with number stimuli. Although this 
study agreed with our findings, it is, however, different from ours because their 
meaningful stimuli are task-relevant (i.e., their external stimuli are part of the task that 
participants are explicitly required to process and perform), whereas the verbal cues 
embedded in our vigilance task are task-irrelevant. 
The incorporation of verbal cues into the vigilance task also allowed us to 
examine the time-interval (or the latency) occurring between the presentation of a 
verbal cue that acted as trigger for MW and the report of that MW episode. This time-
interval might reflect the time spent experiencing a MW state before self-reporting it 
or the time needed for being aware of that mental content. Interestingly, the 
measurement of this time-interval made us aware of the variability in times between 
different MW episodes. In the present study, participants reported some MW episodes 
after one second or less from the presentation of the cue-word that acted as trigger, and 
others after 10 seconds or more, suggesting that the latency of MW episodes may 
actually be very different from a MW episode to another. We explored whether 
different latencies were associated with different temporal focuses of MW, and we 
found no significant differences (see also Cole, Staugaard, & Berntsen, 2016, for a 
similar result on past and future mental time travel). However, future studies should 
investigate whether the variability in MW latency depends on other characteristics of 
MW episodes not examined here and/or on participants’ characteristics assessed with 
trait-level measures.  
Our results also showed that not only the frequency of MW but also the temporal 
focus of MW episodes can be manipulated by systematically modifying the external 
context. Previous studies revealed that, although evidence indicates a prospective bias 
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in MW (Baird et al., 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 
2011), the temporal focus of MW is rather flexible, and specific features, such as 
cognitive load, negative mood or interest, may affect the temporal orientation of MW 
(e.g., Baird et al., 2011; Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011; see section 1.4 in Chapter 1 of the present work). Our findings 
suggest that the exposure to external stimuli can bias the temporal focus as well, by 
increasing the proportion of past-focused MW. This retrospective bias is also 
consistent with the results of very recent studies (Maillet et al., 2017; Maillet & 
Schacter, 2016) showing that MW indicated by participants as triggered by external 
(but not task-irrelevant) stimuli was primarily past-oriented, whereas stimulus-
independent MW did not have a temporality bias, that is it was equally likely to be 
about the past and future. Other evidence reported that, compared to memories (i.e., 
past-oriented MW), involuntary future thinking is related to and triggered primarily by 
current concerns (Cole & Berntsen, 2016) and thus less dependent from external 
stimulation. As suggested by Maillet and Schacter (2016), the association between 
external stimuli and past episodes “may be an important mechanism that helps 
individuals relate the current environmental situation to similar situations they have 
encountered in the past, which may in turn help guide appropriate action (e.g., Preston 
& Eichenbaum, 2013)” (p. 377). 
Finally, some future developments of the present study should be considered. 
Although our results make an important contribution for the role of external, 
meaningful and task-irrelevant stimuli in MW, the events that control MW occurrence 
and the mechanisms associated with the onset of thoughts should be further examined. 
A good way to address this would be to combine self-reports of MW with objective 
measures. The procedure used in the present study (see also Plimpton et al., 2015) 
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allow to collect subjective information about which verbal cues triggered MW 
episodes according to participants and thus to identify the possible onset of MW 
episodes. Future studies should examine whether the onset of a MW episode (i.e., in 
the present study, the verbal cue which is, subjectively, reported to have triggered the 
MW) might be associated with a specific objective marker, such as a change in 
behavioural measures as well as neural or physiological activity. 
Future investigations might also examine the role of external cues in MW by using 
a probe-caught instead of a self-caught technique. In our study, participants were 
instructed to stop the task whenever they realised that they were thinking about 
something and thus they necessarily reported only those MW episodes of which they 
were aware. Moreover, the presentation of verbal cues, albeit infrequent, might break 
up the flow of thoughts and induce participants to became aware of their mental 
contents and report them. Although our findings are in line with the ones found by 
Plimpton and colleagues (2015) with a probe-caught procedure, future studies might 
further explore the role of external cues in MW by employing a probe-caught 
procedure. 
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Chapter 3 
Tracking the dynamics of mind-
wandering: a pupillometry study  
(Study 2) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction and aims of Study 2 
Our findings reported in Chapter 2 support the view of MW as a process possibly 
triggered by external, meaningful and task-irrelevant stimuli (see also, for example, 
Maillet et al., 2017; Plimpton et al., 2015). This finding opens to the possibility to 
investigate the events surrounding the moment of MW onset and the dynamic of 
thoughts’ flow over time, converging with the need of considering MW as a dynamic 
process (Christoff et al., 2016). The next step is, therefore, to approach towards the 
strategy of triangulation of measures (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) and associate 
stimuli which act as triggers for MW with objective measures of MW onset and 
maintenance (how MW unfolds over time). A proper index for addressing these 
aspects may be a physiological measure such as pupil activity. In this introduction, we 
will briefly present some literature showing how pupillometry can be used as a valid 
tool for studying high order cognition, and will report previous studies which have 
already used pupillometry in MW research. 
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3.1.1 Pupillometry and high-order processes 
For a long time, research on pupil activity has focused on the information that 
pupils could give about sensory processing and perceptual inputs (e.g., the well-known 
pupillary light reflex). However, a number of studies have demonstrated that pupil 
measures can also reveal information about high-order cognition (see Eckstein, 
Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2017; Hartmann & Fischer, 2014; Mathot, 
2018; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). In the perception field, for example, it has been 
demonstrated that pupils respond to high-order evaluation of stimuli both presented 
visually (Binda, Pereverzeva, & Murray, 2013) or imagined (Laeng & Sulutvedt, 
2014). When participants were presented with images showing the sun or the moon, 
pupil constricted to a greater extent to the images of suns, despite controlling for 
luminance of the images (Binda et al., 2013). This effect was also found by only asking 
participants to imagine scenes while looking at an empty background: pupil 
constrictions were higher when participants imagined high luminance scenes (Laeng 
& Sulutvedt, 2014). 
Moreover, a response of pupil dilation is associated with emotional (e.g., an 
arousing stimulus or mental image) and cognitive load (e.g., working memory load). 
Some authors stated that something increasing the processing load in the mind also 
causes the pupil to dilate (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Loewenfeld, 1958; 
Mathot, 2018). The seminal work by Hess and Polt (1960, 1964; see also Hess, Seltzer, 
& Shlien, 1965), and Kahneman and Beatty (1966) showed that pupil size is a reliable 
indicator of mental effort and arousal. Hess and Polt (1964) asked participants to 
perform mathematical problems (multiplications) of different levels of difficulty while 
pupils were recorded. Results showed that pupil dilation indicated mental activity and 
that the size of the pupil increased with the difficulty of the problems. Similarly, 
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Kahneman and Beatty (1966) requested participants to perform short-term memory 
tasks (i.e., strings of digits to be remembered; a string of monosyllabic nouns to be 
remembered; a string of four digits presented for transformation) while pupils were 
recorded. The number of the digits to be remembered was varied (three to seven digits 
per string) and the results showed that a pupil dilation occurred with the presentation 
of each digit and that the pupil size were directly related to the number of digits that 
were memorized. Moreover, the comparison between the pupil size recorded in the 
task of digits’ recall and the pupil size recorded during the other more difficult tasks 
(i.e., recall of words and digits transformation) revealed that pupil dilation was higher 
when participants performed the more difficult tasks. These results suggest that pupil 
dilation is related to task difficulty and processing load. This effect of pupil dilation 
was also found in other studies on working memory (Ahern & Beatty, 1979; Beatty & 
Kahneman, 1966; Elshtain & Schaefer, 1968) and decision-making processes 
(Kahneman & Beatty, 1967; see Sirois & Brisson, 2014). 
A relation between pupil dilation and arousal has been also demonstrated (Hess 
& Polt, 1960; Partala & Surakka, 2003). For example, in the early work by Hess and 
Polt (1960), participants were asked to look at images that varied in how arousing they 
were, and whom the images were arousing to (based on the authors’ subjective 
impression of the images). The results showed that when participants viewed images 
that were arousing to them, their pupils dilated (e.g., men’s pupils dilated most to 
images of naked women, whereas women’s pupils dilated most to images of babies 
and naked men) (see also Partala & Surakka, 2003, for auditory processing of stimuli). 
Moreover, it has been suggested that pupil dilation may depend on arousal (intense vs. 
neutral) instead of valence (positive vs. negative), as it has been found no significant 
difference whether arousal is triggered by something pleasant or unpleasant (e.g., 
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Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003; but see Libby, 
Lacey, & Lacey, 1973). Bradley and colleagues (2008) also found that pupillary 
changes covaried with skin conductance reactions during picture viewing, again 
providing support for the hypothesis that pupil diameter is associated with arousal. 
Other evidence also suggests that pupil dilation is associated to painful stimuli 
(e.g., Chapman, Oka, Bradshaw, Jacobson, & Donaldson, 1999; Ellermeier & 
Westphal, 1995) and to interpersonal touch, such that it is higher whether participants 
are touched by a human hand compared with similar machine touch (Ellingsen et al., 
2014). 
Research has suggested that pupil activity is related to the functioning of the locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system in the brain. With the use of single-cell 
recording in monkeys and brain imaging techniques, robust findings have established 
that changes in pupillary diameter are tightly correlated to changes in activity in the 
LC (e.g., Alnaes et al., 2014; Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016; Rajkowski, Kubiak, 
& Aston-Jones, 1993; Rajkowski, Majczynski, Clayton, & Aston-Jones, 2004). This 
has been proposed as support for considering pupil diameter as a proxy for NE-LC 
activity. An important framework that links pupil activity to the LC-NE system in 
regulating behaviour is the adaptive-gain theory (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; see also 
Eckstein et al., 2017; Mathot, 2018). This theory postulates that the LC-NE system 
balances the trade-off between two different modes of behaviour (i.e., the exploitation 
and exploration modes) that are alternated to optimize reward. Exploitation refers to a 
mode when one is engaged in a single activity and is exploiting the rewards associated 
with that activity, whereas exploration refers to a mode when one is easily distracted 
and switch from a task to another so as to explore different tasks and find the one that 
offers the higher rewards. Exploitation would be associated with intermediate, phasic 
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(evoked by stimuli) LC activity, and, consequently, an intermediate pupil size, whereas 
exploration is associated with high, tonic (overall sustained) LC activity, and, 
consequently, large pupils. This relation is also consistent with the Yerkes-Dodson 
inverted U-curve (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) relating arousal and performance. 
Empirical evidence for the adaptive-gain theory has been reported (e.g., Gilzenrat, 
Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011). For example, 
Jepma and Nieuwenhuis (2011) asked participants to perform the Four Armed Bandit 
task, which leads to exploration-exploitation cycles in behaviour, while collecting 
pupil measures. Participants had to select a card from one of four possible decks and 
each deck was associated with a certain pay-off that changed gradually over time. Once 
participants discovered that a deck had a high pay-off, they kept selecting cards from 
this deck (i.e., exploitation behaviour). Since pay-off changed gradually, once the 
high-value deck was no longer profitable, participants started trying other decks (i.e., 
exploration behaviour). Analyses on pupillary data showed that pupils were larger 
during exploration than during exploitation behaviours, consistent with the adaptive-
gain theory. 
 
3.1.2 Pupillometry and mind-wandering 
To date, only a few studies have investigated pupillary correlates of MW and 
contradictory findings in both pupil diameter and phasic pupillary response have been 
reported. These divergences may also depend on the employment of different 
classifications of MW episodes and various tasks (more or less demanding and 
including or not external stimuli) as well as different time-windows to analyse pupil 
activity (Grandchamp, Braboszcz, & Delorme, 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2018). In 
the present section, we will briefly review these studies. 
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Two of the first pioneering studies reported a relationship between periods of off-
task thinking and specific measures of pupil activity (Smallwood et al., 2012; 
Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011), even though they did not combine thoughts’ 
sampling and physiological measures during the same task. For example, Smallwood, 
Brown, et al. (2011) reported that periods of off-task thinking were associated with 
higher pupil diameter and reduced phasic pupillary response to external stimuli. 
Specifically, these authors asked participants to perform two different tasks (i.e., a 
choice reaction time and a working memory tasks) that required participants to make 
a choice on some target stimuli and were previously found to be associated with a 
different rate of off-task thinking, with the choice reaction time stimulating more off-
task states. While participants performed these task without thought sampling, their 
pupils were continuously recorded. The analysis on pupil activity in the 2.5 sec. after 
the presentation of non-target stimuli showed that an evoked pupil response was 
recorded in the working memory task but not in the choice reaction time task (see also 
Kang, Huffer, & Wheatley, 2014, for a replication of the same results by employing 
the same procedure and controlling for isoluminance of the stimuli), and, according to 
the authors, corroborated the perceptual decoupling hypothesis, as the pupil response 
to external stimuli was reduced in the task which should be associated with higher 
occurrence of off-task thinking. Moreover, they found that in the 1.5 sec. period prior 
to a non-target stimulus, the average pupil diameter in the choice reaction time task 
was larger than in the working memory task (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011).  
These studies are a first step toward demonstrating a relationship between pupil 
diameter and MW; however, they did not combine pupillometry and MW sampling 
during the same task. 
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Next, other studies recording pupil measures and reports of MW simultaneously 
have been conducted in order to investigate the relationship between MW and both 
measures of pupil diameter and phasic pupillary response, despite reporting somehow 
contradicting findings (Franklin et al., 2013; Grandchamp et al., 2014; Konishi et al., 
2017; Mittner et al., 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011). 
As for pupil diameter, Franklin et al. (2013), for example, employed a reading 
task with thought-probes, and found that the pupil diameter in the 10 sec. preceding an 
off-task report (i.e., before a thought-probe where an off-task report was given) was 
higher than that preceding an on-task report. Other studies found no significant effect 
on pupil diameter (Unsworth & Robison, 2018, Experiment 2; Uzzaman & Joordens, 
2011) or an opposite pattern (Grandchamp et al., 2014; Konishi et al., 2017; Mittner 
et al., 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016; Unsworth & Robison, 2018, Experiment 1) 
by using completely different tasks (e.g., more demanding; Mittner et al., 2014; 
Unsworth & Robison, 2016) and different time-interval to measure pupil activity. For 
example, Grandchamp et al. (2014) found a reduction in pupil diameter associated with 
off-task by using a more indirect comparison between off-task and on-task states. 
Specifically, they asked two participants to count backward each of their breath cycles 
from 10 to 1 (at 1, they had to restart counting backward from 10) and to also indicate 
whenever they realized they had lost track of their breath count by pressing a button 
(i.e., these button presses were considered as MW periods). Results showed that the 
pupil size in the 9 sec. time-interval before button presses was smaller than the pupil 
diameter in the 9 sec. time-interval after button presses (i.e., re-focusing periods, when 
participants started the task again after reporting the drift of their attention). Thus, in 
this study, both the type of the task and the method for comparing the pupil diameter 
were clearly different compared to the previous one. 
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A smaller pupil diameter associated with off-task states was also found by Konishi 
and colleagues (2017; Experiment 2) by using a different task and different time-
windows to compare pupil activity again. Specifically, they used a task composed of 
a 0-back and 1-back conditions that continuously switched from one to the other and 
thought-probes that included ten questions during the task. The first question of 
thought-probes requested participants to indicate on a continuous slider scale their 
focus of attention (from “completely off-task” to “completely on-task”). From the 
analysis of the pupil diameter in an average time-window of 3.5 sec. before thought-
probes, they found that off-task states – particularly those associated with a focus on 
the past and with an intrusive quality – were associated with a smaller pupil diameter 
compared to on-task states and that this association between pupil diameter and off-
task experience seemed to be only significant in the 0-back condition of the task (i.e., 
not in the 1-back condition). 
As for the studies investigating the relationship between MW and phasic pupillary 
activity, some studies replicated the results found by Smallwood, Brown, et al. (2011) 
of reduced phasic pupillary responses to external stimuli during off-task states (Mittner 
et al., 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016, 2018) while others found no significant 
differences between on-task and off-task states (Konishi et al., 2017). For example, 
Mittner et al. (2014) employed a stop-signal paradigm (i.e., participants responded as 
quickly as possible to the orientation of an arrow pointed to the left or to the right and 
withheld their response whenever they perceived an auditory stop-signal). Thought-
probes asked participants to indicate where their attention was on a five-point Likert 
scale (ranging from task-independent to task-centred). Analyses of pupil activity 
revealed that off-task trials were associated with reduced pupillary response to task-
stimuli.  
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The same results were obtained by Unsworth and Robison (2016), by using a 
psychomotor vigilance task (i.e., a quite demanding task compared to a reading task 
or a choice reaction time task). One valuable aspect of this study is that these authors 
introduced the distinction among different attentional states (i.e., on-task, task-related 
interferences, external distraction, MW, blank mind) into thought-probes. Similarly to 
the previous study, analyses on pupil data showed that task-evoked pupillary response 
was higher when associated with on-task reports than MW reports and the pupil 
diameter recorded during a fixation screen before stimulus presentation was smaller 
when associated with a subsequent MW report than when associated with an on-task 
report. 
Finally, in addition to the findings on pupil diameter and pupillary phasic 
responses, variability in pupil diameter has been also reported during MW states 
compared with on-task states (Bixler & D’Mello, 2016).  
 
3.1.3 Aims of Study 2 
All the studies described above examined the pupil diameter associated with a 
MW/off-task state by using a fixed time-window prior to the probe, set by the 
researcher and identical for each MW episode and for each participant (although 
different between studies). The main aim of the present study was, instead, to examine 
the pupil activity occurring after external cues indicated by participants as triggers for 
MW episodes. In this way, we could extend further the results found in Study 1 (see 
Chapter 2) by obtaining a covert measure associated with the onset of MW episodes. 
The association between self-reports of MW and physiological measures could allow 
to investigate the dynamic of MW onset that was not possible to investigate by using 
only the self-report measure. Since pupil activity is considered as an index of high-
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order cognition and particularly for emotional and cognitive load (e.g., Hess & Polt, 
1960; Partala & Surakka, 2003), we could hypothesize that the onset of a MW episode 
was associated with a change in pupil diameter (i.e., a dilation).  
In addition to this main aim, we also analysed the activity occurring before 
thought-probes, in order to make a comparison with previous pupillometry studies of 
MW.  
Moreover, we examined whether the experience of MW could modify the sensory 
response of the pupil to weak luminance stimuli presented during our undemanding 
vigilance task. According to the perceptual decoupling hypothesis (e.g., Schooler et 
al., 2011), the processing of sensory input should be decreased when the mind wanders 
toward internal information to insulate the internal train of thought from the external 
information. In order to verify this hypothesis, we analysed the sensory response of 
the pupil to the stimuli of the task immediately preceding thought-probes where MW 
or on-task reports were given. 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Fifty undergraduate students from the University of Florence (41 females, age 
range 18-27 years, M = 20.84 years, SD = 2.38 years) volunteered to take part in the 
study. All participants were Italian native speakers and they had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. The experimental protocol is consistent with the declaration of 
Helsinki and with the regulations of the University of Florence that hosted the study. 
 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
 
 
! 98 
3.2.2 Apparatus 
Task stimuli were generated with the PsychoPhysics Toolbox routines for 
MATLAB (MATLAB r2010a, The MathWorks) and presented on a LCD colour 
monitor (Asus MX239H, 51 x 28 cm, resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels, refresh rate of 
60 Hz), driven by a Macbook Pro Retina (OS X Yosemite, 10.10.5). All stimuli were 
shown in white (55 cd/m2) against a black background (0.05 cd/m2). 
Participants sat in front of the monitor screen at 57 cm viewing distance, with 
their heads stabilised by chin rest (see Figure 3.1). Two-dimensional eye position and 
pupil diameter were recorded binocularly with a CRS LiveTrack system (Cambridge 
Research Systems) at 30 Hz, using an infrared camera mounted below the screen. Pupil 
diameter measures were transformed from pixels to millimetres after calibrating the 
tracker with an artificial 4 mm pupil, positioned at the approximate location of the 
participants’ left eye. Gaze position data were linearized with a standard 9-point 
calibration, run prior to each session. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of the apparatus used for each participant in the study. 
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3.2.3 Materials 
Vigilance task 
Participants performed a modified version of the computer-based vigilance task 
developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and used in previous studies on 
spontaneous thought processes (e.g., Plimpton et al., 2015; Vannucci et al., 2015, 
2016; see also Chapter 2 of the present work). This task consisted of 1120 trials, 
presented in a fixed order, each remaining on the screen for 2 sec. A white fixation 
point (0.2 deg diameter) was presented in the centre of the screen for each trial. In each 
trial, an image was shown depicting a pattern of white horizontal (non-target stimuli) 
or white vertical (target stimuli) lines (4.1 x 0.2 deg) on a black background. Target 
stimuli appeared on 68 trials (~6% of all trials) and they were presented pseudo-
randomly, with a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 31 trials between each target 
stimulus. In addition to the lines, a white cue-word (e.g., “exquisite dinner”; 0.88 deg 
height) was also shown under the fixation spot in 210 trials (18.75% of all trials) (see 
Figure 3.2 for an example of the experimental trials). These word-phrases were 
selected from the pool of word-phrases developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili 
(2008) and adapted to the Italian sample (Vannucci et al., 2015; see also Chapter 2 of 
the present work). Equal numbers of positive (n = 70), negative (n = 70) and neutral 
(n = 70) cue-words were included. 
 
Thought-probes 
At 28 fixed points (separated by an average of 40 trials, SD = 7.50, corresponding 
to an average of 80 sec., SD = 15 sec.) during the presentation, the vigilance task was 
stopped by a thought-probe that requested participants to answer some questions 
before continuing the task. First, participants were asked about what they were 
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thinking just immediately prior to the probe. They could report that they were focused 
on the task (on-task report) or that they were thinking about something else or that 
their mind was blank. Second, if participants reported that they were thinking about 
something else, they should (i) give orally a short description of their thoughts 
(recorded by the experimenter), (ii) indicate if the thoughts occurred spontaneously 
(i.e., simply popped into their mind), if they deliberately decided to think about them 
or if they were not sure about the answer, and (iii) indicate whether the thoughts had 
been triggered by the environment, by internal thoughts, by a cue-word on the screen 
(if so, they had to specify the cue-word) or if there was no trigger. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Schematic of the experimental task. Horizontal lines: non-target stimuli; 
vertical lines: target stimuli to be detected by pressing a button. 
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After being welcomed in the laboratory, 
participants were briefly introduced to the research project and eye-tracking recording, 
being informed that they would take part in a study on concentration and its correlates, 
and signed a consent form. Afterwards, they received the instructions for the vigilance 
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task. It was explained that they had to detect target stimuli (vertical lines) in a stream 
of non-target stimuli (horizontal lines), by pressing the space-bar each time a target 
was detected. Moreover, they were told that they would also see cue-words in some of 
the trials and that they were not supposed to do anything with these task-irrelevant cue-
words. It was explained that the condition they were taking part in was looking at how 
people could keep their concentration on the lines and that participants in another 
condition would have to concentrate on the cue-words (it was a cover story). Next, 
participants were informed that the task was quite monotonous and that they could find 
themselves thinking about other things (e.g., thoughts, plans, considerations, past 
events, images, etc.). These mental contents could pop into their mind spontaneously 
or they could be intentionally generated. Participants were told that they would be 
interrupted during the performance and presented with thought-probes consisting of 
questions about (i) their focus of attention just immediately prior to the probe, (ii) 
whether their thoughts (if they reported any) were spontaneous or deliberate, (iii) the 
trigger of these thoughts (if they reported any) (see Materials, Thought-probes 
section). If the mental content was private and intimate, participants could label it as 
“personal” and eventually provide only one relevant word instead of reporting a short 
description. Finally, they were also requested to focus on the fixation spot for the 
whole duration of the task. 
Participants were given a 20-trials practice session, and a 5-minutes break was 
allowed between the two halves of the task. Finally, participants were asked whether 
they had speculated about the actual aims of the study (if so, what they had thought) 
during the task and then they were debriefed and dismissed. The total session lasted 
approximately 120 minutes. 
 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
 
 
! 102 
3.2.5 Analyses of pupillometry data 
Analyses were carried out on 42 out of 50 participants3. First, an off-line analysis 
examined the eye-tracking output in order to exclude time-points with unrealistic 
pupil-size recordings (i.e., values outside the 90th percentile of each 2 sec. long trial) 
and interpolated the remaining time-points at 20Hz. This procedure yielded smooth 
and consistent pupil traces, excluding only 4.45% of trials due to excessive signal loss 
(> 60% of the time-points). This approach, however, retains for analysis trials where 
a blink might have occurred.  
Second, in order to perform our main analyses, trials were selected based on the 
responses given to thought-probes by each participant. Specifically, before analysing 
the data, all the mental contents reported by participants were read by two independent 
judges and classified into distinct categories. The categorization was based on the 
categories already used in previous studies (e.g., Plimpton et al., 2015; Unsworth & 
Robison, 2016; see also Chapter 2 of the present work). When probed, participants 
could report that they were on-task, that they had their mind blank or that they were 
thinking about something else (see Thought-probes section in the Materials). All the 
on-task reports (i.e., when participants’ attention was fully focused on the task) were 
combined in a single category (OT) and all the blank reports (i.e., when participants’ 
attention was not focused on the task and they appeared thinking about nothing at all, 
that is their mind was a complete blank) were combined in a single category as well. 
As for the other contents reported orally by participants and concerning various 
thoughts, they were classified by the judges as either task-related interferences (TRIs) 
                                                             
3 Five participants were excluded due to non-compliance with task instructions; two 
participants were excluded due to self-reported mental illness; one participant was excluded 
due to technical failures in data recording. The sample used for analyses included thus 42 
participants (34 females, age range 18-27 years, M = 20.64 years, SD = 2.35 years). 
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or task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). TUTs were next classified as either MW reports or 
external distraction (ED) reports. As we already explained in the previous chapter (see 
Chapter 2), TRIs comprised reports whose content was related to any task features or 
to the current performance on the task, whereas TUTs included no references to the 
task at hand and comprised both ED and MW episodes. TUTs were classified as EDs 
when the participant’s attention was unrelated to the task at hand and focused on 
stimuli in the current situation (either exteroceptive or interoceptive perceptions, such 
as bodily sensations), whereas they were coded as MW episodes when the participant’s 
attention was unrelated to the task at hand and decoupled from the external 
environment. These thoughts could be triggered by internal or external stimuli. For 
both categorisations (TRIs vs. TUTs, and MW vs. EDs), Kappa was computed as inter-
rater reliability between the coders and the inter-rater agreement resulted to be very 
good (Kappa = 0.99, SE = 0.01 and Kappa = 0.98, SE = 0.01, respectively). Minor 
disagreements were solved by discussion. Moreover, intentional MW episodes were 
excluded from the analyses (see Results section for further details). 
This classification allowed us to identify thought-probes associated with MW, OT 
or other reports for each participant. Trials associated with cue-words reported as 
triggers for MW episodes were identified for each participant as well. 
In the first analysis, we compared the time-course of pupil diameter observed in 
three conditions: after cue-words indicated by participants as triggers for spontaneous 
MW episodes, after cue-words with emotional content which were followed by on-
task reports, and after other “control” cue-words (i.e., all the cue-words that were 
neither MW triggers nor emotional cue-words followed or preceded by on-task states). 
In order to perform the analyses on the pupillometry data, trials were sorted based on 
their timing relative to a cue-word identified as triggering or not triggering a MW 
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episode (i.e., 0, 1, 2 trials after the cue-word, where the trial 0 was the trial including 
the cue-word) (see Figure 3.3, top panel). We used as “baseline” pupil diameter the 
average diameter at the reference event (i.e., the trial 0 where the trigger/non-trigger 
cue-word was presented) and we studied the time-course of pupil diameter over trials 
after subtracting this baseline. 
In the second analysis, we compared the pupil diameter observed in three 
conditions: before cue-words indicated by participants as triggers for spontaneous MW 
episodes, before cue-words with emotional content which were followed by on-task 
reports, and before other “control” cue-words (i.e., all the cue-words that were neither 
MW triggers nor emotional cue-words followed or preceded by on-task states). In 
order to perform the analyses on the pupillometry data, trials were sorted based on 
their timing relative to a cue-word identified as triggering or not triggering a MW 
episode (i.e., 0, 1, 2 trials before the cue-word, where the trial 0 was the trial including 
the cue-word). We used as “baseline” pupil diameter the average diameter in the 
second half of the reference event (i.e., the trial 0 where the cue-word was presented). 
In the third analysis, we compared the pupil diameter observed in three 
conditions: before thought-probes where a MW report was given, before thought-
probes where an on-task report was given, and before any other thought-probe 
responses. Thus, trials were sorted based on their timing relative to a MW, OT or other 
report (i.e., 1, 2, 3 trials before the probe where the participant reported being in a MW, 
in an OT or other state; the trial 1 is the last trial immediately preceding the probe) 
(see Figure 3.3, bottom panel). We used as “baseline” pupil diameter the average 
diameter at the reference event (i.e., the trial 1 that was the last trial immediately before 
the probe). 
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Figure 3.3. Schematic showing trials used for analyses on the time-course of pupil 
diameter after MW trigger/non-trigger (top), and before thought-probe where a MW/OT/other 
reports where given (bottom). 
 
In the fourth analysis, we examined the pupil response to the white/light 
horizontal lines in trials immediately preceding a thought-probe where a MW or OT 
report was given. For this analysis, the baseline pupil diameter in the first 250 msec. 
of each individual trial was subtracted from the trace, allowing to evaluate the 
amplitude of the light evoked pupillary constriction. 
Given the considerable sample size variability across participants, statistical 
analyses relied on a linear-mixed model approach. Individual trials from all 
participants were compared with a model comprising both the effect of experimental 
variables (“fixed effects”) and the variability across participants (“random effects”). 
Random effects were coded by allowing subject-by-subject variations of the intercept 
of the model. In all cases, the dependent variable was the “baseline corrected pupil 
diameter”, which we obtained by averaging pupil diameter in a pre-specified temporal 
window of each trial (e.g., in the interval 500:1000 msec., when the pupil-constriction 
in response to the task-stimulus is expected to peak), and subtracting the average pupil 
diameter in a “baseline” temporal window (e.g., in the first 250 msec. of the trial). 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
 
 
! 106 
Please refer to the results section for specific definitions of the temporal windows for 
averaging and baseline-subtractions. 
We used standard MATLAB functions provided with the Statistics and Machine 
Learning Toolbox (R2015b, The MathWorks). Specifically, the function “fitlme(data, 
model)” fit the linear-mixed model to the data, yielding an object “lme” with 
associated method “ANOVA” that returns F statistics and P values for each of the 
fixed effect terms and “CoefTest” for post-hoc comparisons. 
 
3.3 Results 
Performance on the vigilance task 
Performance on the vigilance task was near-perfect for all participants. Out of 68 
targets, there were 0.33 (SD = 0.69) misses and 0.79 (SD = 1.14) false alarms. 
Given the very few mistakes reported by participants and the paucity of target-
stimuli presented, we were not able to check whether MW reports were associated with 
worse task performance (i.e., target detection or response times) than on-task reports.  
 
Type and amount of reports collected by probes 
Out of the total thought-probes, 309 reports (26.28%) were classed as on-task 
(OT) reports (M = 7.36, SD = 5.52, range 0-19), 154 reports (13.10%) were classed as 
blank mind reports (M = 3.67, SD = 3.79, range 0-14), 89 reports (7.57%) were classed 
as TRI reports (M = 2.12, SD = 2.23, range 0-9), 594 reports (50.51%) were classed as 
TUT reports (M = 14.14, SD = 5.27, range 3-23). Out of the all TUTs, 91 reports 
(15.32%) were classed as ED reports (M = 2.17, SD = 1.75, range 0-9) and 503 reports 
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(84.68%) were classed as MW reports (M = 11.98, SD = 5.02, range 2-22) (see Table 
1 for a summary of these descriptive data). 
As for the distinction between spontaneous and intentional MW episodes, out of 
the all MW, 402 episodes (79.92%) were reported as spontaneous MW (M = 9.57, SD 
= 4.26, range 2-19) and 88 episodes (17.50%) were reported as intentional MW 
episodes (M = 2.10, SD = 2.13, range 0-8) (see Table 3.1); the remaining 13 MW 
reports (2.58%) were reported with uncertain spontaneity/intentionality (i.e., 
participants reported that they were not sure whether these thoughts were spontaneous 
or intentional) (M = 0.31, SD = 0.60, range 0-3). Besides the fact that we were 
primarily interested in spontaneous MW episodes, participants reported too few 
intentional MW episodes and thus these reports were not further considered in our 
analyses. 
 
Variable M SD range 
On-task 7.36 5.52 0-19 
Blank mind 3.67 3.79 0-14 
Task-related interferences (TRIs) 2.12 2.23 0-9 
External distraction (ED) 2.17 1.75 0-9 
Mind-wandering (MW) 11.98 5.02 2-22 
Spontaneous MW 9.57 4.26 2-19 
Deliberate MW 2.10 2.13 0-8 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive data (means, standard deviations and ranges) of reports collected 
by thought-probes. 
 
Out of the 402 spontaneous MW episodes, 212 reports (52.74%) were reported 
by participants as triggered by a specific cue-word shown on the screen (M = 5.05, SD 
= 2.59, range 1-12), 18 reports (4.48%) by internal thoughts (M = 0.43, SD = 0.70, 
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range 0-2), 25 reports (6.22%) by environmental triggers (M = 0.60, SD = 1.33, range 
0-7), and 119 reports (29.60%) by no trigger (M = 2.83, SD = 2.76, range 0-13). The 
remaining 28 MW episodes were indicated by participants as elicited by multiple cue-
words (i.e., more than one specific cue-word; n = 18), or by unknown cue-word(s) 
(i.e., participants reported that they did not remember which cue-word triggered the 
MW episode; n = 10). 
 As for the reports of spontaneous MW triggered by cue-words, there was a mean 
of 8.97 trials, SD = 10.37 (M = 17.94 sec., SD = 20.74 sec.), between a MW trigger 
and the thought-probe where the report of MW triggered by that specific cue-word was 
given. 
Finally, out of the all spontaneous MW episodes triggered by the cue-words, 39 
reports (18.40%) were triggered by neutral cue-words (M = 0.93, SD = 0.97, range 0-
4), 97 reports (45.75%) were triggered by positive cue-words (M = 2.31, SD = 1.44, 
range 0-7), and 76 reports (35.85%) were triggered by negative cue-words (M = 1.81, 
SD = 1.55, range 0-7). Thus, the vast majority (81.60%) of these reports were elicited 
by cue-words with emotional valence. 
 
Analyses of pupillometry data        
We conducted four analyses on the pupillary data: (i) the first analysis was 
conducted on the pupil diameter over two trials after cue-words identified as triggering 
or not triggering MW episodes; (ii) the second analysis was conducted on the pupil 
diameter before cue-words identified as triggering or not triggering MW episodes; (iii) 
the third analysis was conducted on the pupil diameter before thought-probes 
associated with a MW, OT or any other report; (iv) the fourth analysis was conducted 
on the pupil response to the white/light horizontal lines in trials immediately preceding 
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a thought-probe where a MW or OT report was given. These analyses are reported 
below. 
 
First analysis: MW onset and its unfolding over time. We compared the pupil 
diameter over two trials after a cue-word identified as triggering or not triggering a 
MW episode. Cue-words identified as triggering a MW episode were the cue-words 
that were reported by participants as triggers for MW reports. Cue-words identified as 
not triggering a MW episode were (i) emotional cue-words that were presented just 
before a thought-probe where OT reports were given (i.e., indicating that participants 
were not experiencing any MW state before those thought-probes), (ii) “control” cue-
words, that is other cue-words that were neither MW triggers nor emotional cue-words 
followed or preceded by OT reports. Since the majority of cued MW reports were 
triggered by emotional cue-words, and pupil dilation is affected by emotional load, we 
used as a main comparison condition emotional cue-words followed by OT (not 
triggering words, but with similar emotional valence). 
Assuming that the reported trigger of MW acted as a trigger for MW, we analysed 
and compared the time-course of pupil diameter over two trials after the cue-word (see 
Figure 3.3, top panel). We only considered cue-words that were followed by at least 
two trials with successful pupil recording. From this 6-sec. time-course (each trial 
lasted 2 sec.), we subtracted the average pupil diameter during the first trial (i.e., the 
word-cue presentation, lasting 2 sec.). This approach left 194 MW trigger cue-words, 
215 emotional cue-words followed by an OT report, and 7391 other cue-words. For 
the statistical analysis of the traces, we summarized time-courses by taking the average 
pupil diameter in the last second of each trial (the farthest from the reference). These 
values were entered in a Linear-Mixed Model analysis, with two fixed-factors: type of 
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cue-word (MW trigger, emotional followed by OT, other control cue-words) and time 
from the cue (coded as number of trials: 1st trial, 2nd trial), plus the random effect of 
subjects modelled as variable intercept of the model. This revealed a significant 
interaction between the two fixed factors (F(2,23394) = 10.21610, p = 0.00004). A 
series of post-hoc tests showed that the type of cue-word had a significant effect over 
the two trials that followed the cue-word, where there was a significant difference 
between pupil diameter following MW triggers and emotional cue-words followed by 
an OT report (1st trial following the cue-word: F(1,407) = 4.12330, p = 0.04295; 2nd 
trial: F(1,407) = 8.51346, p = 0.00372). MW triggers were also significantly different 
from the other control cue-words (1st trial following the cue-word: F(1,7583) = 
12.66170, p = 0.00038; 2nd trial: F(1,7583) = 19.97163, p = 0.00001), whereas 
emotional cue-words followed by OT were not significantly different from the other 
control cue-words (1st  trial following the cue-word: F(1,7604) = 1.93229, p = 0.16455; 
2nd trial: F(1,7604) = 2.23358, p = 0.13508) (see Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4. Time-course of pupil diameter after cue-word presentation. The pupil traces 
are aligned to the average pupil diameter during the cue-word presentation (from 0 to 2 sec.). 
Red lines: traces associated with cue-words reported as triggers for MW episodes; green lines: 
traces associated with emotional cue-words presented before OT reports; black lines: traces 
associated with other cue-words presented during the task. Thick lines: average across all 
trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM analysis (average 
over the second half of each trial). 
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Second analysis: pupil diameter before MW triggers. Additionally, we compared 
the pupil diameter before a cue-word identified as triggering or not triggering a MW 
episode, in order to examine whether the differences in pupil diameter originated from 
the cue-words or they existed even before. Similar to the previous analysis, the cue-
words identified as triggering a MW episode were the cue-words that were reported 
by participants as triggers for MW reports, whereas cue-words identified as not 
triggering a MW episode were either emotional cue-words that were presented just 
before a thought-probe where OT reports were given or other “control” cue-words. We 
only considered cue-words that were preceded by at least two trials with successful 
pupil recording. We used as baseline pupil diameter the average diameter in the second 
half of the trial where the cue-word was presented. 
This left 199 MW trigger cue-words, 214 emotional cue-words followed by an 
OT report, and 7461 other cue-words. For the statistical analysis of the traces, we 
summarized time-courses by taking the average pupil diameter in the second half of 
each trial. These values were entered in a Linear-Mixed Model analysis, with two 
fixed-factors: type of cue-word (MW trigger, emotional followed by OT, other control 
cue-words) and time from the cue-word (coded as number of trials: 1st trial before the 
cue-word, 2nd trial before the cue-word), plus the random effect of subjects modelled 
as variable intercept of the model. Neither the effect of type of cue-word (F(2,23616) 
= 0.70888, p = 0.49220) nor the interaction (F(2,23616) = 0.66248, p = 0.51558) were 
significant, suggesting that there was no significant difference between the conditions 
(see Figure 3.5). 
 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
 
 
! 112 
 
Figure 3.5. Time-course of pupil diameter before cue-word presentation. The pupil traces 
are aligned to the average pupil diameter during the second half of the cue-word presentation 
(from 0 to 2 sec.). Red lines: traces associated with cue-words reported as triggers for MW 
episodes; green lines: traces associated with emotional cue-words presented before OT reports; 
blue lines: traces associated with other cue-words presented during the task. Thick lines: 
average across all trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM 
analysis (average over the second half of each trial). 
 
Third analysis: pupil diameter before thought-probes. The third analysis of 
pupillometry data was conducted on the time-course of pupil diameter over three trials 
before thought-probe where reports of MW, OT or other reports were given. We 
aligned traces to the last trial before thought-probe and separated those where reports 
of MW, OT or other reports were given. We only considered thought-probes that were 
preceded by at least three trials with successful pupil recording. From this 6-sec. time-
course, we subtracted the average pupil diameter during the last trial before thought-
probes. 
This left 188 MW reports, 144 OT reports, and 236 other reports. For the 
statistical analysis of the traces, we aligned traces to the average pupil diameter on the 
last trial before the thought-probe, and assessed pupil diameter on each trial as the 
mean pupil diameter in the first second of the trial. These values were entered in a 
Linear-Mixed Model analysis, with two fixed-factors: type of report (MW, OT, others) 
and time from the thought-probe (coded as number of trials: 3, 2, 1), plus the random 
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effect of subjects modelled as variable intercept of the model. The Linear-Mixed 
Model analysis revealed a significant interaction between the fixed-factors type of 
report and time from the thought-probe (F(2,1698) = 3.89778, p = 0.02047). At three 
trials preceding the thought-probe, pupil diameter leading to MW or OT reports could 
be clearly differentiated (F(1,330) = 6.71401, p = 0.00999) (see Figure 3.6). 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Time-course of pupil diameter before thought-probe. The pupil traces are 
aligned to the average pupil diameter during the last trial before the thought-probe (from -2 to 
0 sec.). Red lines: MW reports; green lines: OT reports; black lines: other reports. Thick lines: 
average across all trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM 
analysis (average over the first half of each trial). 
 
Fourth analysis: pupil light response before MW/OT reports. We also examined 
whether sensitivity to sensory stimuli is weakened during MW. To address this, we 
analysed the pupil constriction evoked by the white horizontal lines stimuli in the last 
trial before thought-probes where MW or OT reports were given (all the trials were 
not preceded by a cue-word, which would shift the baseline diameter and mask the 
light response). From each trial, we subtracted the baseline pupil diameter in the first 
250 msec. and computed the average constriction in the interval [500:1000 msec.] into 
the trial, where the pupil response peaked. For the Linear Mixed Model analysis with 
type of report (MW vs. OT) as fixed factor and the random effect of participants as 
variable intercept of the model, we had 372 traces for MW reports and 298 traces for 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
 
 
! 114 
OT reports. The analysis did not reveal a significant difference between the two types 
of report (F(1,645) = 0.02219, p = 0.88163) (see Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7. Amplitude of the pupil light response in the last horizontal trials before 
thought-probes where participants reported MW or OT states. The pupil traces are aligned to 
the average pupil diameter during the first 250 msec. of each trial. Red line: MW report; green 
line: OT report. Thick lines: average across all trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average 
values entered the LMM analysis (average over the [500:1000 msec.] interval). 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Very recently, a number of studies have started examining the contribution of the 
external environment to MW, showing that MW can be triggered by external stimuli 
(e.g., Maillet et al., 2017; Plimpton et al., 2015; see also Chapter 2). In the present 
study, we extended these findings further, by combining self-report measures of MW 
with physiological measures, namely pupil diameter. By employing a vigilance task 
with task-irrelevant verbal cues that could potentially act as triggers for MW episodes 
and by tracking the time-course of pupil size over periods of 6 seconds after a MW 
trigger and a non-trigger (i.e., emotional cue-words associated with OT reports and 
any other control cue-words), we could monitor the dynamics of MW, tracking its 
unfolding over time. 
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We found a significantly larger pupil dilation following MW triggers compared 
to non-trigger words. These results suggest that an increase in pupil diameter follows 
the onset of MW and it accompanies its unfolding and maintenance over time. We also 
found that there was no significant difference in pupil diameter before (1-trial pre and 
2-trials pre) MW triggers and non-triggers. This result provides further evidence that 
the cues reported by participants as trigger of MW did act as triggers.   
Following previous work investigating MW by using pupillometry (e.g., Franklin 
et al., 2013; Unsworth & Robison, 2016), we also compared the pupil diameter 
recorded before thought-probes associated with MW reports, OT reports or other 
reports. Also in this case, we obtained the same pattern, such that there was more pupil 
dilation leading up to a MW report than there was to an OT or other report. 
Previous research has linked pupil dilation and emotional and cognitive load (e.g., 
Hess & Polt, 1960; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Partala & Surakka, 2003). Thus, the 
dilation associated with MW onset could be explained in terms of the increased mental 
load (i.e., emotional and cognitive processing) involved in MW compared with 
focused attention to the simple vigilance task (see for similar results, Franklin et al., 
2013; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). In line with this interpretation, most of the 
contents of the MW episodes reported by our participants were personal projections 
into the personal past (i.e., autobiographical memories) and the future, including 
emotional states and responses.  
Apart from the investigation on MW onset, we also investigated whether MW 
states affected the sensory and attentional processing of the simple visual stimuli (i.e., 
white lines) in the vigilance task, by analysing the pupil constriction evoked by the 
stimuli. According to the perceptual decoupling hypothesis (Schooler et al., 2011; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), during MW the representations of environmental 
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stimuli should be superficial and the processing of sensory inputs should be decreased, 
in order to insulate the internal thoughts’ flow from external disruptions. Other studies 
employing pupillometry found an impairment in sensory processing during MW 
compared to on-task states (e.g., Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Unsworth & 
Robison, 2016). In contrast to these studies, we found no significant difference 
between light responses to stimuli (lines) before a MW or an on-task report (but see 
Konishi et al., 2017, for similar results). Since our study employed a very simple task 
with simple visual stimuli (i.e., simple white lines) compared to the other studies, 
methodological differences could account for this discrepancy. It has been proposed 
that simple visual stimuli suffer no costs of divided attention, compared to complex 
visual stimuli (hypothesis of unlimited-capacity parallel processing of multiple simple 
stimuli, Busey & Palmer, 2008; Palmer, 1994; White, Runeson, Palmer, Ernst, & 
Boynton, 2017). Our findings are consistent with this view and suggest that the 
interference between different sources of information (i.e., external stimuli versus 
internal information) might selectively occur for perceptually and semantically 
complex stimuli. However, we should also contemplate the possibility that the 
modulation of pupil activity during MW was too weak to be detected in our set-up. 
Although our findings make an important contribution to our understanding of the 
onset of MW episodes, they deserve further investigation. For example, future studies 
are needed to investigate whether and how changes in pupil diameter associated with 
MW are modulated by its emotional content. Comparing different kinds of MW 
episodes, namely neutral vs. emotional (positive and negative), might help clarifying 
the mechanisms underlying and subserving the onset and maintenance of MW. 
Another dimension that was not taken in account in the present study is the meta-
awareness of thoughts. Previous studies showed that people do not always notice that 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 
 
 
! 117 
their mind is wandering and sometimes MW episodes occur without people realising 
it consciously. Meta-awareness is considered as an intermittent process by which 
people only periodically notice the contents of their mind (Schooler et al., 2011). Some 
findings revealed that “unaware” MW episodes are associated with poorer 
performance (e.g., Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2007, 2008) and with a most 
pronounced brain recruitment of DMN and dlPFC areas (Christoff et al., 2009). Here, 
we used a probe-caught method to collect MW episodes without distinguishing 
between aware and unaware MW episodes. However, on the basis of previous 
findings, one could argue that aware and unaware MW might be associated with 
differences in pupil activity. Thus, future studies might extend our findings in two 
ways. One approach might be to investigate whether and how the level of meta-
awareness of MW affects changes in pupil size by adding a question on meta-
awareness during thought-probes or by coupling self-caught with probe-caught in the 
same task (see section 1.4 of Chapter 1). A second approach might be to explore 
whether the results are replicated by using the same task but a self-caught procedure 
instead of a probe-caught procedure. The self-caught procedure could allow to collect 
only aware MW and thus to verify whether these results are replicated on the sub-
sample of aware MW episodes. 
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Chapter 4 
Tracking the dynamics of aware mind-
wandering: a pupillometry study 
(Study 3) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction and aims of Study 3 
As discussed previously, the dynamics of MW and the distinction between the 
onset and the maintenance of this process (Smallwood, 2013) are significant questions 
that any comprehensive account of MW should address. Our studies described in the 
previous chapters explored the two questions of the onset of MW (when the mind starts 
wandering) and its maintenance over time (how it unfolds over time). Specifically, in 
Study 1 and Study 2, we showed that MW might be triggered by external, task-
irrelevant meaningful stimuli, as verbal cues. Moreover, in Study 2, we showed that 
the onset of cue-dependent MW is marked by a physiological change, such as an 
increase in pupil size. This dilation accompanies the unfolding of MW over time. In 
both studies, we employed a vigilance task with task-irrelevant verbal cues that might 
potentially act as triggers for MW experiences during the task and this paradigm has 
consistently found to be effective. 
In the present study, we aimed to replicate the results of the pupillometry study 
(Study 2) and to extend them further, by employing a different procedure of thought 
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sampling. In Study 2, we used the probe-caught method, that is we intermittently 
interrupted participants and probed them regarding the contents of their experience. In 
the present study, instead, we employed the self-caught method, and asked participants 
to press a button every time they noticed by themselves that they had been mind 
wandering. This procedure provides a straightforward assessment of the number of 
MW episodes that reach meta-awareness (see Schooler et al., 2011, for a discussion). 
By contrast, probes might catch people mind wandering before they notice it by 
themselves, thereby assessing both “aware” and “unaware” MW episodes. 
Moreover, for MW episodes triggered by the cue-words presented on the screen, 
the use of the self-caught method allows to measure the time-interval occurring 
between the trigger of the MW episode and the report. In order to be able to report a 
MW episode, an individual needs to experience a MW episode and to notice it. For 
this reason, the time it takes participants to report such MW episode depends on the 
time for the initial generation of the spontaneous thought (arising/forming of thoughts) 
and for becoming aware of it and being able to report it. In this regard, the coupling of 
the self-caught method with the vigilance task with cue-words allows for studying the 
“natural” time-course of MW, from its onset/initial generation to the subsequent 
monitoring and awareness of thoughts.  
As we have already mentioned in Study 1, the question about the duration of MW 
is still open and it has been largely overlooked. Indeed, it was examined in an early 
stage of MW research, by Klinger (1978) and Pope (1977). Klinger (1978) trained 
participants who took part in his study to accurately recognise and assess certain 
elements of their inner experiences. Out of all the elements, they were specifically 
trained to estimate the duration of short time intervals so that they would be able to 
estimate the duration of their thoughts either during a task in the laboratory or in daily-
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life. After the training session, participants performed experimental thought-sampling 
sessions and, interspersed with the experimental sessions, out-of-the-laboratory 
thought-sampling sessions. In the laboratory, participants listened dichotically to two 
simultaneous 15-min narratives and indicated continuously to which track they were 
attending. At certain times, they were interrupted by a tone and answered some 
questions about their thoughts. Two questions asked them to estimate the duration of 
the latest thought-segment and the previous segment (open-ended questions). On each 
out-of-the-laboratory occasion, participants received a device that emitted a tone at 
random intervals. At each tone, participants filled out a roughly identical questionnaire 
which included the same questions on the duration of thoughts. The median estimates 
of thought-segment duration were 5 sec. in both settings, with a mean of 9 sec. in the 
laboratory and 14 sec. outside the laboratory. Participants rated their confidence in 
their estimates as “very confident” 64% of the time and as “moderately confident” 
35% of the time (Klinger, 1978, 2013). As reported by Klinger (2013), Pope (1977) 
agreed approximately with these results since he asked participants in a laboratory to 
signal with a key-press each time their mind shifted to a new topic and found that it 
happened on average about 5 or 6 sec. apart. 
 More recently, Grandchamp and colleagues (2014) asked two participants to 
indicate the duration of their MW episodes by employing a self-caught procedure in 
several laboratory sessions. Specifically, in each session, participants had to count 
backward each of their breath cycles (inhale/exhale) from 10 to 1 (at 1, they were 
instructed to restart counting backward from 10), and to indicate whenever they 
realised that they had lost track of their breath count (i.e., reflecting the fact that their 
attention had drifted) by pressing a button. Following the button press, participants 
were asked to characterize their MW episodes by completing a questionnaire. This 
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questionnaire included a question asking participants how long the MW episode was. 
They answered by choosing one option among the following ones:  very short (< 2 
sec.), short (< 10 sec.), medium (< 30 sec.), long (> 30 sec.). The results showed that 
a larger number of MW episodes were reported as “short” (i.e., longer than or equal to 
2 sec. and shorter than 10 sec.). 
However, the vast majority of MW studies has not included any assessment of the 
potential duration of MW, despite it would have been relevant for the aims of some 
studies. Indeed, several investigations have examined measures associated with MW 
states (i.e., reaction time variability, eye movements behaviour, BOLD signal) by 
using predetermined and fixed time-windows before self-reports of MW states and 
therefore assuming that MW episodes occurred precisely into those windows and 
lasted for that period of time. Different time-windows have been used among studies 
(e.g., 10 sec. in Christoff et al., 2009, and Franklin et al., 2013; 6.5 sec. in Seli, Cheyne, 
et al., 2013; 3 to 8 sec. in Frank et al., 2015; 5 sec. in Smilek et al., 2010, and Uzzaman 
& Joordens, 2011; 4.8 sec. in McVay & Kane, 2009; 3.5 sec. on average in Konishi et 
al., 2017) and each study has used the same time-window for each participant and for 
each MW episode. In these studies, the use of the time-windows was necessary 
because MW was not linked to preceding events and participants were not even asked 
to estimate the duration of their thoughts (except for Grandchamp et al., 2014). 
In conclusion, in the present study, we had the following aims. First, we aimed to 
replicate the results of the pupillometry study (Study 2) and to extend them further. To 
this aim, we employed the same vigilance task with verbal cues previously used and 
recorded pupil measures throughout the task. However, to collect MW experiences, 
we used the self-caught procedure instead of the probe-caught procedure. In order to 
replicate the previous findings of pupil dilation associated with the onset and 
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maintenance of MW triggered by cue-words, we compared the time-course of pupil 
diameter observed after cue-words indicated by participants as triggers for MW 
episodes with that observed after emotional cue-words appearing onscreen after 
participants resumed the task following a self-interruption. 
In the present study, we also examined whether and how pupil dilation associated 
with MW was modulated by some characteristics of MW, such as its emotional 
valence and its cue-dependent/independent nature. To this aim, we compared the pupil 
size associated with MW episodes rated as emotional (either negative or positive) with 
that associated with MW episodes rated as neutral. The results of this comparison may 
contribute to further clarify the nature of the mechanisms underlying the pupil dilation 
observed during MW compared to on-task report, that is whether this dilation reflects 
only an increased cognitive load associated with MW or also an increased emotional 
load associated with this phenomenon.  
We also examined, for exploratory purposes, whether reports of self-generated 
MW and MW triggered by external cues were associated with a different pupil 
diameter.  
Finally, as we have already mentioned above, the use of the self-caught procedure 
also allows to collect latency data, that is to calculate the time-interval between the 
presentation of the trigger and the MW report. This interval reflects the time needed 
for the arising of thoughts and the awareness of them. Here, we analysed these data to 
have a further insight on this temporal dimension of MW and we also examined 
whether and how the latency data might be affected by some phenomenological 
properties of MW episodes (i.e., temporal focus, specificity, emotional valence). 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Florence (16 
females, age range 19-32 years, M = 21.61 years, SD = 3.06 years) volunteered to 
participate in the study. All participants were Italian native speakers, they had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision, and they were screened for depressive symptoms (Beck 
Depression Inventory-II, Beck et al., 1996; Italian adaptation in Ghisi et al., 2006).  
The experimental protocol is in line with the declaration of Helsinki and with the 
regulations of the University of Florence that hosted the study. 
 
4.2.2 Apparatus  
The apparatus was the same as the one used in Study 2 (see Chapter 3 and Figure 
3.1). 
Task stimuli were generated with the PsychoPhysics Toolbox routines for 
MATLAB r2010a (The MathWorks) and presented on a LCD colour monitor (Asus 
MX239H, 51 x 28 cm, resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels, refresh rate of 60 Hz), driven 
by a Macbook Pro Retina (OS X Yosemite, 10.10.5). All stimuli were shown in white 
(55 cd/m2) against a black background (0.05 cd/m2). 
Participants sat in front of the monitor screen at 57 cm viewing distance, with 
their heads stabilised by chin rest. Two-dimensional eye position and pupil diameter 
were recorded binocularly with a CRS LiveTrack system (Cambridge Research 
Systems) at 30 Hz, using an infrared camera mounted below the screen. Pupil diameter 
measures were transformed from pixels to millimetres after calibrating the tracker with 
an artificial 4 mm pupil, positioned at the approximate location of the participants’ left 
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eye. Gaze position data were linearized with a standard 9-point calibration, run prior 
to each session. 
 
4.2.3 Materials 
Vigilance task 
Participants performed a modified version of the computer-based vigilance task 
developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) (see Study 1 and 2). The task 
consisted of 1020 trials, presented in a fixed order, each remaining on the screen for 2 
sec. A white fixation point (0.2 deg diameter) was presented in the centre of the screen 
for each trial. In each trial, an image was shown depicting either a pattern of white 
horizontal (non-target stimuli) or white vertical (target stimuli) lines (4.1 x 0.2 deg) on 
a black background. Target stimuli appeared on 30 trials (~3% of all trials) and they 
were presented pseudo-randomly, with a minimum of 26 and a maximum of 40 trials 
between each target stimulus. In addition to the lines, a white cue-word (e.g., “jet lag”, 
“long hair”; 0.88 deg height) was also shown under the fixation point in 192 trials 
(18.8% of all trials) (see Figure 4.1 for an example of the experimental trials). These 
word-phrases were selected from the pool of word-phrases developed by Schlagman 
and Kvavilashvili (2008) and adapted to the Italian sample (Vannucci et al., 2015; see 
also Chapter 2 of the present work). Equal numbers of positive (n = 64), negative (n = 
64) and neutral (n = 64) cue-words were included. 
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Figure 4.1. Schematic of the experimental task. Horizontal lines: non-target stimuli; 
vertical lines: target stimuli to be detected by pressing a button. 
 
 
Thought questionnaire 
After completing the vigilance task, participants were asked to indicate some 
details of their reported mental contents on a questionnaire. For each content, they 
were asked to indicate: (i) the temporal focus, distinguishing among “past”, “present”, 
“future”, and “atemporal”, (ii) whether it was general or specific, (iii) the emotional 
valence of the thought on a 7-point scale (-3 = very unpleasant; 0 = neutral; +3 = very 
pleasant). 
Participants received instructions on how to distinguish the different temporal 
focus categories. Specifically, as in Study 1 (see Chapter 2), they were told that an 
“atemporal” mental content would refer to any thought with no specific temporal 
orientation (i.e., “I am a very anxious person”; “I like very much eating pizza”), a 
“present” mental content would refer to any thought related to something occurring 
either here and now (i.e., “I miss my dog, that is now with my boyfriend”) or in the 
current period of life (i.e., “I don’t get along with my mother in this period”), a “past” 
mental content would refer to any thought related to something occurred prior to begin 
the task (more or less remote), and a “future” mental content would refer to any thought 
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related to something occurring after the end of the task (more or less distant in the 
future). 
Participants were also asked to rate on a 7-point scale their overall level of 
concentration (1 = not at all concentrated; 7 = fully concentrated) and boredom (1 = 
not at all; 7 = very bored) experienced during the vigilance task. 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After being welcomed into the laboratory, 
participants were briefly introduced to the research project and eye-tracking recording, 
being informed that they would take part in a study on concentration and its correlates, 
and signed a consent form. Afterwards, they received the instructions for the vigilance 
task. It was explained that they had to detect target stimuli (vertical lines) in a stream 
of non-target stimuli (horizontal lines), by pressing the space-bar whenever a target 
was detected. Moreover, they were told that they would also see cue-words in some of 
the trials and that they were not supposed to do anything with these task-irrelevant 
cue-words. As a cover story, it was explained that the condition in which they were 
participating was looking at how people could keep their concentration on the lines 
and that participants in another condition would have to concentrate on the cue-words. 
This second condition did not really exist. Next, participants were informed that the 
task was quite monotonous and that task-unrelated mental contents (e.g., thoughts, 
plans, considerations, past events, images, etc.) could pop into their mind 
spontaneously throughout the task. In the event that something came to their mind, 
they should press a button on the keyboard (corresponding to the letter L, that was 
made clearly noticeable by attaching a white sticker on it) to interrupt the task. After 
pressing the L button, participants should give orally a short description of the mental 
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content and indicate whether it was triggered by internal thoughts, an element in the 
environment, a cue-word on the screen (if so, they had to specify the word) or there 
was no trigger. These responses were recorded by the experimenter. If the mental 
content was private and intimate, participants could label it as “personal” and 
eventually provide only one relevant word instead of reporting a short description. 
Finally, they were also requested to focus on the fixation spot for the whole duration 
of the task. 
After the instructions, participants were given a 20-trials practice of the vigilance 
task in which they were requested to behave as it was the experimental session and to 
stop the presentation if they had any task-unrelated thoughts. 
When the vigilance task was over, participants were presented with the short 
descriptions of their mental contents and asked to report some details about these 
thoughts on a questionnaire (see Thought questionnaire in the Materials section), and 
indicate their level of concentration and boredom experienced during the task. Finally, 
participants were asked whether they had speculated about the actual aims of the study 
(if so, what they had thought) during the task and then they were debriefed and 
dismissed. The total session lasted approximately 105-120 min. 
 
4.2.5 Analyses of pupillometry data 
All the analyses were carried out on 24 out of 28 participants4. Before performing 
all the analyses (including those on pupillary data), all the mental contents reported by 
participants were read by two independent judges and classified into distinct 
                                                             
4 Four participants were excluded due to non-compliance with task instructions. Thus, the 
sample used for analyses included 24 participants (14 females, age range 19-32 years, M = 
21.50 years, SD = 3.26 years). 
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categories. As in Study 1 and Study 2 (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), the coding was 
based on the categories used in other studies (e.g., Plimpton et al., 2015; Unsworth & 
Robison, 2016). The mental contents could be classified as either task-related 
interferences (TRIs) or task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). TUTs were next classified as 
either MW reports or external distraction (ED) reports. As explained in Study 1 and 
Study 2, TRIs comprised reports whose content was related to any task features or to 
the current performance on the task, whereas TUTs included no references to the task 
at hand and comprised both ED and MW episodes. TUTs were classified as EDs when 
the participant’s attention was unrelated to the task at hand and focused on stimuli in 
the current situation (either exteroceptive or interoceptive perceptions, such as bodily 
sensations), whereas they were coded as MW episodes when the participant’s attention 
was unrelated to the task at hand and decoupled from the external environment. These 
thoughts could be triggered by internal or external stimuli. For both categorisations 
(TRIs vs. TUTs, and MW vs. EDs), Kappa was computed as inter-rater reliability 
between the coders and the inter-rater agreement resulted to be very good (Kappa = 
0.96, SE = 0.03 and Kappa = 0.99, SE = 0.01, respectively). Minor disagreements were 
solved by discussion. 
Next, an off-line analysis examined the eye-tracking output in order to exclude 
time-points with unrealistic pupil-size recordings (i.e., values outside the 90th 
percentile of each 2 sec. long trial) and interpolated the remaining time-points at 20Hz. 
In order to perform our main pupillometry analyses, trials were selected based on 
the specific reports given by each participant. After performing the classification of 
contents described above, trials associated with the self-interruptions to report MW 
episodes as well as trials associated with cue-words reported as triggers for MW 
episodes were identified for each participant. 
Chapter 4: Study 3 
 
 
 
! 129 
In the first analysis, we compared the time-course of pupil diameter observed in 
two conditions: after cue-words indicated by participants as triggers for MW episodes, 
and after emotional cue-words appearing onscreen after participants resumed the task 
following a self-interruption. In order to perform the analyses on the pupillometry data, 
trials were sorted based on their timing relative to a cue-word coded as “trigger” or 
“post-report” (i.e., 0, 1, 2 trials after the cue-word, where the trial 0 was the trial 
including the cue-word). 
In the second analysis, we examined differences between emotional and neutral 
MW episodes, comparing the time-course of pupil diameter observed in two 
conditions: after cue-words indicated as triggers for positive or negative (i.e., 
emotional) MW episodes, and after cue-words indicated as triggers for neutral MW 
episodes. In order to perform the analyses on the pupillometry data, trials were sorted 
based on their timing relative to a cue-word coded as “trigger” (i.e., 0, 1, 2 trials after 
the cue-word, where the trial 0 was the trial including the cue-word). 
In the third analysis, we further examined differences between emotional and 
neutral MW episodes, comparing the pupil diameter observed in the two following 
conditions: in the last trial preceding reports of positive or negative (i.e., emotional) 
MW episodes, and in the last trial preceding reports of neutral MW episodes. 
Finally, in the fourth analysis, we examined differences between cue-dependent 
(triggered by cue-words) and cue-independent (triggered by internal thoughts or by no 
trigger) MW episodes, comparing the pupil diameter observed in two conditions: in 
the last trial preceding reports of cue-dependent MW episodes, and in the last trial 
preceding reports of cue-independent MW episodes. 
Given the considerable sample size variability across participants, statistical 
analyses relied on a linear-mixed model approach. Individual trials from all 
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participants were compared with a model comprising both the effect of experimental 
variables (“fixed effects”) and the variability across participants (“random effects”). 
Random effects were coded by allowing subject-by-subject variations of the intercept 
of the model. In all cases, the dependent variable was the “baseline corrected pupil 
diameter”, which we obtained by averaging pupil diameter in a pre-specified temporal 
window of each trial, and subtracting the average pupil diameter in a “baseline” 
temporal window. Please refer to the results section for specific definitions of the 
temporal windows for averaging and baseline-subtractions. 
We used standard MATLAB functions provided with the Statistics and Machine 
Learning Toolbox (R2015b, The MathWorks). Specifically, the function “fitlme(data, 
model)” fit the linear-mixed model to the data, yielding an object “lme” with 
associated method “ANOVA” that returns F statistics and P values for each of the 
fixed effect terms and “CoefTest” for post-hoc comparisons. 
 
4.3 Results 
Performance on the vigilance task 
Performance on the vigilance task was near-perfect for all participants. Out of 30 
targets, there were 0.46 (SD = 0.66) misses and 0.17 (SD = 0.38) false alarms. The 
mean reaction time associated with correct detections was 767.13 msec. (SD = 124.42 
msec.). 
The mean level of concentration experienced during the task was 4.92 (SD = 1.06) 
and the mean level of boredom was 3.04 (SD = 1.57). 
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Type and amount of mental contents reported 
Participants reported a total of 400 mental contents (M = 16.67, SD = 16.83, range 
1-63). Out of the all mental contents, 28 reports (7%) were classed as TRI reports (M 
= 1.17, SD = 1.58, range 0-6), and 372 reports (93%) were classed as TUT reports (M 
= 15.50, SD = 16.47, range 1-60). Out of the all TUTs, 44 reports (11.83%) were 
classed as ED reports (M = 1.83, SD = 2.20, range 0-7) and 328 reports (88.17%) were 
classed as MW reports (M = 13.67, SD = 14.89, range 0-53) (see Table 4.1 for a 
summary of descriptive data). 
 
Variable M SD range 
Task-related interferences (TRIs) 1.17 1.58 0-6 
    
Task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) 15.50 16.47 1-60 
Mind-wandering (MW) 13.67 14.89 0-53 
External distraction (ED) 1.83 2.20 0-7 
 
Table 4.1. Means, standard deviations and ranges of thoughts reported. 
 
Out of the 328 MW episodes, 225 reports (68.60%) were reported by participants 
as triggered by a specific cue-word shown on the screen (M = 9.38, SD = 10.93, range 
0-42), 13 reports (3.96%) by internal thoughts (M = 0.54, SD = 1.44, range 0-7), 15 
reports (4.57%) by environmental triggers (M = 0.63, SD = 1.50, range 0-7), and 59 
reports (17.99%) by no trigger (M = 2.46, SD = 2.54, range 0-10). The remaining 16 
MW episodes were indicated by participants as elicited by multiple cue-words (i.e., 
more than one specific cue-word; n = 6), by unknown cue-word(s) (i.e., participants 
reported that they did not remember which cue-word triggered the MW episode; n = 
6), or by multiple triggers (e.g., participants reported that their thoughts were elicited 
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by both a cue-word presented onscreen and a sound occurring outside the room at the 
same time; n = 4). 
Finally, out of the all MW episodes triggered by the cue-words, 60 reports 
(26.67%) were triggered by neutral cue-words (M = 2.50, SD = 3.36, range 0-11), 79 
reports (35.11%) were triggered by positive cue-words (M = 3.29, SD = 4.10, range 0-
12), and 86 reports (38.22%) were triggered by negative cue-words (M = 3.58, SD = 
4.64, range 0-22). Thus, the vast majority (73.33%) of these reports were elicited by 
cue-words with emotional valence. 
 
Latency data for MW 
For each MW episode indicated by participants as triggered by a cue-word, we 
computed the time-interval occurring between the presentation of the cue-word and 
the moment that participants pressed the button to report a mental content triggered by 
that cue-word. As in Study 1 (see Chapter 2), we referred to these time-intervals as to 
latency data for MW episodes. Latency data were calculated by adding the time for the 
present (pressed on) trial, to the times for all the trials back, up to the trial that 
presented the cue-word that was reported by the participant as the trigger of the mental 
content (see also studies on involuntary memories for a similar procedure to obtain 
retrieval times; e.g., Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci et al., 2015). 
We checked for possible outliers, by transforming each data point into 
standardised data point and identified data greater than 2.5 in absolute value as outliers. 
Out of the 225 MW episodes triggered by the cue-words, 5 episodes were identified 
as outlier because of the very high time-interval between the trigger and the report of 
MW. 
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The mean latency of the remaining MW episodes was 7291.11 msec. (SD = 
5807.83 msec., range 1383.99-32480.72 msec.). Since each trial lasted 2 sec., the mean 
number of trials being between a trigger and the report of a MW episode triggered by 
that trigger was 3.65 trials (SD = 2.90 trials, range 0-16.24 trials). Out of the 220 MW 
episodes, 91 episodes (41.36%) were reported after a latency lower than or equal to 5 
sec., 76 episodes (34.55%) were reported after a latency greater than 5 sec. and lower 
than or equal to 10 sec., 35 episodes (15.91%) were reported after a latency greater 
than 10 sec. and lower than or equal to 15 sec., and 18 episodes (8.18%) were reported 
after a latency greater than 15 sec. 
In Study 1 (see Chapter 2), we found no significant effect of the temporal focus 
of thoughts on the latency data. Here we verified whether the same effect was 
replicated. In addition, we analysed whether other characteristics of MW (i.e., 
specificity and emotional valence) assessed in the present study affected the latency 
data. We used a multilevel (or hierarchical) dataset in which the unit of analysis was a 
single MW episode. The use of this strategy of analysis not only allowed us to take 
into account the non-independence of the units of analysis, but also to accommodate 
for unequal numbers of data points within participants (Jahng et al., 2008). With regard 
to the valence of thoughts, participants rated each episode on a 7-point Likert scale (-
3 = very negative; 0 = neutral; +3 = very positive). We classified each MW episode as 
negative, positive or neutral on the basis of the score given by participants (i.e., all 
MW episodes that obtained a score ranging from -3 to -1 were classed as “negative”; 
all the MW episodes that obtained a score ranging from +1 to +3 were classed as 
“positive”; all the MW episodes that obtained a score equal to 0 were classed as 
“neutral”). We specified random-intercept multilevel models to test for associations of 
the factors Temporal focus (past, present, future, atemporal), specificity (general, 
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specific), valence (negative, neutral, positive) with the latency data (measured in 
msec.), which was considered as the dependent variable. Given that the latency data 
were substantially skewed and kurtotic, we conducted the analysis after log 
transformation of the data. 
No significant difference between temporal focuses was found, F(3,201.24) = 
0.33, p = 0.806 (past Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.83, 95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 
3.67-3.98; present Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.77, 95% CI: 3.57-3.96; future 
Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.82, 95% CI: 3.65-3.99; atemporal Estimated Marginal 
Mean = 3.80, 95% CI: 3.64-3.95). Moreover, there was no significant difference 
between episodes associated with different emotional valences, F(2,202.64) = 0.41, p 
= 0.665 (neutral Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.79, 95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 
3.63-3.95; negative Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.82, 95% CI: 3.67-3.97; positive 
Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.82, 95% CI: 3.67-3.98), and no significant difference 
between specific and general episodes, F(1,205.13) = 3.47, p = 0.064 (specific 
Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.84, 95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 3.69-3.98; general 
Estimated Marginal Mean = 3.78, 95% CI: 3.63-3.93). 
 
Characteristics of MW episodes reported 
Out of the all MW episodes, 133 episodes (40.55%) were classed as past-oriented 
thoughts, 21 episodes (6.40%) were classed as present-oriented thoughts, 52 episodes 
(15.85%) were classed as future-oriented thoughts, and 122 episodes (37.20%) were 
classed as atemporal thoughts. Moreover, out of the all MW episodes, 166 episodes 
(50.61%) were classed as specific, whereas 162 episodes (49.39%) were classed as 
general. Finally, 92 episodes (28.05%) were rated as neutral, 117 episodes (35.67%) 
were rated as negative, and 119 (36.28%) were rated as positive. 
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We explored whether there was an association between the characteristics of MW 
episodes and the type of occurrence of these episodes (i.e., being triggered by cue-
words, that is “cue-dependent”, and being triggered by internal thoughts or no cue, that 
is “cue-independent”). 
Out of the 225 cue-dependent MW episodes, 103 episodes (45.78%) were past-
oriented, 13 episodes (5.78%) were present-oriented, 23 episodes (10.22%) were 
future-oriented, and 86 episodes (38.22%) were atemporal. Moreover, 108 episodes 
(48%) were specific, whereas 117 (52%) were general. Fifty-four episodes (24%) were 
rated as neutral, 87 episodes (38.67%) were rated as negative, and 84 episodes 
(37.33%) were rated as positive. 
Out of the 72 cue-independent MW episodes, 21 episodes (29.17%) were past-
oriented, 7 episodes (9.72%) were present-oriented, 24 episodes (33.33%) were future-
oriented, and 20 episodes (27.78%) were atemporal. Moreover, 47 episodes (65.28%) 
were specific, whereas 25 episodes (34.72%) were general. Twenty-six episodes 
(36.11%) were rated as neutral, 19 episodes (26.39%) were rated as negative, and 27 
episodes (37.50%) were rated as positive. 
Three chi-square tests of independence were performed to examine the 
relationship between type of MW (cue-dependent vs. cue-independent) and temporal 
focus, specificity and valence of MW episodes. The association between type of MW 
and temporal focus was significant, X2(3, N = 297) = 24.94, p = 0.000016. The 
association between type of MW and the specificity of MW was also significant, X2(1, 
N = 297) = 6.53, p = 0.011. The relationship between type of MW and emotional 
valence of MW was not significant, X2(2, N = 297) = 5.27, p = 0.072. 
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Analyses of pupillometry data 
We conducted four analyses on the pupillary data: (i) the first analysis was 
conducted on the time-course of pupil diameter over two trials after cue-words 
identified as triggering or not triggering MW episodes; (ii) the second analysis was 
conducted on the time-course of pupil diameter over two trials after cue-words 
triggering emotional (either positive or negative) MW episodes or triggering neutral 
MW episodes; (iii) the third analysis was conducted on the pupil diameter before 
reports of emotional MW episodes or before reports of neutral MW episodes; (iv) the 
fourth analysis was conducted on the pupil diameter before reports of cue-dependent 
MW episodes (i.e., MW episodes triggered by cue-words) or before reports of cue-
independent MW episodes (i.e., MW episodes triggered by internal thoughts or no 
trigger). 
These analyses are reported below. 
 
First analysis: time-course of MW (triggered by cue-words). We compared the 
pupil diameter over two trials after a cue-word identified as triggering or not triggering 
a MW episode. Cue-words identified as triggering a MW episode were the cue-words 
that were reported by participants as triggers for MW reports. Cue-words identified as 
not triggering a MW episode were emotional cue-words that were presented just after 
a self-interruption. Since the majority of cued MW reports were triggered by emotional 
cue-words, and pupil dilation is affected by emotional load, we used as comparison 
condition emotional cue-words reported just after self-interruptions (not triggering 
cue-words, but with similar emotional valence) 
We analysed the time-course of pupil diameter over two trials after the cue-word 
and we only considered cue-words that were followed by at least two trials with 
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successful pupil recording. We used as “baseline” pupil diameter the average diameter 
in the last 200 msec. of the trial where the cue-word was presented. This approach left 
68 MW trigger cue-words, and 287 emotional cue-words after self-interruptions. 
For the statistical analysis of the traces, we summarized time-courses by taking 
the average pupil diameter over the second half of each trial. These values were entered 
in a Linear-Mixed Model analysis, with two fixed-factors: type of cue-word (MW 
trigger, cue-word after self-interruption) and time from the cue (coded as number of 
trials: 1st trial, 2nd trial), plus the random effect of subjects modelled as variable 
intercept of the model. This revealed a significant interaction between the two fixed 
factors (F(1,966) = 17.56464, p = 0.00003). Post-hoc test showed that the type of cue-
word had a significant effect over the two trials that followed the cue-word, where 
there was a significant difference between pupil diameter following MW triggers and 
emotional cue-words after reports (1st trial following the cue-word: F(1,319) = 
7.69446, p = 0.00587; 2nd trial: F(1,323) = 25.17870, p < 0.00001) (see Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Time-course of pupil diameter after cue-word presentation. The pupil traces 
are aligned to the average pupil diameter during the last 200 msec. of the cue-word 
presentation (i.e., the cue-word presentation is from -2 to 0 sec.). Red lines: traces associated 
with cue-words reported as triggers for MW episodes; sky-blue lines: traces associated with 
emotional cue-words presented just after self-interruptions. Thick lines: average across all 
trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM analysis (average 
over the second half of each trial). 
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Second analysis: pupil diameter after triggers of emotional vs. neutral MW. We 
also compared the time-course of pupil diameter over two trials after a cue-word 
identified as triggering emotional (either positive and negative) MW episodes or 
neutral MW episodes. We analysed the time-course of pupil diameter over two trials 
after the cue-word. We only considered cue-words that were followed by at least two 
trials with successful pupil recording. We used as “baseline” pupil diameter the 
average diameter in the first 200 msec. of the trial where the cue-word was presented. 
This approach left 46 emotional MW triggers, and 13 neutral MW triggers. For the 
statistical analysis of the traces, we summarized time-courses by taking the average 
pupil diameter over the second half of each trial. These values were entered in a Linear-
Mixed Model analysis, with two fixed-factors: type of MW (emotional vs. neutral) and 
time from the cue (coded as number of trials: 1st trial, 2nd trial), plus the random effect 
of subjects modelled as variable intercept of the model. This showed neither a 
significant main effect of type of MW (F(1,169) = 0.57062, p = 0.45107), nor a 
significant interaction (F(1,169) = 0.03066, p = 0.86122) (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3. Time-course of pupil diameter after cue-word presentation. The pupil traces 
are aligned to the average pupil diameter during the first 200 msec. of the cue-word 
presentation (i.e., the cue-word presentation is from -2 to 0 sec.). Red lines: traces associated 
with cue-words reported as triggers for neutral MW episodes; sky-blue lines: traces associated 
with cue-words reported as triggers for emotional MW episodes. Thick lines: average across 
all trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM analysis (average 
over the second half of each trial). 
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Third analysis: pupil diameter before reports of emotional vs. neutral MW. Next, 
we compared the pupil diameter in the last trial before self-interruptions where reports 
of emotional MW or neutral MW were given. We considered self-interruptions that 
were preceded by at least three trials without cue-words. By performing this selection 
(i) the last trial immediately before the report was preceded by at least two trials 
without any trigger cue-words and thus these trials did not overlap with the ones 
examined in the previous analysis, (ii) the trial before the report was preceded by at 
least two trials without any triggering or not triggering cue-words that could affect the 
pupil diameter. Also, we only considered self-interruptions that were preceded by at 
least one trial with successful pupil recording. This left 59 emotional MW reports, and 
17 neutral MW reports. For the statistical analysis of the traces, we aligned traces to 
the last 200 msec. of each trial preceding reports, and assessed pupil diameter over the 
second half of the trial. These values were entered in a Linear-Mixed Model analysis, 
with the fixed-factor type of report (emotional MW and neutral MW), plus the random 
effect of subjects modelled as variable intercept of the model. The Linear-Mixed 
Model analysis revealed no significant effect of type of report (F(1,136) = 0.45770, p 
= 0.49985) (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4. Pupil diameter before self-interruptions preceded by at least three trials 
without cue-words. The pupil traces are aligned to the last 200 msec. of the trial. Red lines: 
neutral MW reports; sky-blue lines: emotional MW reports. Thick lines: average across all 
trials; thin lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM analysis (average 
over the second half of each trial). 
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Since this approach left few pupil traces for analyses, we conducted a secondary 
analysis by considering self-interruptions that were preceded by at least two trials 
without cue-words. This left 107 emotional MW reports, and 37 neutral MW reports. 
The Linear-Mixed Model analysis, with the fixed-factor type of report (emotional 
MW and neutral MW) and the random effect of subjects modelled as variable intercept 
of the model, revealed no significant effect of type of report (F(1,256) = 0.61901, p = 
0.43214) again (see Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5. Pupil diameter before self-interruptions preceded by at least two trials without 
cue-words. The pupil traces are aligned to the last 200 msec. of the trial. Red lines: neutral 
MW reports; sky-blue lines: emotional MW reports. Thick lines: average across all trials; thin 
lines: standard error; circles: average values entered the LMM analysis (average over the 
second half of each trial). 
Fourth analysis: pupil diameter before reports of cue-dependent vs. cue-
independent MW.  Finally, we compared the pupil diameter in the last trial before self-
interruptions where reports of cue-dependent MW or cue-independent MW were 
given.  
We considered self-interruptions that were preceded by at least three trials without 
cue-words and we only considered self-interruptions that were preceded by at least one 
trial with successful pupil recording. This left 36 cue-dependent MW reports, and 36 
cue-independent MW reports. 
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For the statistical analysis of the traces, we aligned traces to the last 200 msec. of 
each trial preceding reports, and assessed pupil diameter over the second half of the 
trial. These values were entered in a Linear-Mixed Model analysis, with the fixed-
factor type of MW (cue-dependent MW vs. cue-independent MW), plus the random 
effect of subjects modelled as variable intercept of the model. The Linear-Mixed 
Model analysis revealed no significant effect of type of report (F(1,132) = 0.79770, p 
= 0.37341) (see Figure 4.6). 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Pupil diameter before self-interruptions. The pupil traces are aligned to the 
last 200 msec. of the trial. Red lines: cue-dependent MW reports; sky-blue lines: cue-
independent MW reports. Thick lines: average across all trials; thin lines: standard error; 
circles: average values entered the LMM analysis (average over the second half of each trial). 
 
4.4 Discussion 
In the present study, participants performed the vigilance task with verbal cues 
while their pupils were continuously recorded during the task. To collect MW 
experiences, participants were asked to stop the presentation each time they realised 
that they were thinking anything else than the task (self-caught procedure), and to 
indicate their thoughts as well as the trigger (if any) of them. With this procedure, we 
replicated the finding of increased pupil dilation following MW triggers (see Study 2) 
by using a different sampling method and, in addition, showed that this dilation 
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appeared not to be modulated by the emotional content of MW episodes. We also 
examined, for exploratory purposes, whether reports of self-generated MW and 
externally-triggered MW were associated with a different pupil diameter and we found 
no significant difference. 
Moreover, following Study 1, we obtained information about the latency of MW 
episodes (i.e., the time-interval occurring between the presentation of triggering cue-
words and the self-reports of MW episodes) and we mainly found a mean latency of 
approximately 7 sec. as well as a high percentage of MW (41.36%) reported after a 
time less than or equal to 5 seconds from the triggering cue-words. In the following 
sections, all the physiological and behavioural findings are discussed. 
First, by analysing the pupil measures collected throughout the task and 
comparing the pupil diameter recorded after MW triggers and after the first 
(emotional) cue-words presented onscreen when participants resumed the task after 
self-reports, we found higher pupil dilation following MW triggers over two trials. 
This finding replicated our previous results (see Study 2) by using a different thought-
sampling method, that is a self-caught method instead of a probe-caught method. In 
Study 2, by using a probe-caught method, we presumably collected both aware and 
unaware MW episodes. However, since studies reported differences between the two 
types of MW, such as different level of performance (e.g., Smallwood, McSpadden, et 
al., 2007) and brain recruitment (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009), we aimed to extend our 
previous findings by exploring whether they were replicated in the sub-sample of 
aware MW episodes. Thus, contrary to Study 2, here the self-caught method allowed 
us to collect only aware MW episodes and to specifically show that the finding of 
increased pupil dilation following MW triggers was replicated in the sub-sample of 
aware MW episodes. In addition, after selecting only MW triggered by the cue-words, 
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we studied the pupil size over two trials following cue-words triggering MW episodes 
rated as emotional (i.e., with a negative or positive content) and MW episodes rated as 
neutral, and we found that emotional MW episodes were not associated with a 
significantly different pupil diameter than neutral MW episodes. Moreover, by 
including the total amount of MW collected (i.e., not only MW triggered by the cue-
words) and comparing the pupil size recorded before reports of emotional MW and 
neutral MW, we again found no significant difference between emotional and neutral 
MW episodes. We carried out these comparisons in order to verify whether the pupil 
dilation associated with MW reflected only an increased cognitive load or also an 
increased emotional load. What we found makes us hypothesize that the increase in 
pupil dilation associated with MW is mostly related to the cognitive load imposed by 
a mental process (e.g., Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). 
Future studies should better investigate whether the pupil dilation might depend 
on different cognitive dimensions of thoughts (e.g., vividness, or amount of 
components such as people, objects, actions, etc.). 
Here, we also explored whether reports of self-generated MW (i.e., MW episodes 
triggered by internal thoughts or no triggers) and MW triggered by external cue-words 
were associated with a different pupil diameter prior to self-reports. There is increasing 
interest in the possible distinction between self-generated MW and cue-dependent 
MW and previous evidence suggest that these two sub-types of MW episodes could 
be somehow different, at least with regard to the temporal focus of thoughts (e.g., 
Maillet & Schacter, 2016; see also Study 1). Moreover, self-generated MW might be 
more related to current concerns than MW triggered by the cue-words, whereas the 
second one might need more cognitive processes before coming into awareness (i.e., 
processing of cue-words that activate the thought). In particular, this last difference 
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could be reflected in the physiological measures. However, from this comparison, we 
did not find any significant difference associated with the reports of cue-dependent 
and cue-independent MW. It has to be noted, however, that we could not know the 
beginning of self-generated MW episodes and the analysis of the pupil diameter in the 
last trial before the report did not guarantee that all the self-generated MW episodes 
were already started. This concern could be attenuated by the fact the mean latency 
recorded for the MW episodes triggered by the cue-words was much longer than this 
duration, even though we cannot be sure that it could be generalised to all the MW 
episodes. Further studies should better investigate possible differences between self-
generated (or cue-independent) and triggered (or cue-dependent) MW episodes. 
Second, by collecting latency data for MW episodes, we found consistent data 
with Study 1 (see Chapter 2). The latency of a MW episode could be considered as the 
time needed for the initial generation of the thought (arising/forming of thoughts) and 
for becoming aware of it in order to report it. The high percentage of MW episodes 
reported after a time less than or equal to 5 seconds means that certain MW episodes 
are indeed reported really quickly, at least in this type of task, and it could depend on 
the short time needed for the formation/construction of the thought, or on the short 
time needed for being aware of the mental experience, or both. There are some 
differences between the procedure employed here and the one used in Study 1 (see 
Chapter 2), such as the duration of each trial (2 sec. vs. 1.5 sec., respectively), target 
frequency (~3% vs. 2%), cue-words frequency (18.8% vs. 18%), colour of the stimuli 
(white stimuli on a black background vs. black stimuli on a white background), 
position of the cue-words (slightly under a centred fixation spot vs. in the centre of the 
screen without fixation spot), the time length of the whole vigilance task (almost 34 
min. split in two halves vs. 15 min.), and different cue-words (e.g., emotional and 
Chapter 4: Study 3 
 
 
 
! 145 
neutral vs. only neutral and atemporal). Despite these differences, both studies 
employed a similar monotonous vigilance task and found similar latency data, even 
though the times seem a bit longer in this study compared to the other. 
Consistent with Study 1, we also found a certain variability in latency data 
between episodes again. We also analysed whether different latencies were associated 
with different characteristics of MW episodes (i.e., temporal focus, specificity, 
emotional valence). Only few characteristics were assessed due to the specific 
procedure employed, and we did not find any significant differences (see also Study 1 
for the temporal focus). The results on the temporal focus are in line with the ones of 
Study 1 as well as with the findings reported by Cole et al. (2016) on spontaneous past 
and future thinking, even though they used partially different instructions in their 
study. They presented two groups of participants with a similar vigilance task but 
explicitly instructed a group to report only any involuntary future thoughts and the 
second group to report only any involuntary past representations. They did not find 
any significant difference with regard to the latency data between future and past 
episodes, although they found shorter times than those reported in our studies. 
Apart from the comparison between different sub-types of MW episodes, as 
suggested by Klinger (1978), “there do seem to be clear individual differences in 
estimated duration of thought segments” and it is possible that it represents “at least 
in part real differences among individuals in duration of thought segments” (p. 248). 
Thus, further studies might collect trait-level measures and examine whether and how 
different participants’ characteristics might contribute to the variability of MW 
latency. 
 Maybe further investigations might also re-include the self-estimates of MW 
duration (see Grandchamp et al., 2014; Klinger, 1978) in our vigilance task while 
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recording the time-interval occurring between a MW trigger and the self-report, and 
compare the subjective estimates (with confidence ratings) with the latency 
measurement. This approach could help to understand whether there is correspondence 
between the two measurements or specific underestimation/overestimation of 
subjective latency. Any underestimation/overestimation of subjective latency could be 
related to any MW or participants’ characteristics as well. 
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Chapter 5 
General discussion 
 
 
5.1 Summary of the main findings 
The empirical studies reported in the present work focused on the cognitive 
phenomenon of MW. Although the investigation of MW has obtained increasing 
interest by neurocognitive scientists over the last years, some key features of MW are 
still overlooked. Particularly, crucial questions concern the dynamics of MW 
processes: recent research suggests that MW should not be studied merely from a 
content-based perspective but should be also considered as a highly dynamic process, 
and it will be clearly understood only once the dynamic of thoughts are considered 
(Christoff et al., 2016; Girn et al., 2017). In order to further advance the investigation 
into the dynamics of MW, we need to distinguish two basic elements of MW, namely 
the moment of ignition (i.e., the onset) and the maintenance of thoughts over time 
(Smallwood, 2013). Our studies have been developed following this approach and 
have hopefully provided new contributions to this line of research. 
Below, we will summarise the main findings that emerged from the studies and 
will next propose how these findings might be further extended in the future.  
First, we found that the exposure to external and meaningful (i.e., verbal cues) 
task-irrelevant stimuli increased the amount of MW and steered its temporal 
orientation towards the past compared to a condition of no exposure to cues (Study 1; 
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see Chapter 2). The increase in the number of MW episodes suggests that the nature 
of MW is not necessarily stimulus-independent (Antrobus et al., 1966) or self-
generated (e.g., Smallwood, 2013), but that it might possibly be cue-dependent, in 
terms of the cues that trigger MW in the first place. This is consistent with the 
suggestion proposed by Plimpton and colleagues (2015), namely that MW episodes 
might be dependent from external stimuli at the beginning and become stimulus-
independent only once thoughts are set in motion. In Study 1 (see Chapter 2), we also 
analysed the number of MW episodes triggered by internal thoughts, by other 
environmental stimuli and by no trigger in the “Verbal cues” group and “No cues” 
group, and we found no significant differences between the two groups. This confirms 
that the increase in the amount of MW when exposed to verbal cues actually depends 
on the additional number of MW episodes elicited by the verbal cues. Moreover, we 
found a considerable number of MW episodes reported as triggered by external stimuli 
(i.e., verbal cues) by using both a self-caught (60.09% in Study 1; 68.60% in Study 3) 
and a probe-caught (52.74% in Study 2) method. 
Second, we extended further these results by associating self-report measures 
with physiological measures (Study 2 and Study 3). Specifically, we found that the 
verbal cues indicated as triggers for MW episodes were followed over two trials by a 
higher pupil dilation compared with similar verbal cues that did not act as triggers for 
MW episodes. We found this dilation associated with MW onset by using both a probe-
caught (Study 2) and a self-caught (Study 3) method. In Study 2, with the use of the 
probe-caught method, we possibly analysed both aware and unaware MW episodes, 
whereas by using the self-caught method in Study 3, we could especially focus only 
on aware MW episodes and thus replicate our previous result in this specific sub-
sample of MW episodes. Since the pupil dilation is an index of emotional and cognitive 
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load (Hess & Polt, 1960; Partala & Surakka, 2003), the increase in pupil diameter 
associated with MW might depend on the emotional and cognitive load imposed by 
the mental process. By comparing emotional MW episodes and neutral MW episodes, 
we also showed that this increase in pupil diameter appeared not to be primarily linked 
to the emotional nature of thoughts (Study 3). 
Third, the use of the vigilance task with task-irrelevant verbal cues allowed not 
only to link MW to preceding triggers but also, when combined with the self-caught 
sampling method (Study 1 and Study 3), to measure the latency of MW episodes (i.e., 
the time-interval occurring between the triggering stimuli and the self-reports of MW 
elicited by those stimuli). We found that these latency times ranged from a few msec. 
to more than 25 sec. This high level of variability was consistently found in two 
studies, with slightly different versions of the vigilance task (see Study 1 and Study 
3). Beside this, in both studies, a high percentage of MW episodes was reported after 
a latency lower than or equal to 5 sec. from the triggering stimuli (i.e., 57.72% in Study 
1; 41.36% in Study 3), and the mean latency was around 6 sec. in Study 1 and around 
7 sec. in Study 3. The latency that we measured might correspond to the time needed 
for constructing the MW episode and for being aware of the mental content in order to 
report it. Our findings suggest that this time could be very different from a MW episode 
to another, even though most of the episodes seem to need only 5 sec. or less. Finally, 
it has to be noted that the mean latency found in our studies seems to be slightly longer 
than the latency reported in previous studies on involuntary mental time travel (Cole 
et al., 2016). Cole and colleagues (2016) used a similar version of our vigilance task, 
even though some differences exist among our and their studies. For example, they 
used partially different instructions, as they explicitly instructed a group of participants 
to report only any involuntary future thoughts and a second group to report only any 
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involuntary past representations. Moreover, another important aspect might be the 
difference in the number of verbal cues presented in the vigilance task. Cole et al. 
(2016) had verbal cues in each slide of the vigilance task, whereas we presented the 
cues only in some images of the task (see Study 1 and Study 3). Thus, one might 
hypothesize that the paucity of verbal cues could possibly promote the absorption with 
one’s thoughts and consequently lengthen the time needed to notice a MW episode 
and report it (i.e., longer latency times; but see Vannucci et al., 2015, for an evidence 
of no effect of the cues frequency on involuntary memories and thoughts). 
 
5.2 Implications for future research on mind-wandering 
The findings presented here open up several new avenues of research in MW. In 
the following, we discuss some lines of research that could benefit from our results 
and extend them further. 
In the first place, we moved further towards investigating the dynamics of MW. 
Indeed, we demonstrated that it is possible to identify the moment of ignition of MW 
and study the maintenance of MW starting from that point. Although Smallwood 
(2013) already proposed that MW experiences are composed of two distinct elements 
(i.e., the onset and the maintenance of thoughts), he stated that the onset of MW could 
be barely isolated from the subsequent stages due to the difficulty in linking MW to 
preceding events. This possibility was likely doubted because MW has been 
considered as a self-generated and stimulus-independent process for a long time. 
However, we showed that MW experiences can be triggered by task-irrelevant external 
cues and thus MW can be actually linked to preceding events in order to identify the 
onset of the process. Moreover, we also showed that the onset of MW and its unfolding 
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over time was accompanied by a physiological index, such as pupil dilation. 
Collectively, these findings contribute to the investigation of the dynamics of thought 
flow. For example, recent neurocognitive research has enrolled experienced 
meditators in order to study the brain areas recruited during the flow of MW states 
since their arising (e.g., Ellamil et al., 2016; Girn et al., 2017). In these studies, 
meditators are asked to press a button when they realise that they were thinking 
something else than the task, and researchers take advantage of the experience of 
meditators in recognising the arising of their thoughts. However, a procedure that 
makes us able to identify the initial stages of MW would be more useful than one based 
on the assumption that people can recognise the arising of their mental contents 
quickly. 
Second, a dimension of MW that needs to be further investigated is the meta-
awareness. Previous studies on MW have shown that people are not always meta-
aware of their thought content (e.g., Schooler et al., 2011). For example, by presenting 
participants with thought-probes that ask about the focus of their attention and whether 
they were aware that they were experiencing thoughts unrelated to the task, it has been 
found that participants reported various levels of meta-awareness, sometimes being 
fully aware of their MW, and at other times reporting that they were not aware of it 
until the thought-probe was presented. Unaware MW has been reported to be different 
compared with aware MW: for example, it has been associated with poorer task 
performance (Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2007, 2008) or greater recruitment of 
brain activity (Christoff et al., 2009).  
Given the differences between aware and unaware MW episodes, one could 
hypothesize that they might be associated with differences in pupil diameter. In our 
studies, we did not explicitly assess meta-awareness of MW, but we examined pupil 
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size associated with MW experiences sampled with two different sampling method: 
the probe-caught procedure (Study 2) and the self-caught procedure (Study 3). The 
probe-caught allowed us to catch both MW with meta-awareness and MW which had 
not been spontaneously identified (i.e., MW without awareness), whereas the self-
caught procedure allowed us to collect only MW with meta-awareness (i.e., 
participants were explicitly instructed to report their thoughts whenever they noticed 
their mind had wandered). In both cases, we found an increase in pupil dilation 
following MW triggers compared to non-triggers. However, future studies might 
extend further these results by assessing meta-awareness with a specific question 
included in thought-probes or by coupling probe-caught and self-caught into the same 
task. 
Third, by using the vigilance task that allows to identify the onset of MW and the 
self-caught procedure, we showed that it is also possible to obtain information about 
the latency of MW without resorting to subjective estimation of the duration of MW 
episodes (Grandchamp et al., 2014; Klinger, 1978). The high levels of intra-individual 
and inter-individual variability in the latency data deserve future investigation. 
Specifically, future studies should investigate whether and how this variability might 
be explained by some characteristics of MW experiences as well as by participants’ 
characteristics.  
In terms of the properties of MW, for example, one might argue that the 
association between triggering cues-MW contents and pressing current concerns (e.g., 
Klinger, 2009, 2013) might be a factor that speeds the formation of MW experiences, 
thereby reducing the latency data. In terms of trait-level individual characteristics, a 
high tendency to be mindful in daily life (as measured with the FFMQ, Baer, Smith, 
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Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) might be associated with a reduced latency of 
MW, with people being faster in noticing and becoming aware of their MW state.  
Finally, the studies reported in this work were conducted in samples of healthy 
young adults. Future research might extend our investigations to other samples of 
special interest, such as elderly people. Studies have consistently indicated that older 
adults report less MW than do young adults both in the laboratory (e.g., Jackson & 
Balota, 2012; Maillet & Schacter, 2016; Seli, Maillet, Smilek, Oakman, & Schacter, 
2017) and in daily-life (Maillet et al., 2018). However, Maillet and Schacter (2016) 
found that during an incidental-encoding task, older adults, despite reporting fewer 
thoughts compared to young adults, reported a reduction in proportion of thoughts 
cued by internal stimuli, but an increase in proportion of thoughts cued by external 
stimuli. These authors suggest that the age-related reductions in MW frequency could 
be due to a wider reduction in the capacity to internally trigger and maintain 
representations (Maillet et al., 2017; Maillet & Schacter, 2016). This could lead elderly 
people to become environment-dependent (Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014). Contrary to 
these findings, very recently, Warden, Plimpton, and Kvavilashvili (2018) found no 
age effects on the frequency of spontaneous thoughts in daily-life. Moreover, they did 
not find a difference in the type of triggers (external, internal or no triggers) that 
elicited thoughts between young and older adults. Combining our behavioural 
paradigm with pupillometry might advance the understanding of the experience of 
MW in elderly people and help clarifying the mechanisms associated with any age-
related changes. 
Another sample of special interest might be patients with vmPFC lesions. The 
vmPFC is part of a sub-system of the DMN, which is the principal brain system 
supporting MW and spontaneous thought processes (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, 
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Huang, et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2016). Bertossi and Ciaramelli (2016) found that 
vmPFC patients reported reduced MW compared to both control patients (i.e., with 
lesions not involving the vmPFC) and healthy controls. Moreover, vmPFC patients 
reported a reduced proportion of future thoughts and a higher proportion of present 
thoughts. Our behavioural paradigm with pupillometry might also be helpful for 
investigations in samples of vmPFC patients in order to further examine these reported 
changes.
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